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INTRODUCTION 
his fifth volume of Readings in European Security is published as the 
world enters its first global economic crisis in 70 years. The sudden 
onset of this defining moment in our history colours the issues we 
deal with in this volume – although the last session of the European 
Security Forum, “Policies of EU, Russia, and US towards the rise of China” 
held on 24 October 2008, already took into account the first consequences of 
the world financial crisis, if not yet of the subsequent economic recession. 
Therefore, in this introduction, an attempt will be made to address the 
issues covered in the corresponding sessions of the ESF in the light of the 
ongoing global crisis. 
The theme “Between Baghdad, Tehran, Riyadh and Jerusalem: Is 
there a way for the greater Middle East”, was dealt with on 18 June 2007. 
The sense of desperation that characterised at least part of the proceedings 
would probably not be fundamentally recast with the benefit of two years’ 
hindsight. No doubt, there has been some good news in Iraq in the course 
of 2008: the isolation of al-Qaida caught between the politically decisive 
alliance of the ‘Sunni Awakening’ with the US forces on the one hand, and 
the military effectiveness of the ‘surge’ on the other hand has led to a 
modicum of order in Iraq. Furthermore, bad news concerning Iran has not 
– or not yet – loomed in the form of the bombing of Iran or the acquisition 
of the ‘bomb’ by Iran. Alas, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process has been 
further set back, notably with the political and ideological fracture of the 
Occupied Territories into two distinct and opposed Palestinian entities. The 
precipitous fall of oil prices – from $147 a barrel in mid-2008 to less than 
$40 a mere six months later – introduces new elements of instability and 
complexity into an equation with all-too-many unknowns. Countries both 
excessively dependent on oil and gas and containing large and young 
populations – such as Iran or Algeria – are in the front line of the oil crash. 
But other countries in the region such as Egypt, Yemen and Jordan will be 
severely hit by the global recession. What remains unchanged is the sense 
of interconnectedness between the various crises of the Middle East, ever 
since a great strategic vacuum was created in Iraq in 2003. 
On 22 October 2007, the ESF discussed the question: “Does Europe 
Need a New Missile Defence System?”. The political, strategic and military 
terms of the debate that took place on that occasion continue to prevail: the 
actual and hypothetical assessment of the evolving ballistic missile threat 
T 
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(notably from Iran); the impact of the projected US anti-missile deployment 
in Poland and the Czech Republic on relations with Russia; the relationship 
between the bilateral plans of the US and NATO’s multilateral needs and 
projects etc. These and other factors remain unchanged. However, the 
invasion of Georgia by Russia in August 2008 has provided substantial 
ammunition to those in Central Europe who see the permanent 
deployment of US systems and the attendant American military personnel 
as a means to materialise and reinforce the American defence guarantee 
vis-à-vis an assertive and muscular Russia. The manner in which Russia’s 
President, Dimitry Medvedev, ‘welcomed’ the election of Barack Obama by 
threatening to deploy ballistic missiles in the Kaliningrad enclave not only 
further increased the Central European quest for even stronger defence 
guarantees; it also made it more difficult for the US to climb down from its 
ABM projects: a brand-new American President of whom all and sundry 
(including his own Vice-President, Mr. Biden) have said that he would be 
tested by the Russians within six months of his inauguration, was not going 
to start his term by appearing to cave in under Russian bluster. It now 
remains to be seen how Russia’s parlous economic and social prospects in 
2009 and 2010 will affect its confrontational stance on this and other issues 
affecting its relations with the West. 
“What is ‘just’ secession? Is Kosovo unique?” were two hot questions 
dealt with on 11 February 2008, some six months before Russia invoked the 
Kosovo case to justify its recognition of Southern Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s 
declarations of independence. The intrinsic difficulties of defining Kosovo’s 
status, the risks entailed and the poor prospects of an independent Kosovo 
come across clearly in the papers and discussions contained in this volume: 
they have hardly changed since. There has been some positive movement, 
in the sense that the EU and Serbia have been converging, a trend that has 
been paradoxically favoured by Russia’s recognition of the Caucasian 
splinter entities: Russia can no longer be considered in Serbia as a reliable 
partner sharing common principles regarding the integrity of the borders of 
the post-Soviet/post-Yugoslav Republics. Serbia’s full membership of the 
EU now appears to be only a matter of time. That is assuming that the 
intra-European strain caused by the world economic crisis won’t freeze the 
EU’s ability to act in a coherent manner. 
The discussion of 26 May 2008 on “What prospects for a normative 
foreign policy in a multipolar world?” was heavily influenced by what 
appeared at the time as the unstoppable rise of China followed by India, 
with both of these powers sharing rather non-European views on the role 
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and content of international norms. Such a process will progressively 
cramp the West’s ability to define and promote norms. But this is not a 
linear evolution. Indeed, Europe may be able to continue to punch above its 
weight in terms of setting some of the ground rules of the global system. 
The election of an open-minded internationalist and ‘inclusionary’ 
American President could lead to more common ground between the US 
and the EU in terms of norm-setting. Expectations in this sphere should be 
modest given the deep differences between American and European 
approaches to power: but the possibility is there. Second, the EU has 
proved rather adept at acting as a major force vis-à-vis the great surprises 
of 2008, i.e. the war in Georgia and the global financial and economic crisis: 
this may be the result of the fortuitous, and fleeting, combination of a 
hyperactive French EU President and a lame-duck administration in 
Washington. Still, the fact is that it happened. Third, there is, at the time of 
writing, still a fighting chance for the Lisbon Treaty to be ratified, with its 
provisions for a more stable and coherent EU governance. 
Our penultimate session, in November 2008: “Policies of EU, Russia 
and the US towards the Rise of China” was set at the time when the global 
financial crisis was in its initial stage. The full extent of the reverse oil 
shock, the rapid depletion of Russia’s currency reserves and the sharp 
reduction of China’s growth rate had not yet taken on their current 
dramatic aspect: we were still in the realm of necessarily vague and unreal 
forecasts. Continuity, rather than radical revision, was still the name of the 
game.  
Nevertheless, it was already apparent that the ideological stakes of 
the interactions between the EU, the US, Russia and China were set to rise. 
A normatively assertive, but strategically weak EU; a Russia in sympathy 
with China, but also locked into a very unequal relationship; a US retaining 
its superpower status oscillating between a cooperative stance with China 
built on deep economic interdependence and a competitive posture. These 
combinations may lack stability under the strains of the economic crisis. 
And all the less so given the uncertainties relating to China’s future 
posture: China may be used to ‘playing a long game’. However, the 
breakneck growth of the 1978-2008 period and now the sudden setbacks 
with the corresponding need for major and sharp adjustments, (including 
in terms of foreign relations) may not give China the sort of stability 
associated with ‘taking the long view’. 
By the time of our last session, in February 2009, “The Strategic 
Consequences of the Global Financial and Economic Crisis”, the crisis had 
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deepened. World leaders were already preparing for a G20 summit two 
months later, which was being billed as a last chance for them to regain 
control over the global economy’s vertiginous collapse.  At our meeting, 
papers by the American and Chinese contributors highlighted the 
emergence of the colossal and perilous financial interdependence between 
China and the US, with China accumulating $200 billion of US Treasury 
paper in the last quarter of 2008 alone.  Both sides are manifestly becoming 
alarmed; the US at having become financially dependent on the non-
democracies of China and the Middle East; and China in particular at being 
locked into a ‘Catch 22’ situation. On the one hand China is grossly 
overexposed to US dollar assets, yet on the other hand if they try to 
withdraw from this they will be instrumental in driving down the dollar 
and inflicting upon themselves huge financial losses. The most constructive 
note was struck by the Chinese scholar who advocated a massive Chinese 
programme of Keynesian domestic demand expansion. China is indeed 
acting but our debate revealed little confidence of its adequacy to get the 
Chinese-US imbalances on a sound glide path of correction.  
At the subsequent London G20 summit in April, Gordon Brown 
declared the birth of a New World Order. Our debate before the event 
showed no such development to be in sight, and we could say the same 
after it. Let us look forward to Volume VI in this series to find out what will 
have happened in reality.  
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Chairman’s Summing-up 
Michael Emerson* 
he idea of this seminar was to look at the whole landscape of 
interlocking conflicts in an area that was termed the ‘Greater Middle 
East’ by the administration in the United States as it sought to follow 
up the invasion of Iraq with a strategic plan for peace and democratic 
reform in a vast region stretching from Morocco to Afghanistan. The 
invention of this term has in itself been controversial, with questions about 
whether this region has any unifying factors that warrant the suggestion of 
a unified foreign policy strategy on the part of the major global actors. 
Nonetheless, the term served our purpose, because the multiple conflicts of 
the region have now become so interconnected, crosscutting and 
overlapping, partly because of the unintended consequences of US policy 
and partly because of the widening reach of al-Qaeda. Put even more 
bleakly, some would now regard the region as the Bush administration’s 
defining disaster. 
The seminar was well-served by a set of excellent papers by 
Rosemary Hollis (Chatham House, London), Bruce Riedel (Brookings 
Institution, Washington, D.C.), Vitaly Naumkin (Centre for Strategic and 
Political Studies, Moscow) and Mamoun Fandy (International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, London). 
Rosemary Hollis contributed a strategic overview, but with a 
sceptical message to policy-makers under the title “Competing Agendas 
and No Overall Winners”. Her main argument was that the region 
represents not a dichotomy in a fight of good against evil, but a mosaic 
with criss-crossing fault lines. No single player can prevail across the 
board. Either the region will be embroiled in continuing asymmetric 
warfare and escalating conflict, or multilateral accommodation will have to 
be found in each of the interlinked crises. A grand bargain between the US 
and Iran looks unlikely, however, and an Arab–Israeli bargain equally so.  
                                                     
* Michael Emerson is a Senior Research Fellow at CEPS and head of the EU Foreign 
Security and Neighbourhood Policies research unit. 
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Vitaly Naumkin criticised the Western blockade against Hamas, and 
US policy towards the Palestinian–Israeli conflict more generally. He 
illustrated this with a quote from a public speech to a Jewish Republican 
audience by Elliot Abrams, US Deputy National Security Advisor, that the 
current American engagement on Israel–Palestine was a “process for the 
sake of [a] process” intended to silence nascent European and Arab 
criticism. Naumkin argued that attempts to isolate political Islam and shut 
the door on dialogue merely foster its radicalisation. Existing Western 
strategies towards the region, American above all, are in need of revision. It 
is the failure of present strategies that exacerbates the dangerous collision 
between the West and the Islamic world.  
Bruce Riedel’s main argument is that ‘al-Qaeda is back’ with the 
creation of affiliates or franchises virtually worldwide, notably in Iraq, 
Palestine and Algeria, with the latter providing a jumping-off point for 
operations in Europe. Yet al-Qaeda is increasingly critical of Hamas, which 
it sees sliding into collaboration with Palestinian President Mahmoud 
Abbas, and thus with his Western patrons. The most recent developments, 
with Hamas taking over Gaza after a bitter civil war with Fatah, may 
modify this view, and the Palestinian cause remains the centrepiece in al-
Qaeda’s narrative of Western Crusader aggression. The recovery of al-
Qaeda has progressed alongside the resurgence of the Taliban in 
Afghanistan, which has happened for three reasons: i) the Taliban were 
never fully defeated in 2001, ii) the US then took its eye off the Afghan ball, 
and iii) the Taliban benefited from a safe haven in Pakistan.   
Mamoun Fandy focused on the Shia–Sunni divide, which Arabs now 
begin to see as the major threat, rather than the Arab–Israeli conflict. Many 
Arabs now view the Iranian nuclear programme as more dangerous than 
that of Israel, for, as the saying goes, ‘better the devil you know than the 
devil you do not’. Sunni Arabs are content to see a Sunni bomb in Pakistan, 
but not a Shia bomb in Iran. The Shia today have a very strong influence in 
four states (Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and Bahrain) as well as with Sunni radical 
groups such as Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.  
In the debate, there were three mini-sessions on Iraq, Iran and 
Palestine–Israel. On Iraq, it was questioned whether a partial withdrawal 
plan for the US and its allies would make sense, leaving behind a residual 
military presence. There were no takers for this proposition. 
On Iran, Vitaly Naumkin sketched three scenarios: 1) Iran acquires 
the bomb; 2) Iran only wants energy security and does not intend to make 
the bomb; and 3) Iran goes for a ‘Japan scenario’, meaning a build-up of 
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nuclear capabilities sufficient to hold in reserve the possibility to make the 
bomb within a small number of years. Naumkin speculated that Iran would 
be willing to negotiate this third scenario alongside gaining full 
international recognition. On the hypothetical military option for the US, 
Bruce Riedel commented that it would need a Pearl Harbour-level of 
provocation to obtain backing for such an action by Congress.  
On Palestine, one official commented that after the elections, which 
Hamas had won, President Abbas only asked the West for money and the 
release of some prisoners. Instead, he received weapons for Fatah and a 
boost to the dynamics of civil war.  
In conclusion, some brave souls advanced positive proposals, but 
more out of desperation than real hope. Bruce Riedel advocated a return to 
where the Camp David negotiations of 2000 had left off. Some discussants 
were sceptical, in referring to changes on the ground since 2000 (further 
West Bank settlement construction and the separation barriers) and to the 
hazards of imposed solutions. Rosemary Hollis advocated a set of three 
overlapping but differentiated conference tables, for Iran, Iraq and Israel–
Palestine. Despite the huge difficulties of implementing a grand strategy of 
this kind, the debate acknowledged the dramatic dangers of the status quo.   
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Competing Agendas and No Overall 
Winners 
Rosemary Hollis* 
uring the 1990s, the European Union took several steps towards 
developing a comprehensive approach to its southern 
Mediterranean neighbours, largely in the name of promoting 
economic liberalisation and political reform across North Africa and the 
Middle East. The shock of 9/11 and the declaration of a ‘war on terror’ by 
the Bush administration then gave rise to a more pressing and overarching 
agenda to combat extremist elements associated with al-Qaeda and Islamist 
militants. European and Arab governments signed up to this new agenda, 
only to splinter again over the quest by the United States to force regime 
change in Iraq. 
In the wake of the US-led invasion of Iraq, a new, ad hoc alliance or 
‘coalition of the willing’ took shape around the objective of stabilising Iraq 
and the surrounding region. Thereafter the Bush administration launched a 
new plan to promote political and economic reform across the ‘Wider 
Middle East’, with Iraq as the centrepiece. Europe responded with its new 
Neighbourhood Policy in 2005. Despite some initial gains, however, neither 
of these initiatives has gained substantial momentum and the agenda for 
political reform in the Arab world has faltered in the face of the challenge 
posed by political Islam. 
A crucial problem throughout has been the persistence of the Arab-
Israeli conflict – which turned into full-scale war on the Israeli-Lebanese 
and Palestinian fronts in summer 2006. The slide into civil war in Iraq, 
meanwhile, has discredited Washington’s lofty aspirations for re-shaping 
the political landscape of the region on the back of regime change in 
Baghdad. Failure of the EU-3 (Britain, France and Germany) to negotiate a 
halt to Iran’s nuclear fuel-enrichment programme has also introduced a 
new source of tension. 
                                                     
* Rosemary Hollis is the Director of Research, Chatham House, London. 
D 
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Worse still, terrorism has become an even more pressing threat for 
Europe and the US, with al-Qaeda regrouping, gaining strength in Iraq, 
rallying, along with the Taliban in Afghanistan, and striking anew, through 
surrogates and affiliates elsewhere, notably in Britain. 
In the circumstances, it is perhaps not surprising that Tony Blair 
among others has attempted to galvanise support for a broad front against 
the terrorists that consolidates the reformist agenda with the anti-terrorist 
one. Nevertheless, as is argued below, the situation is so complex, with so 
many crosscutting currents, alignments and agendas, that there seems no 
realistic possibility of defining neat dividing lines between ‘them and us’, 
‘good against evil’ or even moderates versus extremists. Indeed, as 
concluded here, it could be counter-productive to try to do so. Better, 
rather, to acknowledge the complexities and devise a multifaceted 
approach to the problems that recognises the interests of all the players and 
seeks some accommodation with all but the most implacable. 
The Manichaean approach 
Speaking in Los Angeles in August 2006, Tony Blair called for “a complete 
renaissance” of foreign policy to combat “reactionary Islam”. He depicted 
“an arc of extremism now stretching across the Middle East and touching, 
with increasing definition, countries far outside the region”.1  
In Dubai on 20 December 2006, he called for an alliance of moderates 
across the Middle East to combat Iran and Tehran-sponsored terrorism and 
extremism.2  
Blair’s Manichaean depiction was no doubt intended to galvanise the 
supporters of stability, liberal democracy and counter-terrorism against the 
Islamist militants and their state supporters battling for hearts and minds 
across the ‘Greater Middle East’. Yet the contending forces in the region 
cannot be reduced to a dualistic struggle between opposites. 
Certainly, there are at least two big ideas competing for adherents in 
the region. One is the vision of representative, accountable government, 
rule of law, human rights and economic development that informs the 
                                                     
1 See the “Speech to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council” on 1 August 2006 
(retrieved from http://www.number10.gov.uk). 
2 See Daniel Dombey, “Blair seeks closer ties with moderate Arabs”, Financial 
Times, 20 December 2006. 
BETWEEN BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, RIYADH AND JERUSALEM | 11 
European Neighbourhood Policy and before that the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership initiative championed by the EU, together with parallel 
initiatives promoted and funded by the US and various Western non-
governmental organisations and their Arab counterparts since the mid-
1990s. The other is the vision of a new caliphate championed by al-Qaeda 
and its affiliates across the region and beyond, reaching into Europe and 
embracing Islamist movements in Africa and East Asia in a quest to banish 
Western forces and influence from the heartland of Islam. 
Yet neither of these visions have much appeal for the autocratic, 
corrupt and militaristic governments in the Greater Middle East, South and 
East Asia, which have aligned themselves with the cause of the war on 
terror declared by the Bush administration after 9/11. And Washington has 
shied away from challenging such governments, since experiencing the 
chaotic fallout of regime change in Iraq and Afghanistan. Neither the 
Americans nor the Europeans have pursued totally coherent and consistent 
policies, and inevitably, the use of force in pursuit of any goal will temper 
the appeal of the cause. 
A mosaic, not a dichotomy 
In Iraq, the elected government features several sectarian parties, some of 
which were incubated in the Islamic Republic of Iran and almost all of 
which look to Iran for political and financial support as well as weaponry 
for their related militias. The balance of power in Baghdad belongs to 
Kurdish groups dedicated to defending Kurdish autonomy in northern 
Iraq, if not outright independence. Neither the Shia Muslim nor the 
Kurdish nationalist parties in Iraq make common cause with al-Qaeda, 
though some Shia militants may hope to capitalise on the challenge to US 
and allied forces in Iraq posed by al-Qaeda affiliates. Meanwhile, Sunni and 
secular Arabs in Iraq, opposed to the US presence there, have turned 
against al-Qaeda and related radical Salafist groups who would sacrifice 
Iraqi nationalism in the name of global jihad. 
Ironically, the two most committed supporters of Iraq’s elected 
government are the US and the Islamic Republic of Iran, but they have been 
enemies of each other, on and off, since the Iranian Revolution toppled the 
Shah and ended years of privileged US access and influence in that 
country. Even as American and Iranian diplomats were meeting in 
Baghdad in May 2007 for their first formal bilateral meeting in three 
decades, they were accusing each other of subversion and were at 
loggerheads over the future of Iran’s nuclear programme. 
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If Iran and the US could make common cause in Iraq, both would face 
opposition from Sunni Arab elements in Iraq and their supporters 
elsewhere in the region. Meanwhile, Turkish forces are poised to cross their 
southern border in pursuit of PKK separatist Kurds operating out of Iraqi 
Kurdistan. The US is attempting to dissuade Turkey from such a venture, 
but the Turks are deterred only by lack of agreement on the ultimate 
objectives of a cross-border operation. 
Turkey is undergoing its most serious political crisis in a decade, as 
the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) faces down its secular 
nationalist opponents championed by the army, who fear the popular AKP 
will subvert the secular nationalist tradition that dates back to the founder 
of the modern state, Kemal Ataturk.3 Since Turkey refused to assist the US 
invasion of Iraq in 2003, the traditionally close relationship between 
Washington and Ankara has cooled. Washington has supported Turkey’s 
quest to gain membership of the EU, but because this goal was adopted by 
the AKP government, its secular nationalist detractors feel abandoned. 
European ambivalence and in some cases outright opposition to bringing 
Turkey into the EU fold has alienated all Turks. 
In the circumstances, it is unclear where the Turks stand in relation to 
Blair’s dichotomy between the good guys and the bad. Meanwhile, neither 
Britain nor America are ready to embrace Iran as an ally in Iraq, though 
both recognise that Iranian influence among the ruling parties in Baghdad 
and their respective followers and militias is greater than their own. Both 
the British and the Americans blame elements of the Mehdi army, recruited 
in the aftermath of the invasion by Muqtada as-Sadr, for subverting their 
attempts to bring some semblance of stability to Baghdad and Basra. As-
Sadr is implacably opposed to the presence of foreign forces in Iraq, but is 
more of a nationalist than are the Shia parties that advocate autonomy for 
southern Iraq to match Kurdish autonomy in the north, at the expense of 
national cohesion and the interests of Iraq’s Sunni Arab minority. 
The criss-crossing fault lines that now define the civil war in Iraq are 
replicated elsewhere in the Middle East, rendering it impossible for either 
the US or the Europeans to distinguish clearly between friends and foes. 
The governments of the so-called ‘Arab Quartet’ – Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Jordan – are all long-standing allies of 
                                                     
3 See Soli Ozel, “Turkey: Testing Democracy”, The World Today, May 2007. 
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‘the West’, and opposed to the al-Qaeda forces in Iraq and elsewhere. They 
are also deeply unsettled by the rising power of Iran, manifest since the 
toppling of Saddam Hussein and his clan in Iraq. Their distrust of Iran is 
infused with both Sunni antipathy for the Shia version of Islam 
championed by the Islamic Republic, and Arab antipathy to Persian 
nationalism. Were the US to cement cooperation with Iran to stabilise Iraq, 
these Arab states would not only be discomforted, but would likely 
channel support to Iraq’s Sunni Arab minority. As it is, much of the 
support already reaching Sunni Iraqi groups in Iraq is coming across the 
borders from Saudi Arabia and Jordan. It is also channelled through Syria. 
Yet King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and President Bashar al-Assad of 
Syria are not about to close ranks. Abdullah, a long-time friend of the late 
Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, who was assassinated in February 
2005, has done little to help the Syrian regime resist calls from the UN for 
its senior officials to be subject to investigation for Hariri’s assassination. 
The governments of the Arab Quartet are all supporters of the Lebanese 
government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, who has defied the efforts of 
the Lebanese Shia movement Hizbollah, backed by Syria and Iran, to take 
over his cabinet.  
When Hizbollah and Israel went to war in summer 2006, Saudi 
Arabia, Egypt and Jordan initially gave every indication of wanting 
Hizbollah to be defeated. As the war progressed, however, hundreds of 
Lebanese civilians were killed and injured and the country was devastated 
by bombing, they rallied to the cause of the Lebanese people and 
government, against the Israeli onslaught. 
So too did the Europeans, except for the British government, which, 
along with the Bush administration, held off calling for a ceasefire 
resolution at the UN, seemingly in hopes that Israel would deal a fatal blow 
to Hizbollah first.4 Their stance embarrassed Siniora to the point that he 
refused to receive US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in Beirut at one 
stage and hostile demonstrators greeted Tony Blair when he made a trip 
there subsequently.5 Lebanese opponents of Siniora have continued to try 
                                                     
4 See Ewen MacAskill, Simon Tisdall and Patrick Wintour, “United States to Israel: 
You have one more week to blast Hezbollah”, Guardian, 19 July 2007.  
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“Hizbullah ministers did the right thing by publicly shunning Blair”, Editorial, 
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to undermine him by labelling him a ‘Western stooge’. All of which 
complicates any quest to line up Middle East ‘moderates’ against the forces 
of ‘extremism’. 
The governments in the Arab Quartet have also acquired this label as 
a result of their efforts, led by Saudi Arabia, to try to bring some semblance 
of order back to the region by offering a way to resolve the long-running 
Arab–Israeli conflict. Habitual defenders of the Palestinian cause against 
Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the governments of 
Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE were embarrassed when 
Hizbollah took on the Israelis in summer 2006 in solidarity with the 
Palestinians. That war was fought on two fronts, starting in the Gaza Strip 
when Palestinian militants, linked to the Palestinian Islamist movement 
Hamas, tunnelled under the barrier around Gaza into Israel and abducted 
an Israeli soldier. Hizbollah began its offensive two weeks later in much the 
same manner, crossing the Lebanese border with Israel and capturing two 
soldiers, killing others. 
The tactic of capturing each other’s fighters and personnel, to hold as 
bargaining chips for prisoner exchanges has been a feature of the Arab–
Israeli conflict for years. In summer 2006, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud 
Olmert made the mistake of declaring the rescue of the missing soldiers one 
of his war aims. He failed to deliver. Worse yet, a subsequent inquiry in 
Israel revealed that Olmert and his cabinet had launched their offensive 
without a clear plan of campaign. Instead of defeating the guerrilla forces 
of Hizbollah, who proved well prepared, elusive and armed with more 
sophisticated weaponry than the Israelis had imagined, the armed forces of 
Israel were unable to halt the rocket attacks deep into northern Israel right 
up to the last day of fighting before a ceasefire finally went into effect. 
The psychological victors of the 2006 war were Hizbollah and their 
supporters, including Iran, Syria and public opinion across the Arab world 
and beyond. Lebanon was devastated, but Hizbollah had proved that a 
highly motivated, ideologically committed guerrilla force could deprive the 
region’s most powerful conventional army of victory in the field. Hizbollah 
and Shia militias in Iraq taunted al-Qaeda and its affiliates with claims that 
they were the better defenders of the Muslim cause against ‘the Zionist 
                                                                                                                                       
Daily Star, 12 September 2006; and also Therese Sfeir, “Protests against Blair visit 
aim to topple government – Jumblatt”, Daily Star, 12 September 2006. 
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enemy’, contrasting their direct assault on the Israelis, and solidarity with 
the Palestinians, with al-Qaeda’s mass attacks on fellow Muslims in Iraq 
and elsewhere. 
Manoeuvres and setbacks on the Israeli–Palestinian front 
After Hamas won a majority of the seats in the Palestinian legislature in 
January 2006, Israel refused to deal with the Palestinian Authority (PA), 
aside from Fatah leader President Mahmoud Abbas, unless and until 
Hamas renounced violence, recognised Israel and accepted agreements 
reached by previous PA governments with Israel. These were the principles 
set in March 2006 by the Middle East Quartet that groups the US, the UN, 
the EU and Russia. Crucially, because of their own counter-terrorism 
regulations and their designation of Hamas as a terrorist movement, the EU 
and its member states have been prevented by law from providing funds to 
a Palestinian administration run by Hamas.  
To channel humanitarian assistance the EU set up a Temporary 
International Mechanism through which to pay the salaries of key workers 
in the Palestinian education and health sectors. Humanitarian aid from 
Europe to the Palestinians has actually increased in absolute terms. The US 
provided direct assistance to the Fatah forces around President Abbas to 
bolster their camp against Hamas activists. Meanwhile, the boycott of the 
PA contributed to the disintegration of the shaky political and 
administrative infrastructure that had barely survived the second intifada 
and Israel’s forceful response in the West Bank and Gaza. In December 
2006, rivalry between Hamas and Fatah officials, activists and fighters in 
the occupied territories turned to violence. 
The prospect of a descent into chaos on the Palestinian front induced 
Saudi Arabia to assert leadership. First, at a meeting in Mecca, King 
Abdullah brokered a deal between the Palestinian factions and persuaded 
them to agree to form a unity government. Then he organised the re-launch 
of the (2002) Beirut or Arab peace initiative, at the Arab League summit in 
Riyadh in March 2007. In return for an end to Israeli occupation of Arab 
land and a resolution of the Palestinian refugee issue, the Arab states 
would normalise relations with Israel. On this occasion, many influential 
Israelis professed interest – but could not stomach acceptance of the right of 
return for Palestinian refugees or a total withdrawal to the status quo ante 
of the June 1967 Arab–Israeli war. So decisive action on the Arab peace 
initiative was not forthcoming, but the field was open for one or another of 
the regional or international players to make the next move. 
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The Palestinian factions fell to fighting again. Israel responded to 
renewed Palestinian rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip with a new aerial 
assault in May. The same month, violence erupted in and around a 
Palestinian refugee camp in northern Lebanon, with a previously un-
remarked Arab militant group calling itself Fatah al-Islam engaging the 
Lebanese army in what became a showdown. In the process, civilians who 
were unable or unwilling to flee the camp suffered death and injury. 
Then came the fatal conflict between the Palestinian factions that has 
divided Gaza and the West Bank. Accusing the Fatah-controlled security 
forces of working against the Hamas leadership, in June 2007 Hamas 
fighters stormed the Fatah forces’ premises in Gaza, killing scores and 
forcing the remainder to flee the Gaza Strip or go into hiding. Street battles 
paralysed life in the crowded Gaza neighbourhoods and refugee camps for 
several days, causing casualties among the civilians and terrifying the 
populace. Abbas reacted by declaring a state of emergency and dissolving 
the unity government of Prime Minister and Hamas leader Ismail Haniya. 
Abbas accused him of orchestrating a coup d’etat, while Haniya countered 
that he had only pre-empted a Fatah coup. Within days, Israel, the US and 
EU leaders had pledged their support to Abbas and his hastily appointed 
emergency administration, headed by former Finance Minister Salam 
Fayad as the new Prime Minister. 
With Gaza under Hamas rule and international isolation, and the 
West Bank more or less under the control of Abbas and his Fatah forces, 
speculation mounted that the US and Israel intended to capitalise on the 
separation to bolster their preferred Palestinian interlocutors at the expense 
of Hamas and the citizens of Gaza. Olmert promised to release to Abbas 
half the tax receipts collected on Palestinian purchases over the past year 
and hitherto held by Israel as part of the boycott. He also said he would 
release some 250 prisoners from among the thousands in Israeli detention – 
mostly Fatah members and associates. He did not, however, propose 
renewed peace negotiations, pending a consolidation of Abbas’s position, 
notwithstanding the urgings of Egypt and Jordan.  
Sidelining reform 
The boycott of the PA in 2006–07 has discredited the US and European 
reform agendas for the Middle East. After all, both Washington and the EU 
had called for the Palestinian elections, which the EU subsequently funded, 
monitored and declared free and fair. Their subsequent refusal to deal with 
the elected officials because of Hamas’ ideology and anti-terrorist laws of 
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their own opened the US and Europeans to charges of duplicity and fuelled 
cynicism across the Arab world. Certainly Hamas was offered 
accommodation provided it lived up to the three principles outlined by the 
Middle East Quartet, but when Hamas made some steps in that direction in 
the Mecca agreement, the EU made no move to reward this and the US 
increased support to Fatah.  
Following the confrontation between Hamas and Fatah, and the split 
between Gaza and the West Bank, the overt support extended to Abbas to 
consolidate his position in the West Bank at the expense of Hamas and to 
the likely detriment of the 1.3 million Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip is 
not a tenable situation. Meanwhile, the reputation of the reform agenda has 
also suffered as a result of backsliding by the Egyptian government on its 
pledges to introduce more democracy. It did not help that Condoleezza 
Rice had only recently hailed Egypt as an example for the region, but made 
no remonstrations when progress was reversed. 
Shifting alignments in Iraq 
The release of the findings of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group in 
Washington at the end of 2006 seemed to promise a return to 
multilateralism by the US. Instead, the Bush administration announced a 
new military agenda, dubbed ‘the surge’ to push for victory against 
insurgents, terrorists and militiamen in Baghdad. As they pushed forward 
their offensive to clear out militants, including the Shia militia in as-Sadr’s 
stronghold of Sadr City and separate neighbourhoods along sectarian lines, 
the casualty rate for US forces escalated to unprecedented levels, though 
the Iraqi death toll began to decline. After apparently going to ground or 
sheltering in Iran for a while, as-Sadr himself then resurfaced in Kufa, to 
preach once more against the US presence in Iraq. His supporters, as did 
also the small alliance of Sunni Arab parliamentarians, withdrew from the 
coalition government. 
At the time of writing, it seems that a new alignment has formed at 
the centre of power in Iraq, around Dawa party Prime Minister Nouri al-
Maliki. Yet, it is not clear how far he will go along with the anti-Sadr and 
increasingly anti-Iranian strategy of the US forces in Iraq. Reports of 
growing Iranian influence and supplies of weapons to various factions in 
Iraq have drawn strong condemnation from the Americans and the British. 
In March 2007, the Iraqi government called a meeting of regional and 
international leaders in Baghdad that produced a broader gathering, hosted 
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by Egypt in Sharm el-Sheikh, in April. In May, again at Iraqi instigation, the 
American and Iranian ambassadors to Iraq sat down to their first formal 
bilateral talks in 28 years. Their agenda was limited to Iraq. In the 
background, Washington resumed pressure at the UN for new sanctions on 
Iran over its failure to accept a UN Security Council call to suspend its 
nuclear fuel-enrichment programme. 
Apparently, the Americans deemed the moment right for diplomacy 
because they and Iran’s other opponents had recouped some ground since 
the Lebanon war. The Arab peace initiative was one indication. Agreement 
at the UN on limited sanctions against Iran was another. Washington had 
also taken into custody five Iranian nationals who had been based in Irbil. 
But by the time the bilateral meeting took place in Baghdad, Iran had 
countered by arresting several Iranian–American nationals visiting Tehran. 
They were subsequently charged with espionage and subversion. 
Seemingly, the US has shelved the idea of attacking Iran, while 
testing the prospects for diplomacy and sanctions. In the meantime, 
however, its various programmes to fund and support Iranian civil society 
groups and some dissident elements in Iran has fuelled anxiety in Tehran 
that the US has a secret agenda for regime change by stealth. 
Where to now? 
The Iranians think they are winning in Iraq and it is only a matter of time 
before the US forces are obliged to withdraw. Asked whether they could 
handle the chaos if this transpired, this author was told by Iranians in 
Tehran in late May that they were sanguine. The Americans, meanwhile, 
seem equally confident that a combination of pressure and dialogue can 
produce a change of policy in Tehran. And if not, the Iranian hardliners 
will be the losers. Certainly, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is 
rapidly losing popularity at home and ordinary Iranians are experiencing 
increased economic hardship.  
Nevertheless, in these circumstances it would be folly for either the 
Iranians or the Americans to expect to triumph over the other in Iraq or 
across the region. The situation is delicate and their positions finely 
balanced. They are, in effect, engaged in asymmetric warfare, on several 
fronts. And while neither sees any need to cave in to the other, the 
prospects of a ‘grand bargain’ between Washington and Tehran do not look 
likely either. The appetite for such a bargain is insufficient on both sides. 
And even if such a rapprochement were to occur, there would be an Arab 
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backlash. Israel would not relish the prospect either, since it could expect to 
pay a price. That could be relinquishing territory or its exclusive position as 
the region’s sole nuclear power outside South Asia (or both). 
An Israeli–Arab bargain, forged as a counterweight to Iran, seems 
equally unlikely, since that would bear a price too. And a deal that 
excludes Iran would leave the US without the cooperation from Tehran 
needed to salvage the situation in Iraq. 
The choices are stark; therefore, either asymmetric warfare and 
potential escalation will prevail across the Greater Middle East or 
multilateral accommodation on each of the interlocking crises will have to 
be sought. No single player can prevail across the board. Equally, potential 
alignments of some players against others will not be decisive, since the 
lines of confrontation are so muddled and fluid. A set of compromises, 
with some gains and some losses for all, would thus seem to be the only 
recourse. 
To conclude, the recommendation is for a set of interconnected or 
overlapping dialogues to be initiated – one focusing on Iraq, one on 
Lebanon and one on the Palestinians. In each case, the main stakeholders or 
powerbrokers would need to be at the table. Conceivably, the UN could 
provide the umbrella, though the EU could take a lead on both Lebanon 
and the Palestinians, while the US would be central to making progress on 
the stabilisation of Iraq and would be needed in the other two dialogues as 
well. The point, however, is that the time has gone for Washington or any 
other single powerbroker to force its regional agenda on the others. 
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A View from Russia 
Vitaly Naumkin* 
he ‘Greater Middle East’ (GME) is a very unusual geopolitical 
construct. Its singularity lies in the fact that the geographical limits 
of the GME are uncertain, just as is the criteria for the attribution of 
particular countries to it. It appears that as conceived by those who coined 
this concept these were states in which, as Bernard Lewis put it, 
something had gone wrong. But these states in essence have little in 
common. Nevertheless, this construct has been accepted by all the main 
global actors, including those of the G8, in whose framework it serves as a 
basis for political discourse. The GME idea is understandably functional, 
but what task does its action plan envisage – war against terror, 
democracy promotion or, more widely, modernisation? 
To the quadrangle specified by the European Security Forum’s 
subject one would be well advised to add Kabul, but with this addition, 
the picture becomes even more disconcerting. Stuck somewhere between 
the GME and Europe is Turkey, for which, according to French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy, the road to the EU will be barred for a long time to come 
owing to geographical parameters alone, but which in relation to many 
other parameters stands out from the group of Middle Eastern states. 
Recent clashes between sympathisers of political (but moderate!) Islam 
and secularists are a characteristic collision that perhaps in future is in 
store for Europe as well, in whose population the share of Muslims is 
steadily growing. 
It is common to think that the states located in the GME are doomed 
to engaging in catch-up development (or to increased lag), resisting 
modernisation, conserving archaic forms of social life and polity, being 
torn by conflict and remaining a source of threats to global security – 
primarily international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction. This view is only partly true. Certainly, as stated in the 
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UN’s first Arab Human Development Report in 2002, the overall population 
of the 22 Arab countries (280 million in 2002) had a GDP equal to the size 
of Spain’s.1 The prospects for the future look rather gloomy. But there are 
states in the region that, for instance, by the levels of GDP per capita have 
outstripped many developed countries (the Arabian monarchies), while 
Saudi Arabia, according to the available forecasts, will by 2020 enter the 
group of the world’s most-developed countries – the G20. In a number of 
countries, parliamentarian institutions and electoral systems are well 
developed, political parties (including those of the opposition) are active 
and the process of democratisation, albeit slow, has been underway in the 
region in recent years. Suffice it also to mention the local elections in 
Saudi Arabia, the steps towards political reform in other states of the 
Arabian Peninsula, the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon, etc. 
Yet, as a result of free elections, the positions of Islamist forces in the 
region, including radical ones, have robustly consolidated. The 
mainstream Islamist organisations have benefited from the democracy-
promotion strategies of the US. Even in Iraq, two Iran-oriented Islamist 
parties – al-Dawa and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution – 
form the main pillars of the regime, which is paradoxically supported 
equally by Washington and Tehran. The West has imposed a blockade 
against Hamas, which had won the elections in Palestine. This move has 
sharply aggravated the situation in the zone of the Arab–Israeli conflict. 
The project to form a government of national unity in Palestine, as is 
known, has been thwarted by the renewed internecine war. Facts on the 
ground repeatedly convince the unbiased observer that attempts to isolate 
political Islam and to shut the door on dialogue with it merely foster its 
radicalisation.  
The continuing Israeli occupation and vicious circle of violence in 
Palestine feeds radical Islamist mobilisation and makes the need to find a 
solution to this protracted conflict urgent. It seems that the efforts of the 
international quartet are not adequate to bring the conflicting sides back 
to negotiations and the global actors are not committed enough to the 
peace process. US Deputy National Security Advisor Elliott Abrams was 
recently reported to have said at a meeting of Jewish Republicans that the 
current American engagement on Israel–Palestine was a “process for the 
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sake of [a] process” intended to silence nascent European and Arab 
criticism.2 
Obviously, the fresh round of violence in the conflict zone will put 
off the prospect of settlement even more. Is it possible to promote a stable 
Palestinian Authority (PA) unity government and can it, for its part, not 
only become Israel’s partner in negotiations but also achieve real results? 
As the Palestinian public figure Hanna Siniora believes, “neither Hamas 
nor Fatah, alone or combined, have learned the political culture of 
working together in a coalition to serve their public, the Palestinian 
people”.3 But in order to change the situation, global actors – Europe first 
of all – have to proceed to diplomatic engagement with all the parties, 
including Hamas, and resume financial aid to the PA. Of course, if Israel 
continues its strikes against the Palestinian territories and rejecting the 
original ceasefire, one can forget about the peace process. 
It is worth referring once more to Siniora and his call for accepting 
the attractive Arab peace plan:  
All the armed elements in the PA, clans, families, militias, Fatah and 
Hamas, even the PA security forces should be disarmed, and the 
Arab troops will be allowed to carry arms to stop lawlessness and 
implement law and order, and bring total security. Later, a non-
factional Palestinian force, professionally trained, will be 
reconstituted to eventually takeover the security role.4 
Under these provisions Israel should withdraw its troops from the 
occupied territories and the Arab League should place its troops in the PA 
(in order for Israel to comply, these troops are supposed to come from 
Egypt and Jordan – the two Arab countries that have diplomatic relations 
with Israel). 
To enhance these developments political reform in Palestine is of 
major importance. This author cannot disagree with Nathan Brown’s 
observation that for a brief period, “the circumstances favoring political 
reform in Palestine seemed more propitious than they ever had in any 
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Arab context”.5 Indeed, the reform had begun to move ahead, and certain 
progress had been achieved; nonetheless, the Hamas victory brought to 
naught all the efforts of the bloc of secular reformers to affect a resolute 
change of the situation in their favour. The sad experience of Palestinian 
democratic reforms also makes one wonder whether that failure was 
inevitable. Brown believes that Arab reform advocates and their 
international supporters can derive five lessons from their experience: 
“the need to align agendas, the peril of short-term goals, the peril of 
personalising reforms, the long-term nature of the reform project, and the 
need to engage Islamists”.6 
It looks like the aggravating, disastrous situation in Iraq – 
unfortunately for us all – makes the final defeat of the most powerful state 
in the world inevitable. Or at least victory is not likely to be achievable. 
Some facts pertaining to this situation merit recalling: 
1) We are still unaware of American plans for settling the situation in 
the country. 
2) The Sunni–Shia strife is continuing and even growing. 
3) The Sunnis continue to feel discriminated against. 
4) Iran wields tremendous influence in the situation and may stand to 
gain in the event of American withdrawal. 
5) The country lacks elementary security conditions. 
6) Especially acute is the problem of refugees (2 million in Syria and 
Jordan) and displaced persons (no fewer than 2 million and possibly 
more). 
7) There is a severe deterioration of educational, medical and 
communal services.  
8) Government armed units are themselves taking part in sectarian 
violence. 
9) Terrorist activity goes unabated and terrorists groups are becoming 
stronger. 
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In analysing the current divisions between President George Bush’s 
administration and Congress, one should note the ongoing relevance of 
the issue of continuing the war in Iraq. Testifying to the serious nature of 
the disagreement is the fact that the Democrats are insisting on the 
legislative definition of a withdrawal date from Iraq, deeming it a 
necessary condition for additional financing of the military operations in 
Iraq. They have twice endeavoured to pass the corresponding bill, which 
President Bush has vetoed, believing that such a step would only give a 
free hand to the extremists. Still, it is not quite clear whether a Democratic 
president, if elected, would seek a complete withdrawal from Iraq or if it 
would rather be a question of redeploying troops, cutting their strength 
and redirecting them out of the zones of contact with the adversary to the 
territory of the military bases, from where they would be able to make 
raids. 
An idea voiced by certain politicians of Muslim states – to replace 
the American–British contingent in Iraq with one formed by a number of 
member states of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference – is hardly 
feasible. It is argued here that the Iraqis will not want to substitute one 
occupation for another. Furthermore, any Muslim contingents would be 
suspected of bias and of being able to fan sectarian hostilities still more, 
preventing national consolidation. 
In Afghanistan, where the military operation bears a collective 
character and has been supported by the greater share of governments 
around the world the situation is far from stable. The positive results 
gained at the initial stage of reconstruction (particularly before the start of 
the military operation in Iraq) are continually being undermined by the 
present trend of events, which, among other things, is characterised by 
the following: 
1) The government of President Hamid Karzai does not enjoy support 
in the country, nor does it control the situation in the regions. 
2) The fact that the ‘free democratic elections’ held in the country were 
won by manifestly unpopular government forces has discredited 
the democratic institutions. 
3) The Taliban movement is again growing in strength and, according 
to some reports, is already controlling more than half of the 
country’s territory. 
4) The number of civilian victims of the hostilities is skyrocketing. 
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5) Terrorists are increasingly using the same tactics as the Iraqi groups 
linked to al-Qaeda. 
6) Taking part in the fighting against government forces are not only 
members of clans in sympathy with the Taliban, but also recruits 
from various strata of the population who are deeply angry, 
particularly on account of the civilian victims. 
7) Drug production and trafficking continues to grow. Although 
during its period in power the Taliban had taken serious steps to 
eliminate the drug business, it now relies on the drug trade as the 
main source of its financing. 
8) Iran has sharply increased its influence in the western regions of 
Afghanistan. 
9) Despite the enormous funds for the recovery of Afghanistan 
allocated by the West, chiefly by the US, efforts to work out a 
mechanism for their use have not been successful so far. 
10) It has not become possible to normalise relations between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
11) The Afghan refugee problem (more than 2.5 million in Iran) is as 
acute as before. 
12) The emerging hopeful prospects are complicated by US 
preoccupations with trying to find a solution to the Iraqi problem, 
the crisis over the nuclear programme in Iran, the continued Sunni–
Shia antagonism in the Islamic world and particularly the lack of a 
solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. One may say that limited 
success could be achieved by the ‘Greater Central Asia’ strategy, 
which envisages cooperation with former Soviet Central Asian 
republics on transport, trade and other policy areas for the socio-
economic development of Afghanistan. 
Iran’s key significance for the US fight against nuclear proliferation 
cannot be viewed out of the context of Israel. And on this question, there 
are virtually no differences between Republicans and Democrats. 
According to a British scholar, Marc Leonard, Israel is regarded by both 
groups as a democratic country in a sea of obscurantism and autocracy 
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but, by contrast, “many Europeans see Israel as militaristic, unilateral, and 
obsessed with killing terrorists, rather than tackling the causes of terror”.7 
Iran – which believes that the overthrow of regimes hostile to it in Iraq 
and Afghanistan along with the growing need felt by the coalition forces 
to cooperate with it gives it a golden chance to affect a decisive 
strengthening of its regional role – is using resentment against Israel to 
win support among the population of the region. At this point, the 
growth of Iran’s influence cannot be deterred. The strategy of 
containment has generally exhausted itself. In addition, it is long since 
Iran ceased to be the revolutionary state that it was in the first years after 
the Islamic Revolution, when its leaders sought the latter’s extension to 
other countries. There is sufficient evidence of pragmatism on the part of 
Iran’s leaders, among whose behaviour nationalism looks a much 
stronger imperative than Islamism. The regime is undergoing a process of 
complex transformation and in the new balance of political forces a new 
generation of politicians, especially those of a conservative orientation, is 
playing an important role. In any case, it would be worthwhile for the US 
to change tack on its hopeless policy of regime change and of 
ostentatiously wasting millions of dollars on supporting opposition 
groups unable to affect the situation in any way. This policy should be 
replaced by one that involves diplomatic recognition of Tehran and 
entering into negotiations. 
All this signifies that no matter what term we apply to the Middle 
East, the existing Western strategies with respect to it and the American 
one above all are in need of revision. It is the failure of these strategies that 
exacerbates the dangerous collision between the West and the Islamic 
world. 
                                                     
7 See Marc Leonard, Divided World: The Struggle for Primacy in 2020, Centre for 
European Reform, London, 2007, p. 14.  
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The Return of the Knights 
Bruce Riedel* 
Introduction 
Almost six years after 9/11 al-Qaeda has spread throughout the Greater 
Middle East with franchises from Indonesia to the Maghreb. Thanks to the 
war in Iraq it survived the West’s counter-attack in Afghanistan. It has a 
secure sanctuary in Pakistan and is building avenues of approach to attack 
Europe and America using the Muslim diaspora community in Western 
Europe. In Iraq it is the dynamic edge of the Sunni insurgency, albeit only a 
small minority within the movement, whose goal now is to break the Iraqi 
state apart and create a jihadist state in the heart of the Arab world. Al-
Qaeda wants to play a larger role in the Palestinian conflict but it has had a 
discordant relationship with Hamas. Al-Qaeda has been very critical of 
Hamas’ participation in electoral politics but is now supportive of the 
Hamas coup in Gaza. As argued below, understanding al-Qaeda’s ideology 
and operations is the key to defeating it. 
‘Greater Middle East’ 
The phrase, the ‘Greater Middle East’ enjoyed brief notoriety at the end of 
President George W. Bush’s first administration and the beginning of the 
second. It became a shorthand expression for the president’s idea of 
transforming the Middle East from its violent and despotic past to a new, 
democratic and peaceful future. Old conflicts like the Arab–Israeli one 
would disappear once democracy came to the region. Senior administration 
officials travelled to Europe and the Middle East to explain the Greater 
Middle East strategy to allies as a break from the past policy of supporting 
stability over freedom – a policy that allegedly had failed to deliver either 
and created the conditions for the 11 September 2001 attack on America by 
al-Qaeda. The president’s second inaugural address after his re-election in 
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January 2005 was the apogee of this movement. He promised support to 
democratic movements “in every nation and culture, with the goal of 
ending tyranny in our world”. 
By the next morning, the administration was ‘walking it back’. A 
senior national security official explained that this was not a new policy, 
but rather an “acceleration” in long-term US goals. It would not be applied 
precipitously to US allies in the Muslim world such as Saudi Arabia or 
Egypt. The next day, the president’s father, former President George Bush 
Sr, was brought out to explain to reporters that they should not over-stress 
the speech or over-interpret it.1  
Ironically, the concept of a Greater Middle East also lies at the core of 
the ideology of America’s enemy, al-Qaeda, but of course with a very 
different emphasis. Al-Qaeda sees the countries of the Greater Middle East 
as the Muslim community of believers, the umma, which has been under 
attack by the West for the last century or more. Al-Qaeda argues that, 
thanks to its leadership, the umma is now for the first time in more than 90 
years successfully resisting the attack of the Crusaders and Zionists on the 
Islamic world. Not since the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, al-Qaeda 
argues, has the Muslim world been as successful as it is now in resisting 
Western and American domination by defeating the West in the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  
The al-Qaeda leadership proclaims the victory of the jihad and the 
‘knights’ who lead it in their propaganda almost every day now. In May, 
Ayman al-Zawahiri said, “we are going through a historic period of utmost 
importance…the Empire of Evil is about to come to an end, and that a new 
dawn is about to rise over a mankind liberated from the Caesars of the 
White House, Europe and Zionism”.2 A central key to the success of al-
Qaeda’s strategy in its Greater Middle East is the creation of al-Qaeda 
affiliates or franchises in different parts of the region, each of which 
operates largely independently of al-Qaeda’s core leadership but proclaims 
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their allegiance to the al-Qaeda emir, Osama bin Laden, and his jihadist 
principles and ideology. 
Indeed, al-Qaeda was established in 1998 as an alliance of several 
jihadist groups in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Bangladesh as a 
World Islamic Front to “kill Americans and their allies…in order to liberate 
the al-Aqsa mosque [in Jerusalem] and the Holy Mosque [in Mecca] from 
their grip so that their armies leave all the territory of Islam, defeated, 
broken and unable to threaten any Muslim”.3 The use of ‘knights’ (al Fursan 
in Arabic) harkens back to the medieval Muslim warriors who fought the 
Crusaders in Palestine. It also reflects al-Qaeda’s self-image that it is an 
organisation of elite vanguards who by their acts of sacrifice will inspire the 
masses to take action. In less than a decade, bin Laden and his movement 
have established a truly global presence. Since 9/11 al-Qaeda or its 
affiliates, franchises and sympathisers have carried out terrorist attacks in 
Algiers, Casablanca, Madrid, London, Istanbul, Riyadh, Jeddah, Karachi, 
Sharm el-Sheikh, Taba, Mombassa, Kuwait, Mumbai, New Delhi, Bali and 
many other cities, not to mention the chaos and anarchy they have 
produced in Iraq and Afghanistan. The breadth and audacity of attacks is a 
mark of the movement’s success in building its local allies and surrogates 
throughout the Muslim world from Morocco to Indonesia, and in the 
Muslim diaspora in Europe. 
Securing the base in the badlands 
Critical to this success was al-Qaeda’s survival in late 2001 after the 
American intervention against its host in Afghanistan, the Taliban, on the 
side of the Northern Alliance forces in the Afghan civil war. Five years after 
the fall of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the Taliban movement has 
made a significant comeback with al-Qaeda. Those who placed the Taliban 
in the “dustbin of history” like former Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld have been proven premature. Today the Taliban and al-Qaeda 
are the prime movers in the insurgency in southern and eastern 
Afghanistan. 
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Attacks on NATO forces in the country are a daily phenomenon. 
British army commanders have said that the fighting in the south is the 
toughest the British army has faced since Korea. Suicide attacks on Afghan 
government, NATO and US forces and Afghan civilians have increased 
dramatically. There were two suicide operations in all of Afghanistan in 
2002; today one occurs every three days. And the Taliban leadership, along 
with the al-Qaeda leadership, is still at large, still planning attacks on its 
enemies in Afghanistan and globally.  
All of this has developed remarkably closely to the script Taliban 
leader Mullah Omar, the self-proclaimed Commander of the Faithful, 
outlined in late 2001 and early 2002 right after the fall of Kabul and 
Kandahar. At the time, Omar lamented the “catastrophe” of the Emirate’s 
fall but said that his organisation would survive and return to challenge the 
coalition and its Afghan backers over time. 
Mullah Omar was also quick to predict that he would not be captured 
by the coalition and would still be able to lead the Taliban in its war. Here 
is what he said as early as 26 September 2001: 
I am considering two promises. One is the promise of God, the other 
of Bush. The promise of God is that my land is vast. If you start a 
journey on God’s path, you can reside anywhere and will be 
protected. The promise of Bush is that there is no place on earth where 
you can hide that I cannot find you. We will see which promise is 
fulfilled.4 
Mullah Omar also put the Taliban struggle after 2001 in a wider 
context from the start. He associated his movement with other Islamic 
struggles against perceived foreign occupiers, especially in Palestine, 
Kashmir and after 2003, in Iraq. In a message in October 2006 at the start of 
the Eid festival, he praised Muslim fighters everywhere and especially 
those in Iraq for fighting America.5 A constant theme in his rhetoric is that 
the Taliban will defeat the US and NATO just as the Mujahideen defeated 
the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. This history is important. 
Like most people, Afghans remember who promised what – validation 
occurs when you are seen to be right.  
There are at least three key reasons for the Taliban’s resurgence. 
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First, the Taliban was never fully defeated in 2001. After a few defeats 
on the battlefield with the Northern Alliance and coalition airpower, the 
Taliban dispersed. It did not fight for Kabul or Kandahar; rather it followed 
classic guerrilla tactics and fled. It was definitely on the ropes, however, by 
the early months of 2002 and vulnerable to a decisive takedown. That never 
came. 
Instead, the cadres moved to remote areas of Pashtun Afghanistan 
like Omar’s home province of Uruzgan and went to ground. They bided 
their time and survived. This proved fairly easy as the new government of 
Afghan President Hamid Karzai and its coalition supporters had far too 
few security forces to secure and govern the country. And the Taliban 
adjusted its tactics. It adopted new battlefield tactics such as the use of 
suicide bombers and improvised explosive devices from the Iraq war. 
Almost certainly, the al-Qaeda organisation provided key help in 
transmitting these techniques from Iraq to Afghanistan. Indeed, according 
to Taliban leaders, Osama bin Laden is actively involved in planning many 
of their operations, including the attack on Bagram airbase when Vice-
President Dick Cheney visited Afghanistan in February 2007, as well as 
operations in Iraq.6  
Second, the coalition and especially the US took its eye off the Afghan 
ball when the invasion of Iraq began. Key US military and intelligence 
assets were diverted from Afghanistan and the hunt for al-Qaeda to the 
invasion and occupation of Iraq. Gary Schroen, the CIA officer who led the 
first CIA team into Afghanistan in late 2001 to topple the Taliban, notes that 
“as early as March 2002 the US military began to withdraw many of the key 
units involved in the effort [to hunt bin Laden] in order to allow them to 
regroup and train in preparation for the coming war with Iraq”.7 Schroen 
notes the same was true for the CIA. Afghanistan was put on the back 
burner and given relatively little reconstruction assistance once the Iraq 
war began. US aid to Afghanistan, a country devastated by 25 years of war, 
totalled less than a billion dollars in both 2002 and 2003. Compared with 
other reconstruction efforts, Afghanistan was simply done on the cheap. 
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Lack of security and economic reconstruction not only fuelled the Taliban 
revival but also the return of the poppy crop and the drug culture.  
Third, the Taliban benefited from a safe haven and help in Pakistan. 
The Taliban of course had long and well-established ties with the Pakistan’s 
intelligence service, the ISI, and the Pakistani army. While these were 
broken by Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf after 9/11, the ties 
between the Taliban and various militant Pakistani and Kashmiri groups 
remained very much intact. These ties had developed over the course of the 
1990s and were most dramatically illustrated during the December 1999 
hijacking of Indian Air flight 814 from Kathmandu to Kandahar, when al-
Qaeda, the Taliban and Kashmiris also mixed together with the ISI to carry 
out the plot.8 
The Afghan government, of course, goes further and suggests that the 
Pakistani army and the ISI still actively assist the Taliban. Afghan 
authorities say Mullah Omar spends a great deal of his time in Quetta. 
President Musharraf says this is a lie. For his part, Omar has consistently 
denied any official Pakistani assistance and has called President Musharraf 
a traitor who should be overthrown and executed. 
Where the truth lies precisely in this regard is very hard to know but 
there is no doubt that the Taliban has used Pakistani territory to regroup 
and has enjoyed assistance from fellow travellers in Pakistan. Pakistan’s 
own internal fragility, highlighted by a Baloch rebellion in the southwest, 
only makes the situation more complex. As recently noted by Paul 
O’Sullivan, chief of Australia’s intelligence service, “al-Qaeda is rebuilding 
both its organisational structures and operational capabilities from bases in 
the tribal regions bordering Pakistan and Afghanistan, and networks in the 
Middle East, North Africa and Western Europe”.9 
As he suggests, al-Qaeda has used Pakistan extensively as a fertile 
recruiting ground to penetrate the large Pakistani expatriate population in 
the United Kingdom for operations. The 7 July 2005 attack on London was 
a dramatic demonstration of this approach to attacking Europe. The British 
have been remarkably successful in foiling other plots, including the 2004 
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Operation Crevice plot to use a half-tonne bomb to attack targets in London 
and the 2006 plot to blow up 10 jumbo jets over the Atlantic. As noted by 
Deputy Assistant Commissioner Peter Clarke, chief of Scotland Yard’s 
counter-terrorism department,  
[T]he fact is there are in the UK many young men who are vulnerable 
to be drawn into extremism and violence [in the Pakistani 
community]. In case after case, the hand of core al-Qaeda can be 
clearly seen. Arrested leaders or key players are quickly replaced, and 
disrupted networks will reform quickly.10 
Al-Qaeda has also used the Pakistani connection to attempt attacks in 
Israel. The captured terrorist leader Abd al Hadi al-Iraq reportedly 
engineered a plan to use two Pakistanis with British passports to blow up 
the American embassy in Tel Aviv in April 2003; instead, they bombed a 
seafront restaurant nearby.11 
As long as NATO keeps forces in Afghanistan, the Taliban cannot 
march on the cities and retake the country. But that is not Osama bin 
Laden’s or Mullah Omar’s objective at this point. The Taliban leadership 
successfully survived the collapse of its emirate five years ago; it now seeks 
to demonstrate that the Karzai government and NATO cannot govern 
effectively in large parts of the country. As a guerrilla movement, the 
Taliban and al-Qaeda win in South Asia by not losing. They want NATO to 
bleed in Afghanistan just like the Soviet 40th army bled in Afghanistan 20 
years ago. 
Creating the franchises in the Greater Middle East 
With a strong base of operations rebuilt in the badlands along the border 
between Pakistan and Afghanistan – 1,500 miles of the most desolate and 
difficult terrain in the world – al-Qaeda opened its post-9/11 global 
offensive with a number of local affiliates. Indonesia was an early example 
of the pattern that would emerge. Al-Qaeda had been training Indonesian 
jihadists in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan for several years. A close 
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operational link was forged with Jamaah Islamiah (JI), an extremely violent 
jihadist group. The JI has been responsible for a series of attacks, most 
notably the 12 October 2002 multiple attacks in Bali that killed over 200 
persons.12 In the last couple of years, the Indonesian authorities seem to 
have had some success in suppressing the JI but it is far from eradicated. 
Another al-Qaeda franchise quickly became active in bin Laden’s 
home, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which has witnessed the longest and 
most sustained political violence and unrest in the Kingdom’s history 
thanks to al-Qaeda. In a major sermon in early 2003 released as an 
audiotape, bin Laden extolled “the band of knights” that had attacked 
America on 11 September and urged his followers to overthrow the House 
of Saud. A series of attacks followed over the next three years. Western 
targets including the US consulate in Jeddah and compounds of Western 
firms were attacked, as was the Saudi interior ministry HQ in Riyadh and 
the Abqaiq oil-processing plant (responsible for 60% of Saudi oil).  
Al-Qaeda had in mind plots that were even more devastating. 
According to the testimony of the captured 9/11 mastermind, Khalid 
Sheikh Muhammad, given on 10 March 2007, one plan was to recruit pilots 
in the Royal Saudi Air Force to hijack their own fighter aircraft and use 
them for a bombing attack on Israel’s southern city of Eilat in 2003. If 
successful, al-Qaeda had hoped the raid would spark an Israeli 
counterattack and start another Arab–Israeli war. In the end, the mission 
was foiled before it got off the ground. Only after a series of violent gun 
battles did the Saudi authorities gain the upper hand over the terrorists.  
Even with their successes, however, the Saudis keep uncovering new 
al-Qaeda cells and arresting dozens of cadres, some of whom have been 
trained in Iraq. In April, the Saudis uncovered several cells planning an 
operation to use hijacked aircraft to blow up the Saudi oil infrastructure. It 
is clear that the terrorists have a good understanding of the critical nodes of 
the system from their attack on Abqaiq. Should they succeed at hitting the 
vulnerable points in the system, the results could be catastrophic for the 
global energy market. And that is in fact exactly what Osama bin Laden 
and Ayman al-Zawahiri are publicly urging their followers to do. 
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Of course, al-Qaeda’s most successful franchise has been in Iraq. 
Founded by the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia has 
been spectacularly successful in attacking Western targets and in 
precipitating the Sunni–Shia civil war that now grips the country. Al-Qaeda 
in Iraq actually makes up only a small minority of the fighters within the 
Sunni Arab insurgency. Its extremist anti-Shia views and its brutal violence 
have alienated it from many Iraqis and even some of its original Sunni 
supporters. Nonetheless, it shows no sign of changing its strategy, which is 
designed to create civil war and lay the groundwork for a jihadist state in 
heart of the Middle East. Given its many enemies inside and outside Iraq its 
chances of success are probably slim in the long term. But as long as it can 
portray itself as leading the fight against the foreign occupation in Iraq it is 
likely to be a deadly and serious adversary. For now it is well funded with 
the proceeds from ransoms of kidnapped Iraqis and donations from 
sympathisers, especially in the Gulf States. Thus, despite being only a small 
minority of the overall Sunni insurgent movement, in Iraq al-Qaeda has 
been successful in accomplishing its goal of driving Iraqi society into 
warring factions, creating a quagmire of civil war in which the American 
and British armies find themselves today.  
The memoirs of Paul Bremer and George Tenet have dramatically 
revealed how ill prepared the US was for the post-invasion occupation of 
Iraq. We apparently had no plan. Al-Qaeda did. As soon as the Bush 
administration began talking about a showdown with Iraq, al-Qaeda began 
to prepare. In the autumn of 2002 Ayman al-Zawahiri spoke about the need 
to be ready to fight in Iraq and reported that Osama bin Laden and Mullah 
Omar were alive and preparing for the next round. He turned US rhetoric 
about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction on its head and told his audience 
that the goal of American occupation was to “confirm Israel’s uncontested 
monopoly over weapons of mass destruction in the region to ensure the 
submission of Arab and Islamic states”.13 A few weeks later, bin Laden 
issued a longer message to his followers urging them to go to Iraq and 
prepare to fight the invaders who sought a “stooge government to follow 
their masters in Washington and Tel Aviv”.14 
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Zarqawi prepared the battlefield on the ground and set the trap. On 
17 October 2004, Zarqawi formally proclaimed his allegiance to bin Laden 
and the al-Qaeda group. In his statement of allegiance he said the 
Crusaders and Jews “have thrown their weight around this Muslim land of 
Iraq deciding it would be the cornerstone in their plan which they named 
the ‘Greater Middle East’ in their effort to impose their infidel democracy, 
transform the peoples of the region and uproot Islam, however, God will 
shame them and forsake them”.15 Zarqawi also created a support network 
in Europe and the Muslim world for his war in Iraq, a network that 
smuggled money and martyrs to Iraq to join the jihad. According to the 
National Counterterrorism Centre, Zarqawi’s operational network had 
extended across 40 countries by 2006 and provided dozens of recruits, 
many of whom will someday return home with the expertise gained in the 
battlefields of Iraq.16 
Since the death of its founder, Zarqawi, the al-Qaeda franchise in Iraq 
has announced the establishment of an independent Sunni state in western 
and central Iraq. The Islamic State of Iraq promises to be the base from 
which additional jihadist movements can grow in the heart of the Arab 
world. The emir of the new state has an impressive Islamic pedigree, Abu 
Omar al Qureishi al Hashimi al Baghdadi as he is known, literally means he 
is a descendant of the prophet’s family. In proclaiming al Baghdadi as the 
emir of Iraq, al-Qaeda is making a statement about its long-term plan for 
the creation of a caliphate in the entire umma. 
One of al-Qaeda’s next goals after Iraq has been to create a franchise 
in Algeria, which can serve as a node for jihad throughout North Africa 
and in the Maghrebi diaspora in Western Europe. For some two years or 
more Osama bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri negotiated with 
the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) on the terms 
and conditions for its joining the movement. In late 2006, bin Laden 
instructed that the group be renamed al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and 
it began conducting attacks in that name in late 2006 and early 2007, with a 
series of strikes at police stations and Western oil targets.  
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On 12 April 2007, ‘Black Wednesday’, the new group carried out 
multiple suicide bombings (previously unknown in Algeria) in Algiers 
targeting the prime minister’s offices and police headquarters, killing over 
thirty people. Another truck bomb was apparently defused. The group 
later produced a martyrdom video of three suicide bombers who had died 
in the ‘Badr raid’ (as it was named, after the famous early Muslim victory). 
Zawahiri has it made clear that France is a major target of the new 
Maghrebi franchise. In announcing the union with the GSPC and al-
Qaeda’s core on 11 September 2006, Zawahiri said it would be “a source of 
chagrin, frustration and sadness for the apostates [of the regime in Algeria], 
the treacherous sons of France” and urged the group to become “a bone in 
the throat of the American and French crusaders”.17 French intelligence 
officials anticipate the group to stage attacks on French targets in North 
Africa and probably in France itself sooner or later. 
Threats to attack France are not new for the GSPC. In February 2005, 
for example, press reports said the French domestic intelligence agency 
estimated that there are about 5,000 sympathisers and militants in France as 
part of the GSPC, grouped around 500 hard-core individuals.18 Spanish 
officials have also expressed concern recently; the intelligence chief of the 
Civil Guard noted, “there is significant activity in the Maghreb which is 
most worrying for us”.19  
Zawahiri’s warning should be taken very seriously. There have been 
reports of planned Algerian attacks in the past on American and Israeli 
targets in France and Belgium, as well as on targets such as NATO or EU 
installations elsewhere in Europe.20 The interior minister of the German 
state of Baden-Wurttemberg summed it up well, noting “the danger is 
getting more specific, the calm is deceptive”. Finally, one should recall that 
the first-ever plot to hijack an airliner and crash it into targets on the 
ground was an Algerian plot in 1994 to crash an Air France jet into the 
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Eiffel Tower – a plot the 9/11 Commission rightly surmised may have been 
a role model for 11 September. 
The ultimate franchise is Palestine 
The franchise that bin Laden and Zawahiri would most like to attract and 
create would be in Palestine. In particular, it is likely they would welcome 
an alliance with the Hamas movement. Hamas has more credibility as a 
Sunni jihadist movement than any other organisation with its dozens of 
martyrdom attacks on Israel and its record of resistance to Israel. Thus, it is 
interesting to review the record of al-Qaeda’s relationship with Hamas for 
insights into al-Qaeda’s strategy and vulnerability. 
Hamas’s founder and spiritual leader, Sheikh Yassin, said positive 
things about al-Qaeda during his lifetime. Following his release from 
prison in 1997 following a botched Mossad assassination attempt in 
Amman, Yassin, he travelled throughout the region in triumph and was 
asked about al-Qaeda. His response was “we support and sympathise with 
any movement which defends the rights of its people to enjoy self 
governance and independence but we are not prepared to seek an alliance 
with those movements”.21  
There is also evidence of operational links between the two groups. 
Hamas operatives assisted an al-Qaeda cell in the Sinai in 2004 and 2005 to 
carry out attacks on Israeli and Western targets in the Sharm el-Sheikh and 
Taba holiday resorts. The Egyptian intelligence service uncovered these 
connections and was extremely angry with Hamas about this terrorism in 
Egypt’s booming tourism centres.22 The extent of these connections is very 
unclear but some contact is certain, particularly between the military wing 
of Hamas and al-Qaeda. 
Nonetheless, Hamas has always jealously guarded its independence 
from outsiders as Yassin indicated in his victory tour. It knows all too well 
the sorry history of Palestinian movements that align themselves with Arab 
patrons and become pawns in the inter-Arab political warfare of the 
Middle East. Hamas has only developed close relations with Syria and Iran 
in recent years, in reaction to the need for a source of military assistance 
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and increased economic aid. In public, most Hamas officials have been 
careful to distance the organisation from the violence of al-Qaeda, 
especially when its targets are outside of Iraq or Afghanistan, and it has 
joined the electoral process in Palestine with great success. 
For its part, al-Qaeda has been increasingly critical of Hamas’s 
participation in the electoral process and its success in winning a majority 
in the last Palestinian parliamentary elections. Bin Laden and Zawahiri 
have warned Hamas against being seduced by political power and 
government jobs into abandoning or scaling back the jihad against Israel. 
Last March, Zawahiri was particularly harsh in condemning Hamas’s 
agreement to form a national unity government with Fatah, especially as 
the deal was brokered by Saudi King Abdullah in Mecca. Zawahiri, 
claiming to speak in sorrow and not anger, said Hamas had “fallen into the 
swamp of surrender” and the leadership had “sold out” to King Abdullah. 
He concluded,  
I am sorry to have to offer the Islamic nation my condolences for the 
[virtual demise] of the Hamas leadership as it has fallen in the 
quagmire of surrender. The leadership of Hamas has committed an 
aggression against the rights of the Islamic nation by accepting what it 
called respecting international agreements [a code word for the Oslo 
process].23 
“Nobody, be he Palestinian or not,” Zawahiri said, “has the right to 
relinquish a grain of Palestinian soil.”24 Zawahiri was particularly upset 
that Hamas had negotiated with Fatah security chieftain Muhammad 
Dahlan, whom al-Qaeda regards as a spy for Israel and America. In May, 
Zawahiri repeated these charges against Hamas in another interview, with 
maps of Palestine shown on the video demonstrating the rise of Israeli 
control over the country from 1948 to today. According to Palestinian 
journalists, al-Qaeda is now seeking to set up its own miniature franchise in 
Gaza and may have been behind the kidnapping of a BBC journalist there. 
The kidnappers had openly proclaimed their support for bin Laden and 
Zawahiri and the Islamic State of Iraq. 
                                                     
23 See Al Jazeera, 11 March 2007; the entire text of Zawahiri’s message is available 
from the Open Source Center, “Al Zawahiri Censures Hamas, Discusses Iraq, 
Sudan, Afghanistan, Other Issues”, 12 March 2007. 
24 Ibid. 
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Hamas’ response is to deny any moderation in its commitment to the 
Palestinian cause. In a formal statement, Hamas said, “we are a movement 
of Jihad and of resistance…We in the Hamas movement remain loyal to our 
positions and dream of dying as martyrs. We assure Dr al-Zawahiri and all 
those who remain unwavering in their attachment to Palestine that today’s 
Hamas is the same Hamas you have known since its founding.”25 
Since this exchange, Hamas has abandoned the Mecca process as al-
Qaeda urged it to and broken with Fatah. In a well-planned and executed 
three-day war in June 2007, Hamas evicted Fatah from Gaza, creating in 
effect a three-state solution (at least temporarily) to the Palestinian–Israeli 
conflict. Outnumbered by Fatah, Hamas fighters used mortars and 
improvised explosive devices to demoralise their opponents, who had 
already been abandoned by their leaders including Dahlan, who had fled to 
the West Bank. How long this solution will last is unclear.  
Al-Qaeda responded to the change in Gaza with cautious approval. 
Zawahiri issued a new statement urging all Muslims to rally behind the 
Hamas takeover in Gaza and send men and money to help defend it. He 
reminded Hamas that it had made serious mistakes in the past and urged it 
not to repeat them by accepting offers to form another national unity 
government with Fatah. 
Al-Qaeda’s attack on Hamas before the coup in June reveals 
important information about what really worries the al-Qaeda leadership 
regarding the weakness and vulnerability of its movement. The Palestinian 
cause is the centrepiece of al-Qaeda’s narrative of Western Crusader 
aggression against the umma. The defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 
and the creation of the British mandate in Palestine set in train the events 
that would lead to the creation of Israel after the Second World War. For 
Zawahiri this is the West’s most evil act because the “Zionist entity is a 
foothold for the Crusader invasion of the Islamic world. The Zionist entity 
is the vanguard of the US campaign to dominate the Islamic Levant. It is a 
part of an enormous campaign against the Islamic world in which the West, 
under the leadership of America, has allied with global Zionism.”26  
                                                     
25 See YNETnews.com, 14 May 2007. 
26 See Ayman al-Zawahiri, “The Emancipation of Mankind and Nations under the 
Banner of the Koran”, an audiotape by Al-Sahab Media Productions on 30 January 
2005 on www.almjlah.net/vb; also available from the Open Source Center. 
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As Zawahiri argues, “after the fall of the Ottoman Caliphate a wave 
of psychological defeatism and ideological collapse spread” throughout the 
Islamic world.27  This defeatism made possible the victory of the Zionist 
movement in the 1948 war that is considered by Palestinians to be the great 
disaster of their history, the naqba or catastrophe. For Zawahiri the issue is 
profoundly personal as well, since he began his career in terror as a junior 
participant in the plot to assassinate Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 
1981 for making peace with Israel.  
Understanding al-Qaeda’s strategy is the first key to defeating it. The 
West needs a ‘Grand Strategy for the Greater Middle East’ that can win the 
war of ideas away from al-Qaeda’s vision of the ‘Caliphate of the Greater 
Middle East’. Fortunately, most Muslims share that goal with us. With new 
leadership in the West, a more sophisticated strategy has a very good 
chance of winning the war with al-Qaeda. 
A good place to start would be to focus with great energy on the 
Arab–Israeli peace process. The proposals former President Bill Clinton and 
his team put on the table in December 2000 can still serve as the basis for an 
agreement. The next American president should carefully consider the 
recommendation of the Iraq Study Group chaired by former Secretary of 
State James Baker, which suggested convening an international conference 
to resolve all aspects of the Arab–Israeli crisis, perhaps along the model of 
the Dayton peace summit that ended the Bosnian war. 
The West also needs to redouble its efforts in South Asia and in 
Afghanistan. The stakes in Afghanistan are high. With the growing 
disillusionment in America and elsewhere with the Iraq war, there is a real 
risk that Afghanistan will all too easily be branded as just another failed 
adventure. Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden are doubtless counting on 
that and thus encouraging the Iraqi resistance. But whatever we do in Iraq, 
we cannot afford to fail again in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is where al-
Qaeda planned and prepared for 9/11, and its leadership is still in the area. 
Furthermore, Afghanistan is NATO’s first significant out-of-Europe 
operation, and its first-ever land war. Failure would probably consign the 
alliance to irrelevance. 
 
                                                     
27 See the interview with Ayman al-Zawahiri on 11 September 2006 to mark the 5th 
anniversary of 9/11, Al-Sahab Media Productions. 
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Chairman’s Summing-up 
François Heisbourg* 
or this meeting of the European Security Forum, we were fortunate to 
benefit from the papers and presentations of three highly 
knowledgeable analysts: Walter Slocombe, former US Undersecretary 
of Defense; Alexander Pikayev, Director of the IMEMO Disarmament and 
International Security Institute in Moscow; and Oliver Thränert, Head of 
the Security Research Group at the Berlin-based Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik. We also profited greatly from the active participation of a number 
of well-placed officials. 
Since the current plan to install ground-based interceptors (GBIs) in 
Poland and the corresponding battle-management X-band radar in the 
Czech Republic is the fruit of a purely national American initiative, there 
was some logic to giving the floor first to Walter Slocombe. As is 
customary, the Chairman put a specific question to the speaker before the 
presentation, in this instance asking why the United States had launched 
this particular initiative – after all, Slocombe states in his paper that the US 
maintains that the European anti-ballistic missile (ABM) element is not 
necessary for the defence of the US. Furthermore, no European country had 
asked for the deployment of the GBIs or the X-band radar. 
In his oral presentation, Slocombe confirmed his general written 
sympathy for the currently envisaged system. He added that although 
there had been no formal request either from NATO or from specific states 
for the ABM deployment, the US had heeded European concerns about the 
lack of coverage of their continent by the ongoing American ballistic-
missile defence programme. He stressed that there was not a great 
difference between successive US administrations on limited missile 
defences, and that Congress will probably not kill the European-based 
programme if Poland and the Czech Republic agree on the deployment. He 
indicated that what the Chairman called the “INF [intermediate-range 
                                                     
* François Heisbourg is a Senior Adviser at the Fondation pour la Recherche 
Stratégique in Paris and Chairman of the European Security Forum. 
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nuclear forces] model of NATO involvement”1 is a model that would be 
appropriate for a European-based missile defence. 
Alexander Pikayev reminded us of a meeting of the European 
Security Forum in which he had participated seven years ago on the eve of 
the American withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty. 
He also received his questions from the Chairman: Why was Russia 
so loud and vigorous in its reaction to the American missile defence 
deployments? How seriously should the West take President Vladimir 
Putin’s suggestion of the exchange of missile-launch early warning data? 
To the latter query, he reacted by indicating that this could constitute a 
unique chance to transform President George W. Bush’s public relations 
difficulties on missile defence into a successful Russian–NATO dialogue. 
On the former question, he underscored several points. The first of these 
was Russia’s heavy reliance on nuclear deterrence in the post-Soviet era 
(with the accompanying reaction to anything that could challenge that 
reliance). He also stressed the location of the proposed systems, holding 
that the reaction would not be as vociferous if the interceptors were to be 
placed in Bulgaria or Turkey. In addition, there were the electoral aspects: 
President Putin wants a resounding legislative victory and his current 
assertiveness plays to that end. Furthermore, there was a sense that this 
time something was finally “in Russian hands”, which had not been the 
case with NATO enlargement. 
Oliver Thränert was asked by the Chairman why he considered Iran’s 
missile programme to be the country’s “best-kept secret”, given that 
missiles and their necessary testing were not particularly easy to hide 
(unlike some other programmes). He considered that there is a real 
unknown regarding the support Iran is receiving from foreign sources. 
That being said, he added that he very much doubted that Iran would have 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) by 2015 (a traditional US 
                                                     
1 More specifically, although the Western intermediate-range nuclear forces (the 
Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles) based in Europe in 1983 were 
purely American in terms of ownership and funding, their deployment was 
undertaken based on a collective NATO decision. Notwithstanding the very short 
warning times involved (circa 10 minutes), which are akin to those of a missile 
defence system, the drafting and implementation of the rules of engagement were 
ensured within the NATO framework and involved the European members of 
NATO. 
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forecast). He reminded us that long-range missiles only make serious 
strategic sense as weapons of mass destruction if they have nuclear 
warheads; if Iran were to change its nuclear course and refrain from 
acquiring nuclear weapons, we would not need a missile defence. (Thränert 
exposed the important and subtle thesis developed in his paper, being that 
we can deter Iran without missile defence, but with missile defence, we 
may be able to prevent Iran from deterring us in the Middle East. 
Moreover, missile defence can contribute to crisis stability, notably by 
removing the need for us to eliminate Iran’s offensive capabilities early on 
and by relieving Iran from a ‘use them or lose them’ requirement.) Thränert 
flagged the issue of command and control as well as the problem of 
southern-flank coverage. He stressed the high desirability of cooperation 
between NATO and Russia on a missile-launch early warning system. 
In the discussion, the contribution of missile defence to crisis stability 
was challenged given the imperfect nature of such defences; however, 
Slocombe reminded us that relying on pre-emption was no less imperfect. 
To the question of the long-term effects of NATO enlargement, Pikayev 
noted its strong impact on both Russian voters and decision-makers, a 
situation aggravated by the widespread perception that, during his 
presidency, Mikhail Gorbachev had secured a commitment by the West not 
to enlarge NATO. Slocombe stated that the alternative to enlargement 
would have been the creation of a belt of resentful countries accusing the 
West of a new ‘Yalta’, yet devoid of the rationale justifying the first Yalta, 
i.e. the fact that Soviet forces had already been present in those countries. 
A CEPS participant took issue with the views of Russian analysts as 
discussed in Alexander Pikayev’s paper, according to whom Russia should 
not be deprived by American GBIs of the options of targeting Western 
Europe, notably France and the UK: this was truly MAD (mutually assured 
destruction)-era reasoning. He posed a query about an article by Judy 
Dempsey in the International Herald Tribune2 concerning apparent American 
proposals recently made in Moscow regarding transparency in missile 
defence, threat-driven deployment and the use of the Gabala early warning 
radar in Azerbaijan. 
                                                     
2 See J. Dempsey, “U.S. offers Russia new concessions on missile shield”, 
International Herald Tribune, 20 October 2007. 
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To this, Pikayev reminded us of the “cannibalistic world of nuclear 
deterrence”. He seized the opportunity to highlight the very serious nature 
of Russia’s proposals for a missile early-warning joint data exchange centre 
(JDEC). For his part, Slocombe indicated that during the Clinton–Yeltsin 
years he had been involved in the crafting of the original US–Russian JDEC 
agreement to set up such a centre in Moscow; he could not understand why 
interest had been lost in actually implementing the agreement. 
At this stage, a senior US official stepped into the discussion, 
providing what was at the time of the meeting information that had not yet 
been introduced into the public debate. After noting that Poland-based 
GBIs would be operationally incapable of intercepting Russian ICBMs, he 
indicated that during the early October ‘2+2’ discussions in Moscow, the 
American secretaries of state and defence had stated that the missile 
defence system in Central Europe would not go live or be activated until 
there was a demonstrable Iranian threat, as materialised by missile tests. 
The potential date of readiness, in the presence of such a threat, would be 
sometime between 2011 and 2015. The importance of Gabala’s role had also 
been emphasised, and Russian liaison officers would be present in the 
Czech and Polish ABM facilities to provide reassurance vis-à-vis “break-
out”. This important (and at the time novel) exposition of what were called 
the American ‘concepts’ shaped the tone of the rest of the discussion. 
A Czech official noted inter alia that in terms of command and 
control, there would be a human element involved, in order to exercise 
negative (stopping the automated computer sequence) rather than positive 
authority. This point drew the remark from Walter Slocombe that although 
the published timeline of 250 to 300 seconds for launching the interceptors 
was too short to take a political decision, the computer would still be 
unable to act entirely on its own. It would still need a human being to allow 
it to implement pre-determined rules of engagement and execution phases. 
A US official recalled, as had his Czech colleague, that NATO had a 
long-term interest in missile defence. Specifically, he noted that the plan 
was to have an initial operating capability in 2010 for the C3 (consultation, 
command and control) aspect of NATO’s Active Layered Theatre Missile 
Defence, which would be the interface for sharing early warning data 
between the US and its allies. He confirmed that the exchange of data 
between Russia and the US had been suggested at the 2+2 meeting in 
Moscow, adding that this would best be done within the NATO–Russian 
relationship. 
DOES EUROPE NEED A NEW MISSILE DEFENCE SYSTEM? | 47 
What were the Russian reactions? asked a European participant. 
Alexander Pikayev noted that Moscow had talked about a “step in the right 
direction”, but not more; it would now be up to the 2+2 working group 
discussions. He considered that Russia’s problem with the CFE 
(Conventional Forces in Europe) and INF Treaties were only marginally 
tied to the missile defence dossier. 
In his concluding remarks, Oliver Thränert remarked that Russia now 
had to make a choice, given the US proposals: Would Moscow stop playing 
the ‘splitting the West’ game? Concerning the INF Treaty, he reminded us 
that this was the most far-reaching arms control agreement, eliminating a 
whole class of weapons between the signatories. Moving away from the 
INF Treaty would really have an impact on Russia’s relations with the US 
and Europe. He also expressed the view that there was a lot of talk about 
Moscow’s embrace of MAD, but he queried whether the Soviets had ever 
really believed in it. 
Alexander Pikayev noted that the former Soviet Union might have 
been a poor pupil of MAD but Russia had become a good teacher… On the 
splitting of the West, he remarked that America had managed to achieve 
this without much help from Russia. On the INF Treaty, he added that 
President Putin’s proposal is to transform the Washington treaty into a 
global treaty, not to withdraw from it. 
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The US-Proposed European Missile 
Defence 
An American Perspective 
Walter Slocombe* 
allistic missile defence has been controversial – technically, 
strategically and politically – almost since it was first proposed in the 
1950s. The proposal by the US to add a European element to the 
deployment of a limited ballistic missile defence, which has been a key 
element of the Bush administration’s defence programme, is no exception. 
At one level, the US proposal is modest in scale and mission, but it has set 
off a major controversy because it touches on so many other issues. Among 
these are differences over the significance of Iranian actions and over how 
to respond to them, along with the growing tensions between a resurgent 
and assertive Russia and the US, the former satellites and the rest of 
Europe. In addition are the European suspicions of American unilateralism 
and militarism, internal strains within Europe between ‘old’ and ‘new’, 
long-standing controversies about ballistic missile defence and concerns 
about the future of arms control. There are also fears for the future of 
NATO, squeezed between American instincts to bypass it and act 
bilaterally and the EU project for a distinctly European defence capability. 
All of these issues are overlain by domestic political ones in practically 
every country concerned. 
This paper attempts to address some of the main issues raised from 
an American, but certainly not an official administration, perspective.  
What is the US project? 
The installation under consideration is, in effect, an extension of the 
deployments the US has in train on US territory, at Fort Greely in Alaska 
and Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. Under the ‘third site’ 
initiative, first broached with the Czech and Polish governments in 2002, an 
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interceptor base would be built in Poland (tentatively at Gorsko in north-
western Poland) that would have launchers and ground support 
equipment for 10 mid-course interceptors. The interceptors would be a 
modified version of the ground-based interceptors that the US is deploying 
in Alaska and California, adapted for the more rapid European 
engagement by removal of the third stage. A narrow-beam X-band radar, 
now being used as part of the test equipment at Kwajalein Island in the 
Pacific, would be moved to the Czech Republic (tentatively at Brdy, just 
south of Prague), to provide precise mid-course tracking and engagement 
control for the interceptor missiles. The configuration would also include a 
transportable X-band radar, based on the radar used with the Terminal 
High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) theatre missile defence system, at a 
location nearer the expected threat to provide initial warning and tracking 
data. This ‘forward-based radar’ could either be moved to a forward 
location as the threat developed or be placed forward more or less 
permanently, presumably in a country bordering on Iran. There have been 
rumours that the US is considering deployment in the Caucasus, but the US 
denies that it has made any approach to any potential host country.  
The system would, according to unclassified presentations of the US 
Defense Department, be constructed in 2011–13 and when operational it 
would be capable of intercepting long-range missiles launched from Iran 
against targets in either the US or Europe. The system would provide 
coverage for targets in Europe north and west of the line running roughly 
from northern Greece through central Ukraine.1 The full cost – currently 
estimated at about $4 billion – would be paid by the US, and command and 
control of the European site would be integrated with that of the US 
ballistic missile defence system as a whole.  
Does Europe need a missile defence system at all? 
The stated purpose of the European element of the US missile defence 
programme – like the broader US long-range ballistic missile defence effort 
– is to counter the possibility that, over the next decade or so, a number of 
‘rogue states’ will acquire both nuclear weapons and long-range missiles to 
                                                     
1 The exact coverage area depends on the characteristics of the attacking missile 
trajectory. According to the Pentagon, the areas the system would defend against 
intermediate-range missiles would also include an additional belt (250 km wide) 
running south-east along the coverage area for longer-range missiles.  
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deliver them. The US has been explicit in acknowledging that the European 
element is specifically designed to counter Iranian missiles. Although there 
is no question that Iran has a military missile programme, the pace and 
scale of Iranian missile efforts are disputed. Iranian authorities have 
themselves suggested that Iran is working on a 2,000 km range variant of 
the Shahab-3 intermediate-range ballistic missile, which could nearly reach 
Rome, Prague and Warsaw, but Iran denies any intention of developing 
longer-range missiles. The US dismisses the Iranian self-imposed limit and 
projects an Iranian intercontinental missile by as early as 2015 (just after the 
Polish site would become operational). Others, including Russia, maintain 
that the Iranian work is proceeding much more slowly. Whatever the exact 
pace and extent of its plans, Iran is on the road to a missile capability that 
would be a threat to Europe, as well as to the US (and Russia, Israel and 
other countries that might stand in the way of Iranian ambitions). A missile 
defence system, it is argued, would deny Iran the option of using its 
nuclear and missile arsenals for a high-confidence threat to respond with 
devastating effect to action by the US and its allies that Iran regarded as 
against its fundamental interests, particularly their resistance to regional 
aggression by Iran.  
There is debate not only over the scale and pace of the Iranian 
programme to build nuclear weapons and delivery systems for them, but 
over the appropriate response from the international community. The US 
administration – along with the new French government and some other 
nations, including Israel – warns that the Iranian programmes are nearing 
the point where Iran will have the capability to threaten nuclear destruction 
of targets in much of the world. The administration also makes the point 
that, whatever the actual pace of the Iranian programme, it will take time to 
build a defence and it is better to be a bit early than far too late. Advocates 
of ballistic missile defence point out that if (as seems all too possible) 
neither diplomacy, sanctions nor even military force deflects Iran from this 
course, it would be very important to have a defence and the prospect of a 
workable defence would provide at least a partial neutralisation of the 
Iranian threat without the immense risks of military action. On the other 
hand, some outsiders – including the Russians but by no means them alone 
and by no means only apologists for the Tehran regime – argue that Iran is 
far from having an effective (or indeed) a nuclear weapon or means to 
deliver it by missiles to distant targets. They maintain that any military 
response, including passive defence as well as active pre-emption, is more 
likely to harden positions and increase risks than to eliminate the danger. 
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Will the defence work? 
Every missile defence initiative since the Nike Hercules programme in the 
1950s has been met with questions about whether the defence offers a 
reasonable prospect of being effective at a simple technical level. The 
American proposal for a European site is no exception. The American 
position is that the interceptors to be deployed in Poland are substantially 
identical to the ground-based interceptors (GBIs) that have been tested with 
increasing success as part of the overall ballistic missile defence effort that, 
while still incomplete and far from fully developed, is basically on track 
technically. The US Missile Defense Agency, pleased with the successful 
July test, expresses confidence that the system to be deployed in Europe 
would be highly effective against the relatively primitive missiles that Iran 
could develop in the next decade or so and that technological 
improvements will keep that edge as hostile missile technology improves.  
Critics point out that the US system is still far from having proved 
successful in tests they regard as operationally realistic, especially those 
whose targets employ what the critics describe as countermeasures within 
the capacity of an adversary able to build long-range ballistic missiles. The 
Missile Defense Agency replies that the system is designed to discriminate 
decoys and that they will begin tests against countermeasures shortly, 
arguing that ‘simple’ countermeasures are far from simple. 
A related line of criticism is that even if the defences work quite well, 
they will, by definition, do nothing against alternative means of delivery 
that do not rely on ballistic missiles. Ballistic missiles are a particularly 
effective vehicle, however – they (and their nuclear warheads) can be 
maintained under close control in a home territory until literally a few tens 
of minutes before use and, assuming the missile and weapon function 
properly, they are certain to be effective if there is no defence. All other 
options, from aircraft to agents, compromise either pre-launch control or 
the certainty of arrival at the target or both. 
Should all of this have been done through NATO?  
The project is not a NATO effort, but a trilateral agreement among the US, 
Poland and the Czech Republic. Nor has the US committed to make it 
available to NATO. Rather, the US will exercise national command and 
control over the system and there has been no formal undertaking as to the 
standards by which the US would decide when and how to use the 
interceptors in cases where there was no direct threat to the US itself. The 
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Bush administration rejects claims that it is slighting or bypassing NATO, 
referring to its extensive briefings on the subject and its undertaking to 
participate actively in parallel NATO measures to provide a defence 
against shorter-range missiles that the GBIs’ deployment could not handle. 
Moreover, the US has pointed out that the US would pay the whole bill for 
a deployment that would strengthen European security by providing a 
defence for much of the territory of Europe.  
It is, from NATO’s point of view, no doubt regrettable that a major 
element of the defence of the European continent requiring the cooperation 
of three NATO allies is not more fully integrated into the alliance, but that 
is by no means unusual: practically every defence procurement decision 
made by a NATO member is ultimately made as a unilateral choice. While 
agreed NATO priorities are often a factor, the degree to which NATO’s 
complex defence-planning mechanism actually influences any individual 
ally’s programme is limited. NATO itself has almost no military assets of its 
own (with NATO’s Airborne Warning and Control System, and of course, 
the integrated command structure being the main exceptions). Virtually all 
of the actual military power that the alliance could muster depends, as 
would access to the European-based missile defence, on national decisions 
to commit nationally-owned assets in particular circumstances. 
But the issue of missile defence presents a particular challenge – and 
an opportunity – for the alliance. The site in Poland could not defend all of 
Europe, even if it worked perfectly. Areas south and east of the coverage 
line, including all or part of the territory of NATO allies Turkey, Greece, 
Bulgaria and Romania are too close to Iran to be attacked by long-range 
missiles, but they could be attacked by shorter-range systems. NATO has 
had under consideration for many years the goal of establishing a 
distinctively NATO-run missile defence for deployed forces and, more 
recently, for protection against short- and medium-range missiles. The US 
has been a vocal backer of that effort, but only as a complement to and not 
a replacement for US programmes, and it has indicated that it would 
provide technology and assets to support a system that would defend those 
NATO allies that the Polish site could not cover. In June, NATO formally 
re-affirmed its commitment to these missile defence programmes. Whether 
these formal commitments translate into funding and hardware to make 
the forward defence system a reality remains to be seen. 
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Is the US seeking to deploy in Europe a system whose main purpose is to 
protect the US and not Europe?  
It is sometimes claimed that the interceptors in Europe are primarily 
designed to fill gaps in the protection of US territory. If the Pentagon’s 
explanations are given any credit, this claim is false. To be sure, the 
European radar and interceptors would be capable of intercepting Iranian 
missiles heading for the US as well as those aimed at targets in Europe. 
Still, the US maintains that a European base is not necessary for the defence 
of the US itself, because the interceptors already being deployed in the US 
(supported by radars in Greenland and the UK) can engage missiles aimed 
at targets anywhere in the 50 states from the Middle East as well as from 
North Korea (their principal mission). The implication is that the Polish–
Czech–US project would not only give the US the means to protect its allies, 
the US would have no need to withhold interceptors for the future 
protection of the US.  
Why is Russia opposed?  
Russia, under President Vladimir Putin, has chosen to make the European 
element of the US missile defence plan a major issue. Were it not for the 
Russian opposition, it is hard to believe that the proposals would be nearly 
so big an issue. That opposition has a number of explicit dimensions and 
perhaps some hidden agendas as well. 
Is Russia back and standing tall? The Russian opposition, some in 
the US claim, is simply muscle-flexing, which is perhaps understandable, 
but is not to be taken too seriously and certainly not to be encouraged by 
accommodation. The US initiative coincides with a sharp deterioration in 
US–Russian (and NATO–Russian) relations. Russia, under President 
Putin’s robust leadership and strengthened by an influx of oil income has 
moved from the economic crisis, internal disorder and international 
weakness of the 1990s to reclaim its pride and reassert its position as a 
major world power. In the eyes of many Russians, one of the humiliations 
of the post-Soviet era was the entry of Poland and its Central European 
neighbours into NATO. The fact that these new military allies of the US are 
considering letting the US establish major military installations on their 
territories is, in Russian eyes, not merely a violation of promises made 
when a weak Russia had to acquiesce to Western insults, but also 
inconsistent with the respect such nations should show to a restored 
Russia.  
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Does the defence threaten the Russian nuclear force? Russian 
spokespersons have also advanced the far more concrete argument that the 
American proposal threatens the Russian nuclear deterrent, at least in the 
long term. If this were true, it would be a major concern, because for all its 
revival, Russian military power and to a considerable degree its 
international standing still depends heavily on its being the equal of the US 
in nuclear weaponry. Some Russian spokespersons, official and otherwise, 
have maintained that the US installations would pose a threat to Russian 
security because they could serve as a means of gathering intelligence2 and 
eventually as the foundation for a larger, more capable system that would 
have the scale and sophistication to threaten the Russian nuclear force. On 
this point, the US argues that it is absurd for Russia, with many hundreds 
of missiles in its arsenal, to claim to see any danger in 10 interceptors, 
because any Russian attack could simply overwhelm the defence. The US 
has gone even farther and asserted that the radar and interceptors are so 
positioned that they would be incapable of supporting an engagement with 
Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) because the interceptors 
could not catch up with the Russian missiles in the tail chase that 
geography would impose.3 As for the longer-term potential of a defence 
against the Russian force based on the current programme, the US argues 
that it has no intention of pursuing the ‘will of the wisp’ of a massive 
defence. Moreover, the US argues that if it tried, the current system is 
simply not capable of serving in any meaningful way as the base for a 
                                                     
2 The Russian contention that the radar in the Czech Republic could monitor 
Russian space and missile activities is implausible technically because the narrow 
beam X-band radar (even if properly aimed) would be wholly unsuited to that 
task, for which the US has plenty of other and far better assets available.  
3 Some technically well-qualified American critics of the deployment proposal have 
disputed this claim, maintaining that it assumes an unrealistically long delay in 
launching the interceptors and a ‘dumbing down’ of the interceptors’ speed. 
Whether or not the assumed delay – up to five minutes – and/or the slower 
interceptor velocity (less than 7 km/sec) make the claims of complete incapability 
against Russian ICBMs misleading, the basic fact is that the numbers are tiny 
compared with the Russian force. Those same observers have also conducted 
analyses that tend to show that the system could intercept Russian missiles aimed 
at targets (such as British and French nuclear forces) in Western Europe. Whether 
the existence of a system with that capability would be a good thing or a legitimate 
cause for Russian complaint is, of course, a matter of opinion.  
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wholly hypothetical future US project to defend against Russian missiles, 
not just because of the numbers but also because of the technical limitations 
on the capacity of the radars and the capabilities of the interceptors. 
Are promises being broken? The Russian government has also 
claimed that the deployments would violate assurances that Russia had 
been given when Poland and the Czech Republic joined NATO against the 
establishment of American military bases on their territories. The American 
response is that the 1999 NATO–Russian statement in question referred 
only to nuclear weapons and “additional permanent stationing of 
substantial combat forces”,4 neither of which are involved. Furthermore, 
the US argues, the 1999 statement was conditioned on the security situation 
remaining as it was then – a premise vitiated by Iranian nuclear and missile 
programmes (and perhaps by changes in Russian policies and behaviour). 
More broadly, the view in Washington – and in Central Europe – is that 
Russia cannot be permitted to assert a right to veto security cooperation 
between the US and sovereign countries, especially when, as the US insists, 
the cooperation poses no threat to Russian security.  
Is this a convenient issue? President Putin and other senior Russian 
leaders have put forward a number of potential Russian actions to offset 
the supposed danger the European site poses to Russian interests. Some, 
like resuming long-range bomber surveillance of US Navy ships on the 
open ocean and reconnaissance flights near US and NATO borders seem to 
be primarily aspects of a Russian reassertiveness, unlinked to any specific 
US actions. Other ideas have been floated as ‘the’ Russian response to 
American plans, such as threats to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces Treaty, to put missiles in the Kaliningrad enclave or to 
target Europe generally (and the bases). These ideas seem calculated mostly 
                                                     
4 The 1999 Founding Act includes the following statements:  
The member States of NATO reiterate that they have no intention, no 
plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new 
members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear 
posture or nuclear policy – and do not foresee any future need to do 
so…NATO reiterates that in the current and foreseeable security 
environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defence and 
other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, 
and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent 
stationing of substantial combat forces. 
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to appeal to European fears that Americans are always fomenting arms 
races and dragging Europe into their adventures and to foster US–
European tensions in general. There are those in the US – and probably in 
other countries as well – who believe that Russian objections and 
particularly the brandishing of these sorts of responses have very little to 
do with any real concerns about Russian security, but rather derive from 
the realisation that criticising the US project as dragging us all back into 
cold war confrontation has easy payoffs for Russia. The very fact that 
Russia objects tends to make the project divisive within the alliance and 
within the domestic politics of all three partners. Linking its objections to 
professed doubts about the pace of the Iranian programmes helps Russia 
curry favour with an Iranian regime that needs advocates.  
Is there any way to convince the Russians? Post-cold war discussion 
of missile defence with Moscow has been marked by repeated failures in 
hopefully-initiated efforts to build a US–Russian partnership on the subject. 
To Americans, and at least in the past to some Russians, missile defence 
looks like an ideal area for cooperation – both Russia and the US (as well as 
others) are threatened by rogue state missiles; only Russia and the US have 
any substantial, independent technological capacity to build a missile 
defence. Therefore, close coordination if not actual partnership should be 
easy to agree. But none of the specific concepts – whether the Bush 41 plan 
for a jointly managed defence, the Clinton team’s joint warning centre or 
the Bush 43 idea of cooperation against Iran – has gone much beyond the 
communiqué stage. All have foundered on issues of joint control, access to 
information and generally uneasy relations.  
As the third site project has grown more controversial, the US 
administration has, possibly making up for lost past chances, sought to 
reach out to Russia. The most recent efforts are proposals outlined by US 
Defense Secretary Robert Gates in an otherwise frosty meeting in Moscow. 
These proposals include measures of transparency designed to assure the 
Russians of the limited and (to them) non-threatening character of the US 
deployments and an undertaking to not make the Polish base operational 
after its completion, unless and until it was clear that the Iranian threat had 
emerged. Although the details are vague (presumably in the hope of 
forestalling a quick Russian rejection), the proposals apparently involve the 
presence of Russian inspectors/observers at the interceptor and radar sites 
to enable the Russians to confirm the limited capabilities and missions of 
the installations. In addition is the possibility of agreeing on a set of 
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milestones by which to measure the progress of the Iranian threat, e.g. 
whether tests have been conducted to longer ranges.  
Russia, for its part, has carefully held open the door to some form of 
cooperative resolution. President Putin’s proposal that a Russian early 
warning radar in Azerbaijan replace the Czech radar site was no doubt 
calculated to gain the public relations initiative, but it also might have 
signalled some interest in making the project a symbol of US–Russian 
parity. Perhaps predictably, the US team that visited the radar site reported 
that it would at best be a partial supplement to the radars already included 
in the US plan, but the recent US offer seems to have included a proposal to 
set up a system to exchange data between the US and Russian sensor 
systems. Russia’s insistence that the Azeri site replace the Czech site and 
American insistence that it could at most be a distinctly secondary element 
illustrate both the technical and the political obstacles to agreement. 
Nonetheless, if both sides want to find a mutually tranquillising 
compromise, somehow incorporating the Azeri site (possibly as one 
although not necessarily the only early warning site) might be a way out. 
Other measures of transparency, such as Russian personnel at the site, 
inspections, joint exercises and joint warning arrangements, have been 
offered, which could also provide ways to both assuage the genuine 
Russian concerns and afford the means for a graceful compromise by both 
sides. 
Do the Russians have a point about the Treaty on Conventional Forces in 
Europe? 
The one concrete step that President Putin has taken so far that he has 
directly linked to the missile defence proposal is his declared intention 
(which still has not received the State Duma approval he could presumably 
have whenever he wants) to ‘suspend’ Russian compliance with the Treaty 
on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). This action – if not its linkage to 
the missile defence question – reflects Russian grievances that deserve to be 
addressed, as NATO has conceded in principle. Russia has long regarded 
CFE as an anomaly and an anachronism. The collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact fundamentally transformed the 
geopolitical landscape for conventional arms control in Europe. NATO can, 
however, fairly claim to have done a good deal to accommodate Russian 
objections, including agreeing in 1999 on substantial modification of the 
terms of the Treaty, which Russia has regarded as unfair in the post-Soviet 
context. NATO nations have nevertheless refused to ratify those changes 
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until Moscow completes the withdrawal of troops in Moldova and the 
Caucasus to which it committed itself when the CFE Treaty changes were 
agreed. 
Will the Czechs and Poles agree? 
The project has had support from the Czech and (previous) Polish 
governments, as well as from some leading opposition parties. In early 
2007, they agreed to start formal negotiations on such issues as the bilateral 
status of force agreements covering the US military personnel who would 
staff the installations. Still, public opinion polls indicate that a majority of 
the population in each country opposes the deployment, and the project 
has yet to receive final parliamentary approval in either country. Some of 
the public opposition is likely to be derived from a sense that the US has 
taken Central European support too much for granted and that the defence 
site will needlessly embroil the host countries in large geopolitical 
confrontations in which they have little direct interest. (Others in each 
country may well see their cooperation with the US on a bilateral basis as 
solidifying their security relationship with America, which many regard as 
more important than the NATO relationship per se.) It will probably take a 
continuing US effort – and a commitment from the new US administration 
in 2009 – for the project to be definitively approved. The new Polish 
government can be expected to review Poland’s position and, assuming it 
decides Poland should continue to back the concept, insist on satisfactory 
terms. That effort in the Polish negotiations and in those with Prague as 
well will no doubt need to include satisfying some pending demands on 
bilateral issues, such as visa equality and trade, and renewed special 
security assurances, possibly including providing missile defences against 
shorter-range (i.e. Russian) attacks. (There are also some supposed 
concerns related to environmental issues, such as the mistaken notion that 
the radar will be a health hazard. The US and the two governments will 
need to reassure their publics on these subsidiary issues.) 
Will the US Congress approve the system?  
The issue has not been a highly visible one in US debates, but it is becoming 
so as Russian objections grow more strident, and everything to do with 
missile defence is to some degree a battleground. In the newly Democratic-
controlled Congress, approval of any Bush administration initiative cannot 
be taken for granted and many of the questions raised in Europe, including 
by Russia, find some resonance in the relevant committees. Moreover, the 
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European missile defence initiative is seen by some as part of a package of 
initiatives: missile defence generally (including expanded cooperation with 
Japan and possible sales to Taiwan), the Reliable Replacement Warhead 
programme for a new nuclear weapon for the stockpile, the impending 
expiration of the Start I agreement and a plan to replace the nuclear 
warheads on a few Trident submarine missiles with non-nuclear warheads. 
Taken together, these initiatives are seen by some as a worrying (and ill-
defined) overemphasis on nuclear and nuclear-related forces. In addition, 
the recent very troubling security failure when nuclear-armed cruise 
missiles were taken out of storage improperly and flown across the 
country, unguarded and unnoticed for many hours, will contribute to 
scepticism about all aspects of strategic programmes. Yet so far, the US 
Congress has limited itself to restricting appropriations to what is needed 
to keep the initiative alive, pending further tests and agreement with the 
host countries, while raising questions about alternative defence 
approaches, such as a sea-based system. Congress is unlikely to fund the 
project fully until there is definitive approval by the two host countries, but 
it is equally unlikely to kill the project if it continues to have the support of 
the administration. A broadly worded but non-binding resolution of 
support for building an effective defence of both the US and Europe against 
Iranian missiles was recently passed by the Senate, although the 
programme most probably will not need – or receive – full congressional 
backing until the new administration takes a position.  
Why is there so much resistance from Europeans? 
In a sense, it is no surprise that any initiative of the Bush administration 
should arouse deep scepticism in Europe, especially if, as is the case for the 
missile defence plan, it can be seen as yet another example of an American 
urge to find military solutions, needlessly exacerbating already difficult 
international relationships, ignoring international institutions, conjuring up 
exaggerated WMD threats under every bed and sabotaging arms control 
agreements, and doing so in the service of a long-standing ideological 
commitment (in this instance to ballistic missile defence schemes). 
What effect does the Russian dimension have? Europeans have 
different views of the degree to which changes in Russia – including the 
establishment of the undemocratic and seemingly unchallengeable 
predominance of a strongly centralist, nationalist and security-focused 
leadership – should be met with conciliation or confrontation. A proposal 
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that (in Russian eyes at least) seems to suggest a military response has 
unsurprisingly been both welcomed and condemned on just that ground.  
Is the US undermining European institutions? Quite apart from the 
issues of how to deal with a changed Russia, this additional instance of the 
US dealing directly with what former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld 
called “new Europe” on a major military initiative raises concerns at a time 
when the future of NATO is uncertain and Europe is in the process of 
building its own multinational defence institutions. What is more, while the 
US maintains that it has gone to great lengths to keep all allies informed 
about its missile defence plans and to take their concerns into account, the 
fact remains that the US has made its own decisions and worked on the 
issue bilaterally with Poland and the Czech Republic, and not through 
NATO, much less the EU. Accordingly, to some in Europe the European 
element of the missile defence project is yet another example of American 
unilateralism and insensitivity to European preferences for multilateral 
action and decision – while to some Americans, the European reaction is 
simply confirmation of European fecklessness and the necessity of bilateral 
action if security is to be preserved.  
Conclusion 
The third site project has a solid military and strategic rationale. In the 
coming decades, it is all too likely that Europe (as well as the US and the 
rest of the world) will find itself living in a world in which dangerous 
regimes have nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them rapidly by 
long-range missiles. The technology exists and it can be further developed 
to provide a reasonably high-confidence defence against such a capability; 
it is hard to see a clear reason not to do so. Indeed, it could be argued that 
those who are (rightly) strongly opposed to an attempt to stop the Iranian 
programmes by military force should be the first to welcome an American 
idea that holds out the possibility of substantially neutralising the threat of 
an Iranian nuclear-armed missile capability, without a military attack or 
having to rely on sustained punitive sanctions.  
The US has probably undertaken a good deal more consultation on 
this project than it gets credit for and the recent proposals will satisfy some 
critics. Nevertheless, the US still needs to do a vastly better job, not just of 
talking to allies and others about its plans in this and other regards, but 
also of taking into account their concerns and putting the project into a 
broader context of US concepts for dealing with Iran, with Russia and with 
nuclear weapons in the new century. The US should make clear that once 
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built, the system would be presumptively available as a NATO asset when 
needed, just as all allies’ forces should be. And the US should strongly 
support the NATO programmes to cover those aspects of the missile 
defence mission that the third site would not. Russian objections are, to a 
large extent, overstated. Indeed, in many respects, they look contrived, but 
they nonetheless must be addressed by serious and bold proposals for 
transparency and cooperation, including a willingness to find a way to use 
the Azeri site as part of the package and to follow through on ideas for data 
exchange. 
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Europe’s Need for a Damage-Limitation 
Option 
Oliver Thränert* 
n his speech at the Munich Conference on Security Policy in February 
2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin strongly criticised US plans for 
constructing elements of its missile defence shield in Poland and in the 
Czech Republic. This missile defence system could protect both the US 
homeland and parts of Europe. President Putin, however, warned that 
these systems could cause a militarisation of outer space along with yet 
another arms race. Many European authors have also articulated negative 
views about the US missile defence project. Echoing Mr Putin’s arguments, 
these critics point out that these US defences in Europe would pose a threat 
to Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrence posture and therefore could cause 
an arms race between NATO and Russia. Paradoxically, the same analysts 
often doubt the technical feasibility of strategic missile defences. Moreover, 
many believe that Iran, as opposed to the arguments put forward by the 
Bush administration, would not become a major threat to Europe, even if 
Tehran were to develop nuclear weapons. The mullahs, so the argument 
goes, are not irrational and would not have any reason to attack Europe or 
the US. Even if they intended to do so, NATO’s nuclear forces would 
successfully deter them. 
In essence, we are witnessing a cleavage between two schools of 
thought. On the one hand are the traditionalists (who are more vocal in 
Europe), who prefer traditional approaches such as diplomacy, non-
proliferation, arms control and deterrence. On the other hand are the 
modernists or missile-defence advocates, who believe that measures to 
meet new threats such as the proliferation of long-range missiles and 
nuclear weapons should also include missile defences. This latter line of 
thinking is more influential in the US and countries such as Israel and 
Japan, which are exposed to Iranian or North Korean missiles. 
                                                     
* Oliver Thränert is Head of the Security Policy Research Group, German Institute 
of International Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin. 
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It was very unfortunate that President Putin’s Munich speech 
activated the current missile defence debate. As a consequence, at least the 
European discussion has been framed along Russian arguments. But the 
central question has often been overlooked: Does Europe need a missile 
defence shield to protect its population against possible threats arising 
from the Middle East? 
This paper first considers potential threats originating from the 
Middle East. It then looks at a scenario in which Iranian nuclear-tipped 
missiles might become a threat to transatlantic security. The main rationale 
for this scenario is to explain why classic nuclear deterrence, which we 
experienced during the cold war, would not be sufficient to meet possible 
new threats in the future. That section is followed by a brief analysis of 
Russian arguments concerning the planned US missile shield. The paper 
concludes with a few questions that need further discussion. 
Threat perception 
When looking at the Middle East, current threat perceptions mainly focus 
on Iran. Indeed, Tehran has one of the most advanced missile programmes 
in the region. But before asking what this means for European and 
transatlantic security, we should first recall that missiles are not weapons of 
mass destruction. What is decisive is the combination of missiles and 
nuclear warheads. Therefore, Iranian missiles would only become really 
dangerous if Tehran were to pursue its current policy of aiming at having a 
nuclear weapon option. The jury is still out on whether the UN Security 
Council could convince Iran through its policy of incrementally increased 
sanctions to change course. If so, the entire issue of missile defence for 
defending Europe and the US against possible Iranian threats would look 
completely different.1 
Furthermore, a threat is a combination of capacity and intention. But 
we do not exactly know the purposes for which Iran is developing its 
missiles. Is Tehran seeking the capacity to deter foreign invasion, or in 
other words, are its intentions more defensive in nature? Or is Iran 
intending to become more assertive vis-à-vis its neighbours and at the same 
                                                     
1 For an analysis of the negotiation process, see O. Thränert, “Sorting out the Iran 
Puzzle: The International Community’s Coordinated Iran Diplomacy has Opened 
Doors”, Internationale Politik (transatlantic edition), Vol. 7, No. 4, 2006, pp. 32–38. 
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time keep foreign powers at bay? At this juncture, it appears almost 
impossible to answer this question, not least because even if current Iranian 
motivations are more defensive, this stance might change once Tehran 
acquires a nuclear missile capability. 
Finally, the future development of the Iranian missile programme is 
very hard to predict. The Iranian missile programme is among the best-
kept state secrets. Western intelligence information is often fragmentary 
and controversial. Time and again, this situation causes dissensions within 
the intelligence community. For instance, in 2001, most US agencies argued 
that Iran would be able to launch an intercontinental ballistic missile 
(ICBM) by 2010. The CIA did not share that view. Today, US intelligence 
services estimate that Iran might develop an ICBM by 2015. Yet, there is an 
important ‘known unknown’ in this equation: To what extent will Iran 
continue to receive foreign assistance from North Korea (with which it has 
very close ties concerning missile development) and from Russian or 
Chinese technicians (apparently still working in Iran but whose exact 
knowledge and skills are unknown)? 
The answer to this question is probably more important today than it 
was in the past. Iran is now at a crossroads in its ballistic missile 
programme. If Iran really wants to extend ranges to more than 2,000 km (its 
newest, single-stage Shahab-3 has a range of about 1,500 km), it needs to 
master the multistage technology. That phase is very complicated and 
ambitious. Many doubt that North Korea, which certainly benefited from 
the assistance of Russian technicians, was successful in this regard. While 
Pyongyang successfully tested a three-stage Taepo-Dong-1 on a single 
occasion in 1998, to the extent that the first two stages worked, a test of the 
Taepo-Dong-2 in 2006 was a complete failure. Considering that all current 
Iranian ballistic missiles are based on North Korean models, it is therefore 
questionable whether Iran will develop its own multistage missile in the 
near future. While there is no doubt that Iranian leaders are willing to 
extend the ranges of their missiles, it will presumably take them much 
longer than the US intelligence community expects. Nevertheless, as noted 
above, there are many uncertainties surrounding the analysis of this issue.2 
                                                     
2 See A. Seaboyer and O. Thränert, “What Missile Proliferation Means for Europe”, 
Survival, Vol. 48, No. 2, 2006, pp. 85–96. 
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At the same time, Europeans should not neglect the possibility that 
Pakistan may also become part of the equation. Islamabad already 
possesses about 60 nuclear weapons, although their type is unknown. The 
country is steadily enhancing its nuclear capabilities. Its most advanced 
ballistic missile, the solid-fuelled, two-stage Shaheen-2, has a range of 
about 2,500 km. This system, although successfully tested on repeated 
occasions, has not yet become operational. In the past, Pakistan has heavily 
benefited from Chinese assistance. Whether Beijing will continue providing 
support for Pakistan’s missile developments remains to be seen.3 
Today, the Pakistani leadership under President Pervez Musharraf is 
seen as a Western ally. At this time, however, his government is facing 
strong pressure from Islamic radicals. Therefore, many observers do not 
rule out the possibility that Pakistan sooner or later may become a failed 
state with nuclear weapons, or another Taliban-ruled (and this time 
nuclear-armed) country. Again, it is hard to predict what consequences this 
would imply for European and international security. It is possible, 
however, that missile defences could make sense as a damage-limitation 
option. 
Why not simply rely upon nuclear deterrence? 
Deterrence optimists such as pundits of neo-realism often take the view 
that a nuclear Iran could be successfully deterred just like the Soviet Union 
was during the cold war. Yet today, the strategic context looks completely 
different. In his famous debate with Kenneth Waltz on potential threats 
associated with the spread of nuclear weapons, Scott Sagan challenges the 
optimist neo-realist view. Sagan argues that further nuclear proliferation 
could result in small states being easily invaded by their nuclear weapon-
equipped neighbours, as the latter may believe their new weapons will 
deter intervention by outside powers.4 This is exactly the situation we 
might face if Iran goes nuclear. Many states in the Middle East already fear 
that a nuclear Iran might turn more aggressive and provide a cover for 
                                                     
3 See R.S. Norris, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces, 2007”, Nuclear Notebook, Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 63, No. 3, 
May/June, 2007, pp. 71–73, p. 74. 
4 See S.D. Sagan, “Sagan Responds to Waltz”, in S.D. Sagan and K.N. Waltz, The 
Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, New York, London: W.W. North & Company, 
1995, p. 129. 
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proxies such as Hezbollah and other terrorist organisations. Leaders in 
Tehran may calculate that a foreign invasion to counter what may be 
perceived as Shia imperialism becomes less and less likely the more Iran’s 
nuclear and missile capacities advance. In any event, many observers 
believe that for Iran, nuclear weapons are weapons of deterrence and power 
projection.5 Against this background, the question is not whether the US, 
NATO or the international community could deter Iran from a nuclear 
attack. At stake is whether a nuclear Iran could deter international 
intervention aiming at re-establishing regional order against Iranian 
aggression or assertiveness. Observing recent history in Middle Eastern 
affairs, we might pose the question: Would the international community 
have sent troops to free Kuwait from the Iraqi invasion in 1991, if Saddam 
Hussein had already had nuclear-tipped missiles capable of reaching 
Europe or the US? 6 
In the past, during the cold war period, the main idea of deterrence 
was not to use military force in a relatively stable situation. In the future, in 
a world with more nuclear powers equipped with long-range ballistic 
missiles, countries feeling responsible for protecting international order 
would need to decide whether they want to use their forces against 
aggressions in a contingency that might result in severe damage caused by 
the use of nuclear weapons by the aggressor.7 
Deliberately accepting one’s own vulnerability, as the West did 
during the cold war, does not seem the appropriate strategic approach in 
such a context. Nevertheless, the question arises as to whether missile 
defences could help the US and its European partners regain room for 
manoeuvre to intervene if there is a need to re-establish order in the Middle 
East or elsewhere. Missile defences of whatever nature will never work 
completely reliably. Still, even limited missile defences would have an 
impact on an aggressor’s calculations, as he could not be certain actually to 
                                                     
5 See D. Dassa Kaye and F.M. Wehrey, “A Nuclear Iran: The Reactions of 
Neighbours”, Survival, Vol. 49, No. 2, 2007, pp. 111–28, p. 117; C. Dueck and R. 
Takeyh, “Iran’s Nuclear Challenge”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 122, No. 2, 
2007, pp. 189–205. 
6 See V.A. Utgoff, “Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions”, 
Survival, Vol. 44, No. 2, Summer 2002, pp. 85–102. 
7 We should also not overlook the fact that nuclear deterrence during the cold war 
did not deter the Soviet Union from invading Afghanistan in 1979. 
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cause damage with his nuclear missiles. But for the country or coalition 
seeking to intervene against aggression by a nuclear newcomer, the 
important question is whether it could afford the damage possibly 
resulting from a nuclear response despite the missile defences in place, or if 
it decides instead that it cannot afford the risk and thus chooses not to 
intervene with troops, thereby avoiding nuclear retaliation by the new 
nuclear state in the first place. 
Here it is held that there would possibly be a significant difference 
between the calculations of the US and those of the European allies for at 
least two reasons. First, before the Iranians developed missiles that could 
reach US territory, they would already have such weapons at hand that 
could threaten European cities. Therefore, in such a contingency, it might 
be easier for Washington to decide to send troops to the Middle East than it 
would be for Europeans to do so, although the US would certainly not like 
to see its European allies taken hostage by Iran. Second, in contrast with 
Europe, the US reputation as a world power would be at stake in a severe 
crisis in the Middle East. If a country like Iran, with its current Islamic 
leadership, follows an aggressive approach directed against its neighbours, 
and Washington is unable to protect its friends and allies and re-establish 
order because Iran could threaten US cities with its ICBMs, this would 
significantly undermine the reliability of US security guarantees in the 
Middle East and elsewhere. As a consequence, Washington could be in 
danger of losing its status as a world power. 
For these reasons, even limited missile defences could be more 
valuable to the US than to Europe. In a scenario in which Iranian missiles 
could reach European but not US territory, even limited defences 
protecting Europe would make it much easier for Washington to go to war 
against Iranian aggression. Even if Tehran could hit targets in the US with 
missiles, the damage limitation resulting from missile defences could better 
enable the US to protect friends and allies in the Middle East against 
Iranian aggression, thereby maintaining US world leadership. 
From a European perspective, the situation could look quite different. 
Europe is not a world power and thus does not have such a status to lose. 
European governments would not like to see Iran becoming a dominant 
power in the Middle East and undertaking proxy wars. Yet they would 
have a hard time convincing their populations to intervene in the Middle 
East against Tehran’s will if this action could result in an Iranian nuclear 
attack in response. It is true that Tehran would need to calculate that 
American as well as British and French nuclear forces could strike back. But 
68 | READINGS IN EUROPEAN SECURITY 
could European governments be certain that deterrence works? More 
importantly, if they determine that it does, could European political leaders 
convince their constituencies of that view? Moreover, would European 
publics be convinced by the argument that if deterrence failed, the installed 
missile defences could limit the damage, and thus is it worth accepting the 
risk and participating in an invasion in the Middle East despite the possible 
consequences? 
The argument put forward here is that missile defences are much 
more likely to provide Washington as a world leading power with more 
room for manoeuvre in the face of a crisis in the Middle East, caused for 
instance by a nuclear Iran, than they would for its European allies. Yet does 
this mean that missile defences do not make sense at all for Europe? Just 
because the US may have a different calculus and may intervene militarily, 
in such a situation it would still be perfectly appropriate for Europe to have 
a damage-limitation option at hand. As previously mentioned, this would 
also clearly be in Washington’s interest, as the US needs to avoid the 
situation in which its European partners are taken hostage. 
In addition, missile defences could contribute to stabilising crises. 
Iranian leaders are not irrational, but they may miscalculate in a crisis, as 
could any government. Given the nature of the Iranian leadership, it is also 
unlikely that it would establish crisis-management procedures such as hot 
lines or red telephones as the US and the former Soviet Union did, albeit 
only after their common experience of the Cuban missile crisis. Again, 
damage limitation through missile defences may make sense in the context 
of crisis mismanagement. Also, if the Iranians were to know that owing to 
missile defences the US or NATO (or both) would not be under great 
pressure to pre-emptively strike at Iran’s nuclear weapons early on, Tehran 
might not find itself in a ‘use them or lose them’ situation. This prospect 
would again contribute to restoring stability. 
Finally, missile defences can be seen as tools to support non-
proliferation policies, not to weaken them. Such projects signal to countries 
interested in nuclear weapons and offensive long-range missiles that the 
states they want to threaten are capable of developing defences that could 
undermine the political aims the proliferators might be seeking to achieve 
through their weapons programmes. Therefore, missile defences would 
serve as disincentives to potential proliferators, thereby reducing their 
willingness to violate non-proliferation treaties. 
To wrap up this section, missile defences are more likely to provide 
the US rather than Europe with more room for manoeuvre in the face of 
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new nuclear adversaries. At the same time, damage limitation is an 
important option for Europe, because the US might choose to act in a crisis 
in which the Europeans might hesitate to do so, and because missile 
defences could contribute to crisis stability. They could also support non-
proliferation regimes, which are especially seen by Europeans as an 
important element of their policies. 
US missile defence and Russia 
The West has an interest in stable and reliable relations with Russia as a 
partner. One of the main obstacles on the way ahead is that Moscow still 
has not defined the role it wants to play in the world. Russia today 
perceives itself as a country that is back on the world scene and wishes to 
be respected as a great power. But what does Russia stand for, and what 
are its foreign policy priorities? Instead of dealing with these questions, 
many debates in Russian foreign policy circles currently focus on criticising 
the West for actions such as NATO enlargement.8 If the West really wants 
to establish a longstanding and stable partnership with Russia, it should 
avoid taking all the arguments put forward by Russia at face value. This 
situation does not facilitate Russia finding its way in the future, a 
precondition for a fruitful relationship between Moscow and its Western 
partners. The present debate about missile defence is an interesting test 
case in that regard. 
The planned US missile defences do not pose a threat to Russia. 
Although Russia and the West do not always share the same interests, the 
cold war and with it the ideological confrontation are gone. Today, the 
large conventional forces facing each other in Central Europe are obsolete. 
There is no longer a danger that a crisis could escalate from conventional to 
nuclear war. 
As mentioned several times by the Bush administration, its current 
missile defence plans are not directed against Russia. Rather, the intention 
is to provide protection from single long-range missiles from Iran or North 
Korea. While the interceptors that are already stationed in Alaska and 
California as part of the ground-based midcourse defence system are well 
suited to defend the US homeland against possible attacks from North 
                                                     
8 See D. Trenin, Russia’s Strategic Choices, Policy Brief No. 50, Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, Washington, D.C., May 2007. 
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Korea, they are less well positioned to hit missiles originating from the 
Middle East. To that end, Washington wants to deploy 10 ground-based 
interceptors (GBIs) in Poland. These could intercept Iranian missiles either 
on their way to Central Europe or to the American east coast. 
President Putin in effect accepted this line of the US argument when 
proposing that a Russian radar system stationed in Azerbaijan could be 
jointly used by Moscow and Washington in the future to detect Iranian 
missile launches. Such an approach would be better than using a new radar 
system to be built in the Czech Republic, the Russian president opined. Mr 
Putin also speculated about the positioning of US missile interceptors in 
Turkey rather than in Poland. This move would not threaten Russian 
interests. With these proposals, Mr Putin admitted that a missile threat 
from Iran could become real and that the US aim is to defend against 
threats originating from the Middle East, not to undermine Russia’s 
strategic nuclear-deterrence posture. 
In fact, the planned US missile defences could not fulfil such an 
intention with respect to Russia. To achieve the purpose of intercepting a 
large proportion of Russia’s still numerous strategic nuclear missiles, 
Washington would need to deploy several hundred missile interceptors in 
Europe. The present US plans are based on 54 GBIs – 44 in the US and 10 in 
Europe – through 2013. More importantly, some of the Russian missiles 
would not cross Europe in order to reach US territory, but would cross the 
North Pole region; therefore, they could not be intercepted by systems 
stationed in Poland. Even if future US presidents were to decide to 
intensify US missile defence efforts, these would never reach a point in 
which missile defences could be relied upon to destroy or intercept all 
Russian nuclear forces in a first strike. After all, why should a US president 
decide to attack Russia without the certainty that New York City, for 
instance, could not be entirely destroyed by one large, Russian nuclear 
weapon in response? Indeed, if Russia were really concerned that US 
missile defences could endanger its second-strike capability, why has the 
Russian critique of US interceptors already stationed in Alaska and 
California thus far been rather lukewarm, while the rhetoric criticising the 
US plans to build up parts of its missile defences in Europe been so intense? 
Prior to the June 2007 G8 summit in Heiligendamm, Russia had been 
escalating its campaign against the US missile shield. It warned of a 
possible new arms race – including the test firing of new Russian missiles. 
In addition, Moscow threatened to abrogate the 1987 Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces Treaty, which bans an entire class of US and Russian 
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ballistic missiles, and to suspend compliance with the reductions agreed in 
the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. These statements almost led 
to the point where the struggle about missile defences became more 
important than the other items on the original G8 agenda such as global 
warming. In making them, Moscow intended to underscore its importance 
as part of the family of the world’s leading countries. 
The reasons for this Russian policy are based on both Russian 
domestic politics and Moscow’s foreign policy goals. Both are interrelated. 
As far as domestic politics are concerned, President Putin seeks to portray 
himself as a great statesman who is not to shy in confronting Western 
policies. In doing so, Mr Putin serves an anti-Western paranoia that is 
widespread not only among the Russian political elite but also among the 
Russian population. 
In terms of foreign policy goals, President Putin aims at 
demonstrating that Russia is no longer as weak as it was during the 1990s. 
Therefore, the days of Moscow accepting Western policies that weaken the 
Russian position, such as NATO enlargement, are forever gone. The 
Russian leadership additionally wants to exploit ongoing transatlantic 
irritations. Furthermore, Moscow intends to negatively affect the European 
integration process and send a signal to new NATO members such as 
Poland and the Czech Republic, in whose national decision-making Russia 
still wants to have an influence. President Putin is aware that in Europe in 
general, and in Germany in particular – a country he understands very well 
owing to his excellent German language skills – the reputation of the Bush 
administration is very low. Mr Putin also realises that Washington missed 
explaining its missile defence intentions appropriately to European publics. 
By arguing that US missile defences could cause a nuclear arms race, the 
Russian president has hoped to diminish even further the reputation of the 
current US administration in Europe. 
At the same time, by criticising the Polish and Czech governments, 
both of which are willing to allow Washington to base parts of its missile 
defences on their territories, President Putin has highlighted the different 
security policy orientations of European countries. These divergences are 
partly reflected in the criticism by other European governments that the 
new NATO members are relying too much on the US rather than being 
interested in developing European security and defence policies. Finally, by 
opposing missile defences in Poland and the Czech Republic – but not in 
Denmark or the UK, which have already passed decisions to contribute to 
respective US defence plans – and proposing that the US station these 
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systems in Turkey, President Putin wants to underline that there is still a 
difference between old and new NATO members and that Moscow 
continues to have a say as far as former Warsaw Pact members are 
concerned. 
Furthermore, Russia is in the process of modernising its strategic 
nuclear forces, which remain a priority for Russian defence planners. 
Moscow continues to deploy silo-based and road-mobile Topol-M (SS-27) 
intercontinental missiles. Russian engineers are also working on new 
ballistic missile submarines armed with the new Bulava submarine-
launched ballistic missile. Moreover, Moscow is pursuing programmes to 
develop new long-range cruise missiles. Further modernisation projects 
include the Igla manoeuvrable warhead and a reported hypersonic delivery 
vehicle. Finally, Russia is engaged in fourth-generation nuclear weapons 
research, such as precision low-yield nuclear weapons, clean nuclear 
weapons (earth penetrators and neutron weapons) and weapons tailored to 
create special effects such as an electro-magnetic pulse. Owing to 
budgetary constraints, Russia’s strategic nuclear forces will decrease in 
numbers in the near future. Nevertheless, given the aforementioned 
modernisation programmes, Moscow intends to keep its forces up to date. 
Apparently, the goal is to have a strategic nuclear fleet that is “small, but 
beautiful” long into the 21st century.9 
Some of these projects are motivated by US missile defence plans and 
aim at overcoming them. Yet, the main rationale for Russia to continue 
placing many of its defence eggs into the basket of strategic nuclear forces 
is different. Russian leaders are well aware of the central role these 
weapons play in Russia’s status as a world power. Next, for Russia, 
modernising its strategic nuclear weapons is still less expensive than 
keeping its conventional forces up to date, not least because all of its plans 
to create an effective state-of-the-art professional army have failed so far. 
Russian strategic thinkers are now mimicking NATO’s flexible response 
strategy of the cold war to the extent that they see nuclear forces as the only 
weapons able to counter NATO’s conventional superiority. This argument 
has grown more influential, particularly since NATO’s enlargement. This 
process might be pursued even into former Soviet territory. Finally, 
                                                     
9 See P.I. Bernstein, J.P. Caves, Jr. and J.F. Reichert, The Future Nuclear Landscape, 
Occasional Paper No. 5, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
National Defense University, Washington, D.C., April 2007, pp. 25–27. 
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NATO’s war against Serbia in 1999 indicated to Moscow that the 
transatlantic alliance does not hesitate to use force. Against this 
background, it seems fair to conclude that Moscow, in criticising US missile 
defence plans in Europe and warning against another arms race, is seeking 
to legitimise a strategic, nuclear modernisation programme that is already 
underway. 
As noted at the beginning of this section, the West has an interest in a 
cooperative partnership with Russia. In fact, missile defences could become 
part of such a partnership. At present, the US Missile Defense Agency, 
together with Russia, conducts a Theatre Missile Defense Exercise 
Programme. The US has also invited Russia to cooperate on the 
development of defence technologies and share intelligence on common 
threats. Washington has even offered to permit Russian officials to inspect 
future US missile defence bases in Europe.10 Discussions within the NATO–
Russia Council to ensure transparency as well as to sort out possible joint 
endeavours in that regard should also be intensified. After all, the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles, 
especially in the Middle East, could turn out to be a threat for Russia as 
much as for the West. But before common missile defence projects can 
materialise, Moscow needs to decide whether it wants to cooperate in this 
field or whether it wants to continue to use the missile defence debate as a 
rhetorical tool to separate the Europeans from the Americans and create 
divisions within Europe. 
Some believe that President Putin’s proposal to use the Gabala radar 
station in Azerbaijan jointly with the US in the future points in the right 
direction. This view seems questionable, however. The Gabala radar is part 
of the Russian early warning system. It could be useful for early warning 
purposes, but the Bush administration is mainly seeking an X-band radar 
capable of tracking and guiding defence interceptors towards Iranian 
offensive ballistic missiles. Therefore, it would be much better to install 
such a system in the Czech Republic as currently planned by Washington 
rather than in Azerbaijan, which is too close to the Iranian border. Many 
observers also believe the Gabala radar to be outmoded. Furthermore, the 
Gabala radar station is a significant element of Russia’s national defence. 
Once the data from the Gabala radar as well as Russian space-based 
                                                     
10 See T. Shanker, “Pentagon Invites Kremlin to Link Missile Systems”, New York 
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surveillance systems confirm a missile attack, it would trigger nuclear 
retaliation. Therefore, it seems rather unlikely that Moscow would 
completely share all its data with other nations such as the US. By the same 
token, if some cooperation between the US and Russia were to take place, 
particularly if a crisis erupted in the Middle East, Washington could never 
be sure that Moscow was indeed sharing all of its data. Against this 
background, the US could not entirely rely upon cooperation with Russia 
in terms of the Gabala radar. Therefore, it could not renounce its plans for 
its own radar in the Czech Republic as part of its missile defence system.11 
Issues that need further discussion 
Even if one is in favour of the Bush administration’s missile defence plans, 
some open questions remain. One concerns the technical feasibility of 
missile defence. Since 2002, when the flight test programme for the ground-
based midcourse defence began, three out of six tests were successful 
intercepts. Still, many express doubts concerning the effectiveness of the 
system. They argue that those tests were not undertaken under realistic 
conditions. The GBIs to be deployed in Poland, which will consist of two 
rather than three stages, have not yet been tested. Given the fact that the US 
began intensifying its missile defence activities during the Reagan 
administration of the 1980s, one might ask how long it will continue to take 
to develop an effective strategic missile defence. Yet, exactly because it is so 
difficult and time-consuming to develop effective defences, it seems 
inappropriate not to increase the current efforts instead of waiting until 
today’s potential missile threats develop into real ones. 
Next, there is the issue of costs. The total estimated costs for the 
European missile defence project are $4.04 billion for the fiscal years 2007 to 
2013.12 Because the planned US defence systems to be deployed in Poland 
and the Czech Republic would not only defend Europe but would mainly 
be part of the US national homeland defence, Washington will cover the 
expenses. Should Europeans in the future be expected to share the missile 
                                                     
11 See A. Zagorski’s comment in the Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel, “Putin’s 
Surprise”, 15 June 2007 (retrieved from http://www.russiaprofile.org/ 
page.php?pageid=Experts%27+Panel&articleid=a1181909384). 
12 See S.A. Hildreth and C. Ek, Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe, CRS 
Report for Congress, Code RL 34051, Congressional Research Service, Washington, 
D.C., updated 25 July 2007, p. 4.  
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defence bill, this could cause trouble for many European governments. 
Their main problem would be how to reconcile the cost-expansive 
transformation of conventional forces already engaged in international 
contingencies such as Afghanistan with the expected missile defence costs. 
Moreover, the planned radar station in the Czech Republic and the 
GBIs to be deployed in Poland would be part of a multilayered, US national 
missile-defence architecture. Washington considers forward-based missile 
defences in Europe an additional option to other US interceptors to defend 
against Iranian missiles crossing European territory in their mid-course 
flight. These defences could also intercept Iranian ballistic missiles that are 
targeted against Central Europe. Washington continues to insist, however, 
that it remains in full control of these defences and does not intend to give 
the Europeans a say insofar as command and control are concerned. In 
other words, the US project clearly lacks a NATO component. For the 
Europeans this means that they will completely depend upon the US on an 
issue of strategic proportions (including the problem of the debris falling 
on European territory from missiles intercepted on their way to the US). 
Whether proposals to deploy two GBI bases in Europe – one controlled by 
the US and one by NATO – could contribute to a solution to this problem 
needs further discussion.13 
Notably, the US GBIs in Poland could protect Central Europe, but not 
the southern flank of NATO’s territory. The Atlantic alliance needs to rely 
upon the concept of the indivisibility of security. This means that all NATO 
members need to have the same protection against missiles. So far, in its 
own missile defence efforts NATO has focused on the Active Layered 
Theatre Ballistic Defense Programme, aiming at improving the protection 
of deployed NATO forces in out-of-area contingencies. NATO has also 
been deliberating strategic missile defences. A related feasibility study 
concluded that a long-range ballistic missile defence system to protect the 
alliance would be technically feasible. In June 2007, NATO defence 
ministers agreed to conduct a study of a complementary anti-missile 
capability that would protect the south-eastern part of the alliance territory, 
which would not be covered by the planned US interceptors. How these 
projects could be combined with the US GBIs in Poland, particularly in 
                                                     
13 See S. Frühling and S. Sinjen, “NATO Missile Defense: The Political and 
Operational Case for a Two-Base Structure”, Rusi Journal, December 2006, pp. 58–
61.  
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relation to command and control of a NATO-wide missile defence, remains 
an open question. 
Finally, even if all these issues could be resolved, another central 
question would remain: What impact would a NATO missile defence 
capability providing protection for Americans as well as Europeans have 
on the European security and defence policy (ESDP)? If missile defence 
were seen as an indispensable strategic tool for Europe, operated by 
NATO, would that not imply a diminishing role for the ESDP? This 
question is especially of concern to countries such as France, which puts an 
emphasis on the development of Europe as a security and defence actor. 
Although it is true that the Bush administration has taken the initiative on 
missile defence and may be criticised for not consulting its European 
partners appropriately on the issue, the EU itself has failed to adopt a clear 
position on this security and defence matter.14 
Conclusion 
The discussion about a missile defence system that could protect both the 
European and American populations has just begun. Governments will 
have to take decisions while not exactly knowing how the missile threat, 
for instance from the Middle East, will evolve. The costs and technical 
feasibility of missile defences will also remain unclear. In any case, Europe 
as well as the US should continue engaging in missile defence projects 
because the option of damage limitation is of the essence at a time when 
further nuclear and missile proliferation is taking place. At the end of the 
day, this is a question of world order. Missile defences could provide at 
least the US with more room for manoeuvre to re-establish order. 
Cooperating with Russia in the area of missile defence should be a Western 
goal, but it should not be seen as a precondition. Some important questions 
affecting NATO, such as command and control issues, need further 
consideration. Still, the respective debates should not give room for a 
transatlantic struggle at a time when cooperation seems more needed than 
ever. 
 
                                                     
14 See T. Bauer and F. Baumann, Missiles for Europe? U.S. plans expose Europe’s 
strategic weaknesses, CAP Policy Analysis No. 3, Centre for Applied Policy 
Research, Munich, July 2007. 
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Russia and Missile Defences 
Alexander Pikayev* 
ince late 2006, the debates about US plans to deploy the third site of its 
national missile defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic 
have been perceived as a major irritant in US–Russian and Russian–
NATO relations. Although the issue is indeed one of a number of serious 
disagreements between Moscow and Washington, its role seems 
exaggerated by the media and some analysts. Nevertheless, the missile 
defence deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic do represent one of 
the most serious disagreements in recent US–Russian relations. The 
solutions to these disagreements seem remote, and they must be carefully 
managed in order to prevent relations between Moscow and Washington 
from slipping towards confrontation. 
Red line 
Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, has mentioned two red 
lines on which Russia will not change its position – Kosovo and missile 
defences. On all other controversies in the Russian–Western relationship, 
including Iran and the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), 
Moscow has expressed its willingness to reach a deal. Strong and vocal 
Russian opposition to the plans to locate the third site of the US national 
missile-defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic could be 
explained by three major factors: 
• Traditionally, missile defence systems have been the key controversy 
in the realm of US–Russian strategic nuclear relations, since they add 
uncertainty to nuclear planning and create additional pressure to 
increase nuclear arsenals. 
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• The choice of deployment on the territories of two NATO member 
states located close to Russia’s borders has exacerbated Russia’s 
disappointment over NATO’s eastward enlargement. 
• Finally, the Kremlin might be interested in using the potential 
deployments as evidence of Western ‘aggressiveness’ in the context 
of Russian parliamentary and presidential electoral campaigns. 
The dramatic weakening of Russia’s conventional deterrent since the 
Soviet collapse has forced the Russian military to pay more attention to the 
country’s still powerful nuclear forces. In contrast with the Soviet era, the 
nuclear forces are regarded as a deterrent not only against a potential 
nuclear attack, but also against large-scale conventional aggression. 
Therefore, the ability to inflict the ‘required damage’ to a potential 
adversary in such circumstances by nuclear forces has become a key factor 
in hard security calculations. As missile defences might hinder such a 
capability, they are thus considered threatening. In the eyes of some 
military planners, the US missile deployments could decrease the 
retaliatory capabilities of the strategic nuclear forces and enable better 
utilisation of conventional predominance in the European theatre of 
military operations. 
Furthermore, the relatively rapid shrinking of Russia’s strategic 
nuclear forces, owing to the decommissioning of older missile systems built 
during the Soviet era together with the very low production of new 
missiles (fewer than 10 per year during most of the post-Soviet period), has 
led to increasing concerns that missile defences could become an element of 
the first-strike strategy. The majority of Russia’s nuclear forces could be 
eliminated in the first strike made by nuclear and highly accurate 
conventional systems; those missiles that survived could be intercepted by 
the missile defences during an attempted retaliation. 
Even limited missile defences might make the options for a limited 
nuclear response not credible. It is widely considered that an all-out 
nuclear response with a large number of strategic missiles as a reaction to, 
say, conventional aggression, seems unlikely. Such a decision would be 
suicidal given the imminent risk of an equally devastating second strike. 
Therefore, the warring side might try to limit an initial nuclear attack by 
using a small number of missiles in an effort to diminish the scale of its 
adversary’s unavoidable retaliation. Yet, even limited missile defences are 
capable of intercepting missiles during such a restricted strike. As a result, 
a nuclear threshold would be increased together with the self-deterrence to 
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cross it. A higher nuclear threshold would make it more difficult to use 
nuclear forces as a deterrent against conventional aggression. 
The third site of the missile defence deployment would increase the 
general capabilities of the US national missile defence system, and therefore 
make the above-mentioned risks more realistic. According to some Russian 
experts, the potential deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic also 
possess some specific risks: 
• The interceptors located in Poland might be capable of intercepting 
missiles launched from bases situated in western Russia during their 
flight to targets on the US east coast. Such a capability has been 
recognised by an authoritative non-governmental report recently 
published in the US.1  
• The anti-missile system to be based in Poland could also undermine 
the nuclear deterrence between Russia and the Western European 
nuclear powers – the UK and France.  
• The radar to be located in the Czech Republic would further develop 
US capabilities to detect and track Russian missiles, which might 
improve the efficiency of other elements of the nuclear missile 
defence system located on US soil to intercept such missiles. 
• The second mobile radar could be deployed to enable the earlier 
detection of missile launches. If deployed in the Caucasus, it would 
be able to monitor activities in that region, which is the most sensitive 
one for Russia’s security. 
• The planned deployments could represent a first step for the system’s 
potential enlargement. Later, more interceptors could be deployed 
and their velocity might be increased as well. Currently under 
development, a multiple-warhead anti-missile system could also be 
delivered within a few years. This expanded anti-missile system 
would significantly raise the risk posed to Russia’s strategic 
deterrent. 
• The interceptors would be deployed in silos. Traditionally, the silos 
have represented launchers for surface-to-surface ballistic missiles. 
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This prospect triggers concerns that the silos might be secretly 
converted for deploying such ballistic missiles, which would be able 
to reach strategic targets in western Russia, including Moscow, 
within minutes. Thus, the disarming capabilities of the US could rise 
substantially. 
• Even if the planned system did indeed aim at intercepting potential 
missile strikes from Iran, the interception might occur over Russia’s 
territory. Consequently, it is possible that Russia could suffer from 
radioactive or toxic fallout (or both), or even a nuclear explosion in 
the atmosphere or on the ground.  
Certainly, these perceived risks are debated and some of them do not 
look very convincing for either the West or some Russian experts and 
decision-makers. Still, the pro and con arguments are usually of a 
complicated technical nature, and could be disputed by using similarly 
complex counterarguments. It is difficult for decision-makers who do not 
understand the technicalities to make an independent judgment. In this 
situation, they would likely have to base their decisions on worst-case 
assumptions, despite the fact that these assumptions are disputable. 
The second set of concerns is linked to NATO enlargement. Russia, 
with its downsized conventional forces, feels insecure in the proximity of 
the most powerful military alliance in the world, which now directly 
borders Russia and in some areas is just a few hundred kilometres from its 
capital, Moscow, and a few dozen kilometres from its second capital, St 
Petersburg. The feeling of insecurity has been aggravated by the fact that 
the adopted CFE Treaty on limiting conventional forces in Europe, which 
partially alleviated Moscow’s security concerns, has not been ratified by 
NATO countries, and the Baltic states – situated the most closely to the 
Russian heartland – have refused to accede to the agreement. In recent 
years, NATO enlargement has been followed by the move of its military 
infrastructure towards Russia’s borders. Two US military bases have been 
opened in Bulgaria and Romania. Moscow believes that this represents a 
violation of the CFE Treaty, a charge that is rejected by NATO. 
It should also be mentioned that the official US justification for the 
deployments – Iran – is itself controversial. This project could be viewed as 
sending the wrong message to Tehran at a time when the international 
efforts aimed at solving the Iranian nuclear issue might be entering a 
critical phase. The G6 countries – the US, China, Russia, France, Germany 
and the UK – are trying to convince the Iranians to give up the most 
controversial elements of their nuclear programme through a mixture of 
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carrots and sticks. In that context, a demonstration of ‘zero tolerance’ 
towards the programme represents an important integral component of the 
efforts. Yet, a decision to deploy the missile defence for protection against 
Iranian nuclear missiles could be considered in Tehran as a willingness by 
the US tacitly to accept Iran’s nuclear status. Under their possible logic, if 
Washington is developing the second echelon of its defence against a 
nuclear Iran, it seems ready to adapt itself to Iranian nuclear developments 
if the negotiations fail. Thus, the missile defence could induce Tehran to go 
nuclear rather than encourage it to show restraint. 
From this perspective, the deployment of missile defences in Poland 
and the Czech Republic, together with the strategic nature of the planned 
system, have become the last straw in a chain of events provoking the 
currently tough Russian reaction. The Kremlin thinks that it has been 
deceived, at least three times. First, during German re-unification, Russia 
allegedly received assurances that NATO would not go eastward, yet the 
alliance made such a decision just a few years later when the circumstances 
changed. Second, in the 1997 Russia–NATO Founding Act, the alliance 
promised not to embark on new, significant conventional deployments on 
the territories of new member states. Although NATO does not recognise 
that the US bases in Bulgaria and Romania as well as the planned missile 
defence deployments could be characterised as ‘significant’, the Russians 
underline the strategic nature of missile defence systems, which thus makes 
them a significant factor in the NATO–Russia balance of forces. 
Third, after the 2002 unilateral withdrawal by the US from the Anti-
Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the US and Russia signed a Memorandum 
on Strategic Security, wherein they are obliged to consult on major issues 
related to strategic stability, including missile defences. This Memorandum 
has never been fulfilled by the Bush administration. The Russians were 
allegedly vaguely informed about the US missile defence plans in Europe, 
but consultations only began in 2007 – after the issue had already escalated 
into a serious crisis in the bilateral relationship and after the US had 
already made the deployment decision. 
The fourth and the least considerable factor is represented by an 
electoral campaign. The Kremlin perceives that the West is trying to 
interfere in Russia’s domestic politics in order to provoke a Russian version 
of the Ukrainian Orange Revolution. To neutralise such an attempt, some 
might think there is a need to discredit the West in the eyes of ordinary 
Russian voters as an ‘aggressive’ anti-Russian entity.  
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Potential missile defence deployments in Poland and the Czech 
Republic are a strong public relations argument favouring such a 
proposition. The system, supposed to be used against Iran, will be 
deployed much closer to Moscow than to Tehran, immediately at the 
Russian western border and far away from the possible launch sites of 
inexistent long-range Iranian missiles. This clear geographical fact 
discredits US arguments in the eyes of Russia’s ordinary domestic 
audience. The contention that Poland is an ideal position from which to 
defend most of Europe is technically complex and cannot compete with the 
simple and clear geographical argumentation. Also, that contention could 
be disputed by using similar technical rationales, which are difficult for 
non-experts to understand. 
Furthermore, the deployment would be made on the initiative of the 
US; no European country, including Poland and the Czech Republic, had 
asked Washington to protect it from a perceived threat of an Iranian missile 
attack before the decision to deploy the system was made in the US. This 
further undermines the credibility of the US arguments that the system is 
designed to protect Europe from the missile threat. The very fact that the 
anti-missile interceptors would be deployed in Poland – a determined critic 
of Russia that seeks to undermine EU–Russian relations – further helps to 
make the case to the Russian public that, in fact, the system has Russia in 
mind. 
It should be noted that the electoral context has made the issue more 
visible in the Russian media. It should not be considered, however, that the 
electoral context is the only reason for Russian opposition to the project. 
The strategic nuclear and security factors are perceived as far too important 
to forget about the system after the elections are completed next spring. 
Countermeasures 
Threat perceptions coming from the US nuclear missile defence system in 
general, and from the missile defence installations in Poland and the Czech 
Republic in particular, along with desires to improve the economy and a 
determination to protect national security make it almost inevitable that 
Russia will have to implement countermeasures against the future system 
if it really is deployed. There might be debates about the nature of the 
measures, those that should not be used and those that should be picked up 
from the available list. But some countermeasures will be implemented. 
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The Kremlin says that the countermeasures will be asymmetrical. 
Moscow wants to avoid the militarisation of the economy, which was one 
of the main reasons for the Soviet collapse. Therefore, it would likely 
concentrate on relatively inexpensive measures, aimed at neutralising the 
system. From the military viewpoint, the list of potential countermeasures 
is quite clear. Moreover, some of them have already been developed and 
tested. 
First and most importantly, Russia will have to increase the 
survivability of its nuclear forces and improve their capabilities to 
penetrate through missile defences. There are indications that after the 
unilateral US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002 and Washington’s 
refusal to go verifiably low in the levels of strategic nuclear forces, Russia 
has had to reconsider its own nuclear modernisation plans. Earlier, there 
were calculations that the Russian strategic nuclear forces might be reduced 
to a level of a few hundred warheads sometime in the 2010s. Now, it looks 
likely that Moscow would be able to maintain force numbers at the levels 
permitted by the 2002 US–Russian Moscow Treaty, i.e. at around 2,000. If 
the US–Russian agreement on strategic arms control collapses owing to the 
expiration of the Start I Treaty in 2009 and the Moscow Treaty in 2012, 
there would be no prohibition on Russia going for higher ceilings. 
Reportedly, in 2001 the then US Secretary of State Colin Powell 
toured European capitals in an attempt to assuage criticism of the US 
decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. One of the arguments he made 
to try to reassure Europeans was that Russia would not be able to build up 
its strategic nuclear forces as a countermeasure against the missile defence 
deployments because of economic reasons. This information was delivered 
to Russian leaders. It is likely that it has strengthened their determination 
to make such a build-up possible.  
In 2002, as a result of the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, 
another arms control agreement – the Start II Treaty – ceased to exist. 
Among other things, it prohibited intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs) with multiple re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). Some experts believe that 
these represent the most effective countermeasure against missile defences. 
With them, it is cheaper to maintain higher nuclear ceilings than with 
single warhead missiles. The considerable throw weight of MIRVed ICBMs 
permits the deployment of a larger number of decoys in order to confuse 
the missile defences. Initially, to comply with the Start II Treaty, Russia 
developed a new single warhead ICBM – Topol-M. It did not develop new 
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MIRVed missiles and under the terms of the Start II Treaty, the existing 
systems were to be dismantled. 
Yet the collapse of the Start II Treaty has permitted Moscow to start 
developing a new MIRVed ICBM. In 2007, it was successfully flight-tested. 
Under the Start I Treaty provisions, the US was informed about the new 
system, which was named RS-25. 
Simultaneously, Russia developed and tested a new warhead, 
especially designed for penetrating missile defences. According to Russian 
officials, it is a high-speed manoeuvrable warhead. Its deployment would 
make the task of intercepting a missile at the final stage of its trajectory 
much more difficult. 
Russians have also started to pay more attention to two other 
components of its triad – submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) 
and heavy bombers. These enable missiles to be launched from unexpected 
azimuths, making the task of their early detection more difficult. There are 
reports that Moscow has begun production of Sineva SLBMs, and it has 
developed and tested a new Bulava missile. Although earlier there were 
hints that the strategic submarines would only be based in northern Russia, 
recently there have been accounts that bases on the Pacific coast would also 
remain – which would not only permit maintaining survivability but 
would also increase the number of potential launch sites in the ocean. As a 
result, an interception task would become more complicated. 
In 2007, it was announced that Russia had resumed limited 
production of the Tu-160 Blackjack heavy bombers. It has also resumed 
routine flights of the Tu-95 Bear bombers to train pilots for implementing 
higher alert missions. Strategic airports around the Russian territory have 
been deactivated for permitting the strategic bombers to disperse in order 
to increase their survivability. 
This long list should not be interpreted as a real build-up. So far, 
Moscow is only trying to maintain operational all the legs of its strategic 
triad and to make qualitative improvements. The build-up is only relative 
and can be termed as such solely by comparing it to the levels predicted for 
the situation should the US have remained in the ABM Treaty. In real life, 
Russia’s strategic nuclear capabilities continue to diminish along with the 
decommissioning of a large number of old Soviet systems and the small 
production of new missiles.  
In addition, the military forces might need the capability to destroy 
threatening objects on the ground. Russian leaders have warned that they 
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might retarget Russian nuclear missiles on European targets. They have not 
clarified what specific targets they have in mind, but most likely these are 
the components of the missile defences to be deployed in Poland, the Czech 
Republic and elsewhere. This retargeting might include of some strategic 
nuclear delivery vehicles – land- sea- and ground-based. Conventional sea- 
and air-based cruise missiles could also be used for implementing such a 
mission. 
In 2007, Russia tested a new short-range, high-speed, ground-based 
cruise missile, which could be deployed on the Iskander missile launcher. It 
was further reported that the range of the cruise missile, if necessary, could 
be increased. If deployed in the Kaliningrad oblast or in Belarus, it could 
potentially destroy interceptors in Poland and even the radar in the Czech 
Republic. 
Militarily, the Russians might also be interested in intercepting the 
anti-missiles on their flight in two scenarios. First, if these were launched 
for intercepting Russia’s own missiles. Second, if the anti-missiles 
attempted to hit a third-country missile above Russia’s airspace. In the 
latter case, it is especially important to have the capability to intercept the 
anti-missile in the air, since destruction of the facilities on the ground is 
infeasible. 
Finally, the deployments might trigger Russia’s own efforts in the 
area of missile defence. In 2007, it was announced that new S-400 Triumph 
air-defence systems had been deployed around Moscow. The systems 
purportedly possess a capability to hit not only airplanes, but also cruise 
missiles and short-range ballistic missiles. This deployment could be 
considered as the first step in efforts to improve the protection of vital 
strategic facilities if the silos in Poland were to be converted for housing 
surface-to-surface missiles. 
The above-mentioned list of current and potential countermeasures is 
not complete and is based on publicly available information. New 
measures could be announced in the foreseeable future. Some measures 
remain hypothetical, while the scale of the deployment of others that have 
already been developed and tested remains uncertain and will depend on 
the state of overall political relations between Russia and the US, and 
Russia’s relations with the West in general in the coming years.  
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Diplomatic context 
Moscow and Washington continue to disagree over the missile defence 
deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic. Both sides, however, seem 
interested in preventing the disagreement from reaching confrontation. 
Russia continues to maintain an interest in becoming a part of the West, 
and a significant proportion of the Russian political class still believes that 
their country belongs to the European civilisation. The US is experiencing 
problems in Iraq and Afghanistan, and cannot afford a confrontation with 
Russia, which would considerably undermine US interests in the Middle 
East, Iran, Afghanistan, South Asia, the Korean peninsula and possibly in 
other sensitive areas.  
In order to decrease the tension, the Russians have delivered a 
proposal for the joint use of some elements of the Russian early warning 
system for monitoring missile risks. Initially, at the June 2007 G8 summit in 
Heiligendamm, President Vladimir Putin proposed that the US jointly use 
the phased-array radar built by the former Soviet Union and located at 
Gabala in Azerbaijan. Russia operates the facility, which is rented from 
Azerbaijan until 2011. There is a feeling that Moscow does not have plans 
to continue the rent beyond 2011 and is fulfilling a plan to construct a 
newer early warning facility on Russian soil as a substitute. Nevertheless, 
Moscow has made such use conditional on eliminating plans to deploy the 
US defences in Poland and the Czech Republic. 
During the US–Russian informal summit at Kennebunkport in Maine, 
President Putin further developed his proposal. Beyond Gabala, he offered 
the joint use of the new radar in Armavir (Krasnodar Krai), which should 
be completed by 2008. Also, he returned to the idea of opening a joint data 
exchange centre (JDEC) in Moscow. The US–Russian JDEC agreement was 
achieved in the late 1990s. Under the agreement, American and Russian 
officers, sitting alongside one another, would receive limited and filtered 
data from the national early-warning systems of the two countries and 
provide the data to their respective militaries. So far, the Russians have 
selected a building for the centre in northern Moscow, but the two sides 
have subsequently lost interest in the initiative. 
According to President Putin, the data received from Gabala and 
Armavir could go to the JDEC, and from there to the US and Russian 
militaries. He also suggested establishing a similar centre in Brussels, in 
order to share the data with non-NATO states. 
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Irrespective of the reasons underlying the Putin proposal, it has 
opened doors for discussing potential US–Russian cooperation with respect 
to strategic missile defence. Previously, Moscow had only accepted 
consultations on non-strategic missile defences within the NATO–Russia 
Council. It has also participated in missile defence simulations conducted 
on a bilateral basis with the US. In the current political context, the 
proposal has helped to limit damage in the bilateral relations inflicted by 
the US decision to deploy missile defences in Poland and the Czech 
Republic. 
Furthermore, in 2007 the US and Russia agreed to establish a 2+2 
consultation mechanism at the level of ministers of defence and foreign 
affairs. Within the framework of this mechanism, several working groups 
have been established. One of them should deal especially with the missile 
defences. The groups gather on a regular basis, with the ministers meeting 
every six months. In fact, a permanent channel for bilateral political 
dialogue has been formed. It will help to maintain constant contact for 
discussing matters of mutual concern, including the missile defences. This 
contact might in turn help to manage tensions in the bilateral relationship 
during the electoral season in Russia and perhaps later in the US. 
From its side, the US has also made some proposals aimed at 
alleviating Russia’s militant rhetoric. During the 2+2 consultations in 
Moscow held in October 2007, Washington delivered a set of proposals to 
the Russians. Although they remain classified, it has become known that 
among other things, these proposals contain transparency and confidence-
building measures intended to address Russia’s concerns about the missile 
defences to be deployed in Poland and the Czech Republic. In particular, 
Russian inspectors would be permitted to visit the future sites. There are 
also hints that the deployment of the missile defences could be postponed. 
Some US officials have even alluded that the plans might be reconsidered if 
the threat from Iran does not materialise. 
Obviously, a change in the US position has taken place because the 
Bush administration is facing difficulties in promoting the missile defence 
initiatives and because it needs a certain understanding with Russia on 
some sensitive issues, including a few regional ones. It is clear that the US 
is unlikely to gain unconditional permission from Prague on the radar 
deployment. Meanwhile, the US Congress has reduced expenditures for the 
missile defences and there is influential domestic opposition to the plans. 
Some Western European allies are far from enthusiastic about the US plans 
and how these have circumvented multilateral institutions and debates. 
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The Russian side suspects that the recent US proposals represent only 
a propagandistic effort aimed at reducing domestic and international 
opposition to the US project. First, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and 
Defense Secretary Robert Gates did not bring to Moscow any proposal in 
its normal diplomatic form. There were only vague oral statements, which 
did not permit the Russians to understand the US ideas in full detail. 
Washington has promised to give the Russians a written proposal, but as of 
6 November 2007, it has not yet been delivered. Second, the US reportedly 
promised to establish only the missile defence infrastructure; the 
deployment of the interceptors themselves would only be undertaken upon 
evaluation of the threat. Again, this proposed measure could be considered 
meaningless. The US could receive a go-ahead for the initial works and 
upon their completion, Washington could unilaterally decide that the time 
was ripe for deployment. As such, this measure would not amount to a 
substantive difference from the current situation. Finally, the US might 
offer the Russian military an opportunity to visit the sites in Poland and the 
Czech Republic, if both countries accept it. This measure per se could be an 
important step for confidence-building and transparency. It would be 
hostage, however, to historical hang-ups on the part of Warsaw and 
Prague. They could block such visits, perhaps with tacit US acquiescence or 
even inducement.  
Regarding the future, the Russians would be unlikely to change their 
opposition to these US plans. There may be calculations to buy time until a 
new administration comes to power in the White House, which might be 
less ideological about defence. Also, a weak, centre-right cabinet of Czech 
Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek could lose its fragile majority in 
parliament and be substituted by a centre-left coalition, which, together 
with a majority of Czech voters, opposes the US radar deployment.  
The US opponents to the missile defences are also interested in a 
tough Russian position, and behind closed doors, they might even urge 
Moscow to remain firm. Russia’s opposition would also force the Bush 
administration to pay a higher price both domestically and in US relations 
with some key European countries. Finally, the missile defence issue is 
increasing suspicions that Poland is playing the role of an American Trojan 
horse in European institutions and that it is pursuing the US line in order to 
slow down European integration. 
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Conclusion 
The plans of the Bush administration to deploy the third missile defence 
site in Poland and the Czech Republic represent a premature and ill-
defined measure. The decision about it has been made at a time when the 
US and US-led institutions, as never before, need broad international 
support for their efforts to stabilise Iraq and Afghanistan. In that context, 
the inevitable alienating of Russia as a result of that decision may bring 
counterproductive consequences in the short term. In the longer run, the 
US action could trigger a counteraction, which has been in various phases 
of preparation since the US unilaterally withdrew from the ABM Treaty 
and which might put an end to a unique situation of security that emerged 
in Europe with the end of the cold war. Fortunately, more recently the US 
and Russia have established diplomatic instruments for maintaining 
uninterrupted dialogue on the missile defence system and other critical 
issues on the bilateral agenda. This step brings with it the hope that their 
relations will remain manageable during the electoral campaigns in both 
countries, and that disagreements about the missile defence plans will not 
escalate into open animosity and confrontation. 
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Chairman’s Summing-up 
Michael Emerson* 
his 28th session of the European Security Forum, on 11 February 2008, 
was timed one week before the expected declaration of 
independence by the government of Kosovo, and not surprisingly 
the seminar attracted a packed audience. The widespread expectation is 
that the US and a progressive cascade of EU member states will recognise 
Kosovo, and that the EU will go ahead with a major ‘rule of law’ mission 
there without further UN resolution (arguing that the wording of the 
existing Resolution 1244 is sufficiently elastic to authorise this action). It is 
further expected that one or more EU member states (such as Cyprus) will 
oppose recognition, but will not prevent this mission from being launched.  
The seminar was served with four excellent papers, each focusing on 
a different aspect. 
Bruno Coppieters (Free University of Brussels) set out the six criteria 
that should be satisfied to ‘justify’ the recognition of a contested secession, 
based on his reading of the contributions of political philosophy and the 
ethics of war. These six criteria – just cause, right intentions, last resort, 
legitimate authority, proportionality and likelihood of success – are not 
codified in international law, with the exception of legitimate authority. His 
evaluation of the Kosovo case was that international recognition qualified 
under three of the criteria (just cause, right intentions, likelihood of success) 
but was more dubious on the other grounds. Coppieters’ personal 
judgement was therefore that there should be continuing negotiations to 
find a compromise solution within the Security Council, so that Kosovo 
would not be only partially recognised by the international community. He 
observed that the peoples of other divided states have been waiting a long 
time, for example, the Abkhaz and Taiwanese. 
Gerald Knaus (European Stability Initiative) concentrated on what is 
actually going to happen in Kosovo, following an inevitable declaration of 
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independence and build-up of the role of the EU. Kosovo is not about to be 
fully independent, but a protectorate with powers retained by the 
international community and the EU, equivalent to those seen in Bosnia 
under the Dayton arrangements. Knaus is deeply pessimistic about the 
outlook for the long-term development of Kosovo. The EU’s ‘rule of law’ 
mission will be the most ambitious and expensive crisis management 
operation that the EU has undertaken so far. However, problems of 
legitimacy and coherence loom ominously on the horizon. Even more 
fundamental is the problem of developing a viable economic development 
strategy for Kosovo, which stands to become the most isolated country in 
the whole of Europe by virtue of visa restrictions on the movement of its 
people.  
Janusz Bugajski (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
Washington) argued that international law, and in particular the 
legitimising role of the UN Security Council for any recognition of a 
contested secession, should not be treated as the sole and supreme arbiter 
of state sovereignty. Political realities often prevailed otherwise, which 
could either be for reasons of realpolitik or implicit recognition of some of 
the criteria presented by Coppieters. Milosevic’s attempted mass expulsion 
or genocide of the Albanian population in 1999 deprived Serbia of its right 
and legitimacy to govern Kosovo. He further argued that the consequences 
of Kosovo’s non-independence should be weighed against, for example, 
how this would be received by dictatorships inclined towards mass 
repression or genocide. Finally, Bugajski assessed the implications of 
Kosovo for relations between Russia and the West. He argues that the 
Kremlin is not interested in finding a solution for Kosovo, but rather 
instrumentalises disagreements over the recognition of Kosovo to undercut 
the efforts of the EU and NATO to pacify and democratise the Balkans.  
Dmitri Trenin (Moscow Carnegie Center) argued that it must have 
been clear since mid-1999 that Kosovo is irretrievably lost to Serbia, but 
then a sad reflection on both Serbia and the EU that the opportunity to 
settle the future of Kosovo had been missed. While Kosovo was not the 
cause of the new age of great power rivalry between Russia and the West, it 
could become one of its symbols. The sounds of Independence Day in 
Pristina will reverberate in Abkhazia, Kurdistan and Taiwan, and no less in 
Tbilisi, Baghdad and Beijing. Russia, however, is unlikely to follow the US-
EU example and retaliate by recognising Abkhazia, South Ossetia and 
Transnistria. The costs of such actions to Russia and the convenience of the 
status quo militate against such action. Nonetheless, for Trenin the 
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international context is not hopeless. He can conceive of a set of 
differentiated solutions to each of the frozen conflicts of the former Soviet 
space: agreement on a common state for Moldova and Transnistria, 
autonomy for South Ossetia within Georgia, recognition of Abkhazia but 
with the Gali district ceded back to Tbilisi, and the settlement of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict based on territorial exchange and guaranteed 
land access corridors. However, the political context for pursuing such 
solutions is now characterised by the return of international power 
relations. Kosovo is a signal that the geo-political holiday the world had 
enjoyed since the end of the Cold war is now finally over. 
Discussion was structured according to four themes. 
First was how to view the six criteria proposed to assess the 
justification of a contested secession. The chair asked whether it would be 
advisable and realistic to try to embody more of these criteria into 
international law, rather than leave the field to the legal-procedural 
criterion of the UN Security Council’s vote. Coppieters was himself 
dubious about this, arguing that the interpretation of how to apply such 
principles as a just cause would lead to impossible disagreements. He 
advocated their use in political debate, which could indeed help frame the 
political context for decisions.    
Second was the question of whether Kosovo’s case for independence 
was justified or not. To boil the discussion down to the bottom line 
positions of the authors: one felt that it was justified, another that it was 
inevitable, another that the new state would in fact be more of a 
protectorate than an independent state, and another that it was justified on 
some but not all of the criteria.  
Third was the question of the likely extent of collateral impact on 
other cases of would-be independent states. The sense of the meeting was 
that the arguments would indeed reverberate around the world, and that 
the EU’s argument that Kosovo was unique would therefore fail to 
convince. On the other hand there was a predominant view that scenarios 
of domino effects were largely exaggerated for each of the three regions 
under discussion. The first was Western Europe, where the idea that the 
Spanish Basque province, Scotland or Belgium would be affected, was 
roundly dismissed. The second was the Western Balkans, for which the 
main views expressed were that Bosnia and Macedonia were not so fragile, 
unless perhaps the independence of Kosovo were followed by the second 
order irredentist secession of Northern Kosovo to Serbia. The third was the 
frozen conflicts of the former Soviet Union, where (as Trenin argued) 
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Russia had reasons to tread carefully, rather than plunge in with its own 
recognition of Abkhazia etc.  
Fourth was the issue of prospects for Russian relations with the EU 
and the West. There were some sharp differences expressed in the 
discussion over interpretations of Russia’s motives in the positions taken in 
the Serbia-Kosovo affair. The classical official argument was enounced by a 
Russian diplomat that his country was simply upholding the rule of 
international law, with an analogous view also deployed by a Serbian 
diplomat on behalf of his country. A widely prevailing view among the 
independent participants was that Russia was not really interested in 
Kosovo, but was willing to use its veto card in the UN Security Council to 
advance its international geo-political presence, and to undermine the 
efforts of the EU and NATO in the Balkan region. 
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The Recognition of Kosovo: 
Exceptional but not Unique 
Bruno Coppieters* 
ver since the option of supervised independence for Kosovo emerged 
as the preferred status option within the EU, its diplomats have been 
propagating a view of Kosovo as a unique case. The governments of 
countries confronted with secessionist conflicts have to be convinced that 
the EU policies on Kosovo will not turn against them. Countries such as 
Georgia and Cyprus indeed have good reason to feel nervous, but the EU 
message on the unique nature of the Kosovo case is clear. The recognition 
of Kosovo as a sovereign state should not be considered as a legal or 
political precedent for any other decision the EU or the US might have to 
take in the future.  
The question of whether Kosovo is a unique case is an interesting 
one. It is intriguing in itself to learn why the EU keeps talking about a 
unique case and not about an exceptional case. A simple answer is that 
unique cases do not refer to general principles, whereas exceptions do. 
Exceptions are rule-bound. There are general rules and principles, and 
there are principles that may justify exceptions. We may talk about unique 
cases when they fall outside a general normative framework and when 
there are no clear principles telling us why they fall outside this 
framework. We may either not know these principles, we may fail to agree 
on their meaning or application, or we may not be interested in making 
them explicit. Then we would say that they fall outside the general 
framework for the reason that they are unique. 
The EU does not know how it can justify, in general terms, why the 
principle of the territorial integrity of a state should be overruled in one 
particular case. The EU would be happy to claim that the UNSC has the 
legal authority to overrule the principle of territorial integrity in the case of 
Kosovo, but it is unable to do so, due to the position of Russia and China. It 
is also impossible for the EU to make the general claim that it has the 
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legitimate authority itself to overrule the principle of territorial integrity on 
European territory. Due to the lack of clear principles justifying the 
recognition of a unilateral declaration of secession, it is quite 
understandable that the EU is talking in terms of a unique case.  
My presentation concerns the recognition of a unilateral declaration 
of independence, in this case that of Kosovo, as an exceptional case. I will 
present a set of general moral principles to address the question of whether 
the recognition of a unilateral declaration of independence is a legitimate 
exception or not. But I also have to point out the limits of such an 
endeavour. Such moral principles may help us to address the question 
why, when and how the principle of territorial integrity may be overruled 
through the recognition of a unilateral act of independence, but it should 
not be expected that such an approach would resolve the contradictions 
among the various parties involved in this dispute. The meaning of these 
principles may indeed be interpreted and applied to concrete cases in 
contradictory ways. A set of principles can be helpful to indicate the main 
issues at stake in the moral debate on Kosovo but it cannot replace 
international law, a good compromise, the art of diplomacy or the authority 
of the UNSC. 
Political philosophy has produced several sets of principles on the 
morality of secession. My personal view is that questions such as the 
legitimacy of the unilateral declaration of Kosovo can best be understood 
within the framework of the moral principles that are traditionally used in 
war settings. These are referred to as the jus ad bellum principles, or the 
principles regulating the justification of the use of military force. These 
principles are traditionally used to justify exceptions to the general rule 
that states have to establish peaceful relations with each other and to 
abstain from the use of force. We may apply a similar line of thought to the 
case of secession. We can assume that the general rule is that statehood and 
territorial integrity have to be preserved. We can further assume that the 
recognition of unilateral forms of secession is only justified under 
exceptional circumstances and if it is in accordance with a systematic set of 
moral principles. The six jus ad bellum principles are therefore useful in this 
context.  
I will reflect on the recognition of Kosovo as an exception to the 
general rule of territorial integrity. But I will also analyse the extent to 
which Kosovo’s recognition by Western governments is exceptional, as 
compared to other breakaway territories supported by an external power. 
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There is first of all the Principle of a Just Cause. It states in this 
context that the recognition of a declaration of independence should have a 
just reason if it occurs against the will of the central government and 
overrules the principle of territorial integrity. This means that the injustice 
to be prevented or remedied should be severe enough to justify recognition 
of a unilateral declaration of independence. The ‘just cause’ argument is 
used by the EU in reference to Kosovo. The EU points to the forced 
expulsion of about 700,000 Kosovo Albanians from their homes in 
1998/1999. But we have to be aware that the Serbian government, for its 
part, also argues from the ‘just cause’ perspective. It considers that the 
events that took place under Milosevic could not be repeated under a 
democratic Serbian government, and therefore do not need be prevented 
by the creation of new injustices. The recognition of the independence of 
Kosovo would violate Serbian sovereignty and the principle of territorial 
integrity, and would furthermore threaten the rights of the Serbian 
minority in this territory. 
The second principle to be taken into account is the Principle of Right 
Intentions. This means that the real motives behind the decision to 
recognise the declaration of independence of Kosovo should be consistent 
with ‘just cause’ and not with other objectives. Much diplomatic time and 
effort are expended in the name of the ‘right intentions’ principle. The EU is 
declaring that the recognition of Kosovo is in accordance with wishes of the 
people of this territory, the stability of the region and even with the real 
interests of Serbia. Those who are opposed to the recognition of Kosovo 
apply this principle critically. They point out that the EU – in cooperation 
with the US – would primarily be defending specific geopolitical interests 
in the region, at odds with the interests of Serbia.  
The third principle to be applied in this context is the Principle of Last 
Resort. The UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy, Martti Ahtisaari 
declared in March 2007, after about a year of failed mediation attempts 
among Serbians and Kosovo Albanians, that he had abandoned all hope of 
reaching agreement between the parties. He pleaded in favour of a decision 
by the UNSC for supervised independence. It is of course not easy to say 
when you have reached the point where further negotiations are 
meaningless. If Mr Ahtisaari would one day have to be sent as a UN Special 
Envoy for Cyprus, he would surely be instructed to consider a far longer 
timeframe for mediation than he had in Kosovo. The question of a 
reasonable last resort was at the centre of the international dispute on 
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Kosovo. The Russian government argued that more time was needed for 
negotiations to achieve a positive outcome.  
The fourth principle to be used in this context is the Principle of 
Legitimate Authority. States have their domestic origin in the popular will, 
but they are also recognised internationally as states by other states. This 
act of recognition is a political act, but it should not contravene basic 
principles of international law. And who, ultimately, has the right to break 
up other states? Would the UNSC have such a right? Or could any state in 
the international community claim such a right? EU governments failed to 
reach agreement on this issue. So they preferred to concentrate on the 
question of whether the EU has the right to administer a breakaway 
territory with no UN mandate.  
The fifth principle that should inform us about the legitimacy of 
recognising the unilateral declaration of independence of a breakaway state 
is the Principle of Proportionality. The moral costs and benefits of such 
recognition have to be calculated at both the domestic and the international 
levels. What does the EU say about this?  
A unilateral recognition of Kosovo’s declaration of independence 
would help to stabilise the domestic situation in Kosovo itself. It would 
create sovereign equality among Kosovo and Serbia, facilitating their 
common integration within the EU. The EU expects that such equality 
would in the long term pave the way for conflict resolution. Such an 
objective would be excluded by all other status options, such as the 
autonomy of Kosovo within Serbia or the preservation of the status quo. 
But such optimistic perspectives of the EU are refuted by those who oppose 
recognition. They state that the Serbian minority in Kosovo could not be 
fully integrated within an independent state structure and that Belgrade’s 
opposition to EU policies on Kosovo excludes conflict resolution within the 
EU. 
The fact that the positive consequences of Kosovo’s recognition on 
the reform of its state structures are more easily predictable than the 
negative consequences on the international level is a major reason why the 
EU decided to recognise the independence of Kosovo. What recognition 
surely has as an immediate adverse effect on the international level is the 
creation of new fault lines within the EU on matters of European security 
policy. It further worsens the diplomatic relations between the West and 
Russia. It will also render EU appeals to respect the authority of UNSC 
resolutions in other diplomatic disputes less credible, as the EU itself is 
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now overriding the UNSC resolution of 1999 on the international 
administration for Kosovo.  
The recognition of Kosovo will make the international management 
of those secessionist conflicts in Europe where Russia plays a prominent 
role much more fraught. Despite all talks about a unique case, Kosovo will 
be at the centre of all discussions on the settlement of secessionist conflicts. 
The question will be raised as to why the EU favours the application of 
federal models in conflicts such as the one in Abkhazia if it considers these 
models as inappropriate for Kosovo. The fact that Kosovo is an inspiring 
model for the leaderships of breakaway states does not mean, however, 
that the external states protecting those secessionist entities will follow the 
Kosovo example by recognising them.  
This can be more easily understood when we analyse the sixth and 
last principle in this series, the Principle of Likelihood of Success. The 
Kosovo government reckons that its declaration of independence will be 
recognised by about a hundred countries, or by about half of the entire 
world community of states. This may take some time, and such a partial 
recognition would not grant Kosovo a seat in the United Nations, but it 
would turn the independence from Serbia into an irreversible option, and 
thus largely fulfil the Likelihood of Success Principle.  
It is primarily – but not exclusively – in respect to this last principle 
that Kosovo differs from other secessionist entities. The independence of 
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was recognised by Turkey in 
1983 and the independence of Chechnya was recognised by the Afghan 
government under the Taliban in 2000. But these processes of recognition 
did not facilitate the integration of those two breakaway entities in the 
international community, and placed Turkey and Afghanistan at odds with 
the international community in respect to these conflicts.  
There are no good reasons for Russia to recognise Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia or Transnistria, as long as it has no reasonable chance of convincing 
a substantial part of the international community to follow suit. 
Recognition of those entities would moreover reduce future diplomatic 
options available to the Russian government and lead to fresh discussions 
on the right of secession in Russia itself. Such discussions do not constitute 
an immediate threat to Russian territorial integrity, but they are always 
unpleasant and should not be favoured for no good reason. Moreover, such 
recognition would not be necessary to strengthen the position of the 
breakaway states in negotiations, since Russia holds a power of veto 
anyway. 
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The Kosovo conflict is not exceptional in respect to some of the other 
criteria we have examined. Northern Cyprus, Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
claim, for instance, that they do not have less just cause than Kosovo for 
independent statehood. In these cases, the external actor supporting them 
refers to a just cause argumentation to legitimise its policies, as the EU does 
in respect to Kosovo. Turkey considered past oppression of the Turkish 
Cypriots by the Cypriot central government as a major (but not the only) 
good reason for its move to recognise the independence of the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983. And the Russian discourse on 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia evokes the long history of ethnic conflict of 
those two communities with the Georgians, enabling it to justify its 
presence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia by the lack of reconciliation 
between the parties concerned. It defends its own peacemaking role in 
these conflicts as the best guarantee for the prevention of new injustices.  
The aims of the EU in its support for Kosovo’s supervised 
independence are not exceptional either, as compared to the aims pursued 
by Russia or Turkey when they are supporting particular status proposals 
for the breakaway entities in Georgia or Cyprus. All three external actors 
are acting here in agreement with the ‘right intentions’ principle. The EU 
considers the option of sovereign equality between Serbia and Kosovo as 
the optimal basis for long term conflict transformation processes. As an 
alternative to recognising the independence of Abkhazia, in 1997 Moscow 
drafted a federal model to resolve this conflict on the basis of the idea of a 
‘common state’. Such a peace proposal gives substantial competences to the 
secessionist entity. ‘Common’ refers here to equal rights between the 
parties. Equality is also seen by Turkey as the key for conflict resolution in 
Cyprus. Turkey made an attempt to raise the international status of 
Northern Cyprus in 1983 by recognising its independence. Twenty years 
later, it has eventually supported the view that both parts of the island 
could be equal in rights within a federal framework, as proposed by the so-
called Annan-plan for the reunification of Cyprus. The EU, Russia and 
Turkey agree that their own interests in secessionist conflicts are best 
served by an exit strategy, where equal status among conflicting parties 
constitutes the basis for conflict resolution. 
It may be concluded that there is no point in conceiving of the 
recognition of the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo as 
unique. It makes more sense to consider it as exceptional. Such an 
exceptional decision could in principle be justified by the EU on the basis of 
a set of general principles, if it is feasible or if the EU has an interest in 
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doing so. But the EU member states would not be able to agree on the 
choice of such principles, on their meaning or on their method of 
application to any particular case. Moreover, the EU has no interest in 
loosening the validity of the principle of territorial integrity, which is the 
inevitable result of such a normative discussion on the question of 
secession. The Kosovo decision of 2008 is thus very different from the 
Kosovo decision of 1999, where many EU members were eager to discuss a 
reform of the international legal framework for international humanitarian 
intervention, in the light of general moral principles.  
The EU Kosovo policies are exceptional when compared to other exit 
policies employed by external actors involved in secessionist conflicts on 
the side of the breakaway entity, with regard to their likelihood of success. 
Even partial recognition will turn independence into an irreversible option. 
There is no reason to believe that any other breakaway state with strong 
external support would be able to follow such an example successfully.  
My personal opinion about the EU position is that it is strong in terms 
of just cause, right intentions and likelihood of success but weak in terms of 
last resort, legitimate authority and proportionality. This decision cannot 
therefore be called just. As far as the principle of last resort is concerned, it 
has been assumed that Putin’s Russia and China would swallow Western 
plans on supervised independence in the same way as Yeltsin’s Russia 
accepted the creation by the UNSC of an international administration in 
1999. This did not happen. Russia threatened to use its veto at the UNSC. 
The US, the UK and France did not appreciate being confronted at the 
UNSC with one more ‘unreasonable veto’ – which is a formulation Tony 
Blair used in 2003 during the discussion on the Iraq war. It seems that 
overruling such opposition by unilateral decisions has now replaced 
diplomacy. 
As far as legitimate authority is concerned, partial recognition is not 
satisfactory for Kosovo. Partial international integration does not guarantee 
its development. Further negotiations are necessary to reach full agreement 
within the UNSC, despite the present international row over the creation of 
a fait accompli by Western governments. Only an agreement within the 
UNSC leading to full international recognition may change the 
proportionality calculation for the better. 
The Balkan conflicts in the 1990s sparked an interesting scholarly 
debate about the question of the recognition of a right to secession in 
international law. Those in favour expected that internationally agreed 
procedures would facilitate peaceful forms of separation. The debate on 
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Kosovo’s independence made it clear once more that such an approach is 
doomed to fail. Too many countries would oppose the creation of abstract 
international rules that challenge the principle of territorial integrity. Such 
formalisation would furthermore have mixed results in secessionist 
conflicts. International legislation on secession enshrining the just cause 
principle may deter certain repressive governments from harming 
minorities, but may also favour the escalation of ethnic conflicts if 
secessionist movements choose for a politique du pire, or a deliberate 
strategy to make things worse.  Legislation of this nature may also have an 
adverse impact on negotiations. Secessionist entities will only be interested 
in proving that their state fulfils the legal just cause criteria in order to 
exercise their right to secession. This will make it more difficult to bring 
mutually acceptable solutions to the table.  
Regulating secession is, however, an interesting option on the 
domestic level to avoid acts of independence taking place unilaterally, 
without principled negotiation and outside the existing constitutional 
framework. The judgement of Canada’s Supreme Court on the right of 
secession of Quebec; the Good Friday Agreement on Northern Ireland and 
the Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro 
indicated precisely which rules had to be followed in the case where a 
majority of the population of a territory makes a clear choice to secede. 
These rules did not focus on a just cause for secession, but rather on the 
question of legitimate authority. Such domestic regulations have had a 
positive effect on the political stability of Quebec and Northern Ireland and 
have also allowed the peaceful separation of Montenegro from Serbia. But 
these rules have to be specific to each case, and should leave sufficient 
room for political negotiation and compromise.  
The Just Secession Criteria for the Recognition of a Unilateral Act of 
Independence  
1) Secession should have a just cause. This means that the injustice to be 
prevented or remedied should be severe enough to justify the recognition of 
a unilateral declaration of independence.  
2) The decision to recognise a state that has seceded unilaterally should be 
guided by right intentions. This means that the recognition of its 
independence should be motivated primarily by considerations consistent 
with the just cause for independence.  
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3) The recognition of a unilateral declaration of independence can only be a 
last resort solution. All efforts to achieve a mutual agreement between the 
secessionist entity and the central government have to be considered as 
fruitless. 
4) A unilateral declaration of independence has to be recognised through a 
legitimate authority. Partial recognition may be granted by a limited 
number of states. Full recognition by the world community of states 
generally means entry into the UN. 
5) The principle of proportionality should be respected. The anticipated 
costs and benefits should be calculated at both the domestic and the 
international levels. 
6) The recognition of a unilateral declaration of independence should have a 
likelihood of success in achieving its aims. There should be a reasonable 
chance of having the new state recognised in the long run by a substantial 
section or even the whole of the international community. 
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Kosovo’s Independence: Practicalities, 
Precedents and Power Politics 
Janusz Bugajski* 
e were asked to consider two questions: first, is the secession of 
Kosovo just or legitimate? And second, is Kosovo a unique case 
that will set no precedents? I would also like to add a third 
question: will Kosovo’s independence exacerbate the East-West conflict? 
Is Kosovo’s Independence a Just Secession? 
It would be helpful to tackle this question not only in terms of international 
law but also in the context of practical politics and empirical realities. 
Claims from some sources that the United Nations is the supreme arbiter of 
state sovereignty and the legitimate defender of the legal global order 
should be treated with considerable caution. For instance, in assessing the 
question of national independence, the UN Security Council remained 
largely silent on the illegitimacy of the Soviet bloc and Russia’s unilateral 
dominance of captive states and subject nations for 45 years after World 
War II. The UN thereby implicitly supported the limitations imposed on 
the sovereignty of each East European country and the direct Soviet 
annexation of the three Baltic States. The conclusion is that UN 
pronouncements and the pretensions of some UNSC members to global 
leadership have to be balanced with the practicalities of fait accompli and the 
realities of power politics. This is the case with Kosovo, where four sets of 
arguments indicate that independence is both practical and realistic.  
First, in terms of recent political history, under the old Yugoslav 
constitution, although Kosovo and Vojvodina were autonomous provinces 
within the Serbian republic, following the passage of the 1974 Yugoslav 
constitution they became federal units equal to that of the six republics in 
their voice and votes in all federal institutions. Kosovo possessed clear 
administrative borders, independent local self-government (within a 
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decentralised communist structure), and other separate institutions similar 
to the six Yugoslav republics. Moreover, the country that Kosovo was part 
of (the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, SFRY) ceased to exist in the 
early 1990s. The population of Kosovo was not consulted during the 
creation of the Milosevic-engineered Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) 
in 1992, consisting of Serbia and Montenegro.  
The Albanian majority in Kosovo was never canvassed by Belgrade 
or by the EU when the FRY was dissolved and the Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro (USM) was established in 2003. This final Yugoslavia was 
dissolved when Montenegro gained independence in May 2006 and the 
country that UN Resolution 2244 referred to ceased to exist in both name 
and in its inherited borders. Since the unilateral revocation of Kosovo’s 
autonomy in the early 1990s, Belgrade has consistently demonstrated that it 
principally seeks to hold the territory of Kosovo and not its majority 
Albanian population. Hence, over a million Albanian voters were 
disenfranchised and excluded from voting lists for Serbia’s constitutional 
referendum in October 2006 and from Serbia’s presidential and 
parliamentary elections. The overwhelming majority of Kosovo’s residents 
are not considered Serbian citizens by the government in Belgrade. 
Second, in terms of the pro-independence movement, Kosovar 
separatism was primarily a reaction to state repression by one of the 
republics of ex-Yugoslavia (Serbia), which entailed the abolition of 
Kosovo's autonomy and the attempted genocide or mass expulsion of the 
Albanian population by the regime of Slobodan Milosevic in 1999. This 
precipitated a NATO military intervention without a UN mandate. 
Kosovo's push toward statehood was not engineered or promoted by a 
neighbouring country, whether to forestall the independence of any 
republic, or to annex any part of its territory, or to maintain political 
pressure on a nearby state. It can also be convincingly argued that Serbia 
lost its right and legitimacy to govern a population (and the territory it 
inhabits) that its government sought to systematically expel or murder and 
has since excluded from the Serbian polity. Countries that lose wars 
invariably lose the territory that they conquered or brutalised. 
Third, in terms of ethnic composition and political voice, well over 
90% of the current population of Kosovo is Albanian and overwhelmingly 
endorses independence and statehood for the territory. Even if all the 
Serbian residents who fled after the NATO intervention in 1999 were to 
return to Kosovo, the vast majority of inhabitants would still unequivocally 
vote for independence in any territorial referendum. This constitutes a 
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legitimate form of territorial or regional democracy in line with EU 
standards. 
Fourth, in terms of the external political presence, Kosovo is in effect 
an international protectorate that is developing a democratic and pluralistic 
political structure supervised by NATO, the European Union, and the 
United Nations. The democratisation process is far from complete but the 
major international players are committed to supervising and monitoring 
the emerging state, to providing internal and external security, and to 
offering incentives for Kosovo’s eventual membership in NATO and the 
EU. A continuing political link between Kosovo and Serbia could obstruct 
the progress of both bodies towards either Union or Alliance inclusion, and 
could undermine the process of regional stabilisation. 
The question of a ‘just secession’ can also be turned on its head by 
considering the practical impact of non-independence for Kosovo. It is 
worthwhile exploring some negative alternatives to an independent 
Kosovo state that is supervised by the EU and NATO and moving in the 
direction of European integration. In sum, non-independence may not only 
destabilise Kosovo itself as public frustration boils over, unsettle a broader 
region by provoking violent responses from Albanian militants in 
neighbouring states, set back the European project by thwarting the 
emplacement of an EU supervisory mission, and necessitate longer US 
military involvement in the Balkans. It could also serve as a negative 
precedent further afield. 
Much has been said about the potential for state breakdown, 
territorial ungovernability, international incapacitation, renewed 
insurgency, and escalating violence if Kosovo were to be denied full 
independence or if the process were indefinitely delayed. However, not 
enough thought has been given to the negative precedents and pretexts 
than an incomplete and stifled Kosovo could serve in several other 
European conflict zones where the West maintains a strategic interest. For 
instance, a number of Russian officials and their political proxies or 
supporters in neighbouring entities such as Transnistria, Abkhazia, and 
South Ossetia have incessantly claimed that Kosovo’s imminent 
independence will serve as a precedent for the secessionist entities in 
Georgia and Moldova to also move towards independence. What they fail 
to point out is the prospect that Kosovo’s non-independence could send an 
even more powerful negative signal to these and other crisis points. 
First, at a political level, separatist leaders in the post-Soviet statelets 
will conclude that if they are to have any prospect of gaining independence 
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and recognition, they should not allow any major international 
organisations to intervene on their territories, as was the case in Kosovo. 
This could significantly diminish the effectiveness of international 
mediation, engagement, intervention, peace-enforcement, and state 
reconstruction in a number of post-conflict regions. 
For instance, while the EU, the UN, and the OSCE (Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe) have been pushing for closer 
involvement in Moldova and Georgia, such proposals are likely to be 
resisted even more tenaciously by secessionist leaders. The EU border-
monitoring mission along the Moldovan-Ukrainian frontier, designed to 
prevent illicit trade and the penetration of organised crime, will be opposed 
as unwarranted interference in Transnistria’s internal affairs. Moves by 
some OSCE members to enhance the organisation’s engagement in the 
breakaway region will be further obstructed while EU proposals to replace 
the Russian ‘peace-keeping’ force in Transnistria with a broader 
international mission will be resisted.  
All this will serve the Kremlin’s interests, encapsulated by President 
Vladimir Putin during his speech at the 2007 security conference in 
Munich. Putin argued that the activities of NATO, the EU, the US, and the 
OSCE in Russia’s neighbourhood threaten regional stability, undermine 
global multipolarity, and promote Washington’s unilateralist policies and 
expansionist objectives. 
Second, the potential for violence in and around Kosovo could serve 
as a precedent catalyst in thawing the ‘frozen conflicts’ into open warfare in 
several former Soviet republics. Kosovo’s non-statehood could spark mass 
protests, political radicalism, and potentially a new insurgency movement 
inside the unrecognised territory. The lesson thereby learned by other 
unrecognised entities would be self-evident: what cannot be achieved 
through negotiations could be more effectively won through political 
intransigence, the threat of violence, and the reality of open conflict. 
Another possibility is that the governments in Chisinau (Moldova) 
and Tbilisi (Georgia) may conclude that a military assault on the 
breakaway regions could be successful in response to the latter’s 
unwillingness to compromise with the central authorities or to agree to any 
international mediation and multi-national institutional involvement. The 
prospect for renewed bloodshed and ‘ethnic cleansing’ would thereby 
escalate and tensions throughout the wider region would rise sharply.  
Russia’s direct intervention cannot be discounted and this could also pull 
Washington and Brussels more directly into the conflict. 
WHAT IS ‘JUST’ SECESSION? (IS KOSOVO UNIQUE?) | 109 
Third, the Kosovo lesson of non-independence would be well 
received by repressive governments. The restraints on dictatorships 
engaging in mass repression and even genocide, because of the possibility 
that they would lose legitimacy over a territory and bestow credibility on 
internal independence movements, would further evaporate. For example, 
Russia’s repressive policies in Chechnya would be further legitimised by 
any ruling over Kosovo that precludes independence. Justifications for 
separating populations that have been severely victimised by the central 
government could be effectively dismissed as a result of negative 
international decisions over Kosovo. 
Will Kosovo Set A Precedent? 
As Kosovo moves towards supervised independence, analysts and policy 
makers will be closely examining the implications that the emergence of a 
new state in the Balkans will have on neighbouring countries and entities, 
as well as on nearby regions. The stabilisation of the Western Balkans is 
manageable if NATO, the EU, and the US work in tandem to prevent 
radicals from exploiting latent tensions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, 
and Montenegro. Belgrade no longer possesses the capabilities to export 
war to neighbouring states, but a display of diplomatic and military resolve 
may be necessary by NATO and the EU to convince local actors that the 
West is serious.  
Will the independence of Kosovo provoke a chain reaction of 
secessionist wars and collapsing states in Europe? Or will it pass into 
history as the culmination of another mass movement for national 
liberation and self-determination? Most likely, while it will not set any 
precedents for separatism, Kosovo’s statehood may be used as a pretext by 
some secessionist movements, expansionist states and their proxies to 
pursue their political agendas. 
Some EU governments have voiced fears that Kosovo’s independent 
status will destabilise a number of multi-ethnic countries in Western and 
Eastern Europe. The Spanish government has warned about a potential 
example for Catalonia and the Basque country. But in a similar vein, the 
British could voice anxieties over Wales and Scotland, and the French over 
Brittany and Corsica. But are such apprehensions realistic? The collapse of 
Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia, and the emergence of 
two-dozen countries in the early 1990s did not precipitate the breakup of 
Western Europe’s democracies, whether unitary or federal states. Similarly, 
the independence of another territory in the Balkans is unlikely to give 
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impetus to separatist nationalisms in the EU for two valid reasons: 
democratic context and political record. 
Most of the popular sovereignty movements in the EU operate within 
a democratic framework, while radical and violent groups elicit only 
limited public support. Several pro-autonomy parties have won increasing 
local control for their territories within a federal or decentralised 
administrative structure. Full statehood is unlikely as the majority of the 
public continues to support membership in a larger state because of the 
significant economic and political benefits that this brings. Nevertheless, 
mechanisms do exist or will need to be established in those countries facing 
potential division, such as Belgium, and will be conducted in a democratic 
manner. 
In stark contrast, there are no such loyalties among the vast majority 
of the Kosovar population to the central state and there are few if any 
economic or political benefits for Kosovars within a semi-democratised 
Serbia. If Serbia was on the level of Spain or Britain the situation may be 
different but this would also depend on the political record. Unlike the 
Kosovars, the Catalans, Welsh, Basques, Scots, Corsicans, and other ‘ethno-
nations’ have not faced mass murder or expulsion in recent history at the 
hands of the capital that wants to maintain control over them. All of these 
ethnic and regional minorities are well integrated in the state structure. 
And there is no international security force present that has separated the 
constituent ethnic groups in order to preserve the peace and prevent 
bloodshed. 
Similarly, most of the Central and East European states have settled 
their minority and territorial disputes as an important component of their 
qualifications for NATO and EU membership. Undoubtedly, renewed 
issues of political representation and administrative decentralisation will 
surface over the coming years, as they have among the older member 
states, but without seriously threatening European security. For instance, 
fears of Hungarian separatism in either Romania or Slovakia are 
exaggerated as Magyars do not form large territorially compact majorities 
and have substantial representation in parliament and in central and local 
governments.  
Kosovo is highly unlikely to serve as a precedent for most of Europe 
because the circumstances in this aspiring state are markedly different. 
Central control by Belgrade was lost as a result of mass repression and 
attempted genocide, and the consequences of state aggression were NATO 
intervention and the creation of an international protectorate. Nevertheless, 
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Kosovo’s independence will be exploited as a pretext by two kinds of forces 
– ambitious expansionist states and proxy radical movements. This may be 
particularly evident in the case of Russia. Moscow will seek clear 
advantages from the Kosovo status talks to further its regional aspirations 
in Moldova and the Caucasus. Pro-Moscow secessionist movements in 
Moldova’s Transnistrian region and Georgia’s Abkhazian and South 
Ossetian entities may use the opportunity to press for their own 
sovereignty, although their situations have differed from that of Kosovo.  
None of these territorial units possessed federal status when the 
Soviet Union collapsed and the local populations were not subjected to 
attempted genocide by either the Moldovan or Georgian governments. 
Unlike in Kosovo, the separatist movements were largely directed by local 
power elites tied to Russian security forces. In these regions calls for self-
determination and independence were not based on national self-defence 
from a repressive state but principally on the narrow interests of a small 
clique of power holders. This post-Soviet elite also promotes the Kremlin’s 
agenda by exerting pressure on both Moldova and Georgia to remain 
within Moscow’s orbit and desist from entering Western institutions. 
Nevertheless, despite all the political arguments, Kosovo’s independence is 
likely to present an additional challenge to the reintegration of Moldova 
and Georgia. 
Will Kosovo Exacerbate the East-West Conflict?  
Why has Moscow fixed its attention on Kosovo and an issue that many in 
the US administration believed would be handled by the Western allies 
without Russia’s resistance? Kosovo has evolved into more than a wedge 
issue for Moscow vis-à-vis the US. The wedge has widened into a valuable 
strategic weapon. Due to the indecision exhibited by Western powers in 
confirming Kosovo’s final status, President Putin’s administration views 
the issue as a boost for its regional and global ambitions. Although Kosovo 
is not intrinsically vital for Russia’s expansionist interests, the unresolved 
status question serves several foreign policy objectives. By vetoing 
Kosovo’s independence, maintaining an indefinite status quo, and 
opposing Pristina’s declaration of independence, Russia aims to raise its 
international stature in several ways. 
First, the Kremlin can claim that Russia is a major defender of 
international legality by its insistence on working through the UN Security 
Council. Of course, Russia would not allow the UNSC to interfere in its 
own neighbourhood; for example, by approving a long-term UN mission in 
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territories where it exercises direct influence in Moldova and Georgia. 
Moreover, Russia itself regularly violates the UN Charter (in Chechnya) or 
stations troops in neutral states without their government’s approval (as in 
Moldova). 
Second, Russia is posing as a promoter of multilateralism, where the 
UN process can serve its interests and undercut those of the US. 
Multilateral institutions such as the UN are not only slow and cumbersome 
in making decisions but they operate according to the lowest common 
denominator whereby the resistance of one capital can deny the interests of 
the majority. The UN Security Council could be made more effective and 
representative through reforms that would include more permanent 
members and majority voting rather than unanimity. 
Third, Moscow is posturing as a staunch protector of state 
sovereignty and national integrity by opposing the imposed break-up of a 
UN member state: Serbia. Russia thereby appeals to several UN members 
who fear separatism. At the same time, the US is depicted by Moscow as a 
maverick interfering in the internal affairs and state structures of allegedly 
vulnerable states. This serves to disguise Moscow’s own expansionist state 
ambitions among former satellites along its borders. 
Fourth, Kosovo forms part of a wider strategic agenda that enables 
Russia to elevate its international position, to interpose in Balkan and 
European affairs, to aggravate weaknesses in Western decision-making, to 
promote splits within the EU, to divide the Atlantic Alliance, to gain veto 
powers over Europe's enlargement, and to construct a Eurasian pole of 
power as a counterbalance to the US. 
Washington continues to demonstrate resolve over Kosovo’s final 
status despite the difficulties in forging an EU consensus and the hesitation 
evident among some European states in bypassing the UNSC, whose 
decision for Kosovo’s supervised statehood is blocked by the Kremlin. The 
process of independence will probably be completed by the time of the 
NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008. But the recognition of Kosovo’s 
statehood will most likely generate fresh regional and international 
tensions that need to be competently handled by the trans-Atlantic powers. 
Containing Russian reactions outside of the Balkans may prove more 
problematic. According to some analysts, the Putin administration has 
drawn a red line across Kosovo’s independence. If the West recognises the 
new state, Russia may pursue its neo-imperial interests more vigorously in 
several neighbouring regions and intensify its anti-American alliances. 
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Moscow has already signalled that it will fortify its economic and political 
ties with Iran; it will seek a closer relationship with China to counter 
“American expansionism;” it will develop the CSTO (Collective Security 
Treaty Organization) into a competitor with NATO in Central Asia and the 
Caucasus; and it will increase pressure on those former Soviet satellites that 
seek inclusion in Western institutions. 
Georgia has become the most vulnerable outpost of Western interests 
in the Caucasus, a region that Russia is determined to dominate both for 
reasons of geostrategy and energy politics. Moscow’s military commanders 
may be prepared to assist the Abkhazian and South Ossetian separatist 
movements and confront the Georgian military if Tbilisi attempts to regain 
the two enclaves. Indeed, the Kremlin may seek to draw Georgia into a 
military confrontation to justify an already planned intervention. The 
Russian authorities may also seek to apply pressure on Moldova by raising 
the spectre of recognising the breakaway Transnistrian region once Kosovo 
gains independence. They may fortify their military presence in Belarus 
and Kaliningrad, and they could lean more heavily on the new Ukrainian 
government led by Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko to undermine the 
process of Western integration. Putin recently warned against Western 
influences in Ukraine, raising the prospect of instability and disintegration. 
Russia’s presidential elections in March 2008 will not significantly 
alter policy. President Putin’s selected successor, Dmitry Medvedev, is not 
an independent actor with his own power base but will remain beholden to 
the ‘chekistocracy’ that controls the Kremlin. Moscow’s policy will remain 
assertive and at times openly confrontational toward the West. Indeed, 
President Medvedev may seek to prove his Greater Russia credentials by 
heating up one or more conflicts with the US or with the EU, or with both. 
The list of conflict points between Russia and the West expands 
almost every week. It now includes such contentious questions as the US 
missile defence shield in Central Europe, the CFE (Conventional Forces in 
Europe) treaty, ballistic missile accords, the role of the OSCE in democracy 
promotion, NATO enlargement, energy security, and even the ownership 
of the Arctic. Tensions also persist over Kremlin pressures on the three 
Baltic States and its escalating confrontation with the UK. It is not 
surprising that the EU and Russia have been unable to arrange a new 
enhanced ‘partnership agreement’ as was expected a year or so ago. 
The Putin leadership has deliberately created a sense of danger 
through its anti-Western rhetoric. The expansion of Western alliances and 
the promotion of liberal democracies are depicted as direct threats to 
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Russia’s interests. For the Kremlin the birth of new pro-American 
democracies such as Kosovo in former communist territories presents a 
long-term challenge to Russia's strategic designs. Democratic governments 
invariably seek membership in NATO and the EU in order to consolidate 
the reform process and provide permanent security and the assurance of 
state independence. For Moscow, such steps undercut its influences in 
neighbouring countries, shrink its regional power projection, and retard its 
ambitions as a revived superpower. Russia feels more confident in realising 
its aspirations, where its immediate neighbours are either predictable 
authoritarian states, isolated and marginalised countries with populist or 
neutral governments, weak states that are internally divided and therefore 
cannot qualify for NATO or EU membership, or countries ruled by outright 
anti-American governments.  
The Balkans are therefore useful for Moscow in disrupting 
democratic expansion in the wider Europe. Serbia is a valuable bridgehead 
within South East Europe for Russia to pursue its economic and political 
interests, especially through the expansion of its energy networks and in 
cementing Belgrade’s economic dependence. The Kremlin is not interested 
in finding a solution in Kosovo but prefers to maintain a ‘frozen conflict’ in 
the middle of the Balkans that it can exploit to its advantage. The UN 
Security Council not only blocks Kosovo’s independence and may hinder 
the progress of Euro-Atlantic integration for the Western Balkans, it also 
allows Russia to restore its position as the pre-eminent anti-American 
power and a pretender to international leadership. The decision on 
Kosovo’s statehood will be an early indication of whether Washington and 
Brussels are determined to stand by their principles of democratic 
governance in a wider Europe and are capable of ensuring trans-Atlantic 
cohesion, even at the cost of exacerbating the escalating confrontation with 
Russia. 
It is useful to conclude with a point of logic that seems to have been 
missed in analysing Russia’s position on the Kosovo question. Moscow 
claims that it will not agree to any solution for Kosovo that is unacceptable 
to either of the contesting parties, Belgrade and Pristina. According to the 
logic of this statement, the Kremlin should equally not agree to Kosovo’s 
non-independence as this is not acceptable to one side in the conflict. 
Accepting indefinite delays with regard to decisions on final status is also 
tantamount to agreeing to a solution favoured by only one side in the 
conflict. 
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The Independence of Kosovo and its 
Implications 
Dmitri Trenin* 
t must have been clear since mid-1999 that Kosovo is irretrievably lost 
for Serbia. After an ethnic conflict of such intensity, and a follow-up 
outside intervention of such military scale and moral fervour, the 
Serbian leadership should have been in no doubt as to the consequences of 
their policies of the preceding decade. That it refused to think in terms of 
the new realities and chose instead to continue to revel in the images of 
distant memories and glorious dreams, is a sad comment on the state of 
current Serbian politics. The lesson of 1999 is crystal-clear: Kosovar 
Albanians will no longer live under Belgrade’s rule.  
It stands to reason that the provisional status of Kosovo, placed under 
international rule after the 1999 conflict, could not be extended into 
perpetuity. A two million-strong people, who resolutely oppose its re-
attachment to its former metropolitan power, and aspire to full 
independence, should be given that chance, and its free status must be 
recognised by the international community. Composed of the sovereign 
states as its principal members, the international community, however, has 
long faced a dilemma of territorial integrity vs. national self-determination.   
In Kosovo’s case, an ideal way out of this dilemma should have gone 
through Belgrade’s acceptance of the province’s final separation from 
Serbia. Since both Pristina and Belgrade view their future in terms of 
integration into the European Union, the EU had a uniquely strong hand in 
making both sides agree to a formula of conflict resolution. It is also a sad 
comment on the state of the Union today, that the EU has missed that 
opportunity and failed to take the prime responsibility for resolving a 
conflict in its immediate neighbourhood. However, the Kosovo issue will 
remain on the agenda, and Europe will have to deal with it. Perhaps one 
day it can be resolved within a Union that has just taken on board both 
Serbia and Kosovo. 
                                                     
* Dmitri Trenin is a Senior Associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace (Washington, D.C.) and Director of Studies at its Moscow Center. 
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Meanwhile, we will have to live with the consequences of a dual 
failure to reach agreement. On one level, between the parties to the conflict 
themselves, Belgrade and Pristina; on another, between the United States 
and its major allies, as well as Russia and China. Every conflict situation of 
course has consequences. After Kosovo’s proclamation of independence 
and its recognition by most states, but the refusal to recognise it by some, 
the situation in the sphere of ‘frozen conflicts’ will be most directly 
affected. While Kosovo is not the sole cause, it could become one of the 
symbols of new division at the global level. Seen from that viewpoint, the 
post-Cold War era, including the 9/11 interlude, may be finally over, but a 
new age of great-power rivalry; an Era of Competing States, to use a 
Chinese term, may well be starting to unfold. 
In the unhappy group of countries afflicted by these frozen conflicts, 
each case is special, but precedents count. The sounds of the Independence 
Day salute in Pristina will reverberate in Sukhumi, Abkhazia; Erbil, 
Kurdistan; and Taipei, Taiwan, as well as in Tbilisi, Baghdad, and Beijing. 
Again, it is not so much Kosovo’s UDI as its recognition by the US and 
others that carries the most weight. A line will have been crossed, a taboo 
will have been broken. Those aspiring to independence around the world 
will be encouraged by the thought that what they need to do is to persuade 
America and Europe of the justness of their cause. Kosovo’s just war has 
logically evolved into its just secession.  
Russia is unlikely to follow the US-European example and retaliate 
by recognising Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria. Each of those 
territories declared its independence a long time ago, and has reaffirmed it 
in referenda ever since. Under the peacekeeping arrangements concluded 
in the 1990s, Moscow treats the separatist enclaves as parties to the 
conflicts, on a par with the governments of Georgia and Moldova. This 
gives Russia much latitude for all kinds of contacts and relationships in all 
spheres; political, economic, cultural and humanitarian. In two cases, the 
unrecognised entities are adjacent to Russia’s own territory, and are part of 
its economic space; in all three, Russia has military boots on the ground, 
and many or even most local residents are Russian passport-holders.  
At the same time, Moscow recognises the territorial integrity of 
Georgia and Moldova within their Soviet-era administrative boundaries. 
Russia’s diplomacy sticks to the formula of a common state whose 
parameters need to be agreed by all parties to the conflict. This allows 
Russia to use conflict situations as pressure instruments when the going 
gets tough in Georgia and Moldova, and to protect its interests in an 
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eventual conflict settlement. A full diplomatic recognition of Abkhazia et 
al. would rob Moscow of the benefits of ambiguity and saddle it with open 
political conflicts with Georgia and Moldova, possibly leading to a 
resumption of violence and severe international complications. An embassy 
in Sukhumi would come at an exorbitant cost. 
The Russian leadership is also aware that whereas Kosovo’s 
independence will be recognised, in quick succession, by scores of states, its 
own recognition of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria will not be 
followed up by even Moscow’s nominal allies following suit. Not only 
Kazakhstan, but even Belarus are unlikely to break relations with Georgia 
over Abkhazia. What may be a sign of diplomatic strength in one case, 
could very well become a sign of diplomatic weakness in the other.  
The option of independence as a prelude to annexation is even more 
far-fetched. Transnistria is a land-locked territory, whose only neighbours 
are Moldova and Ukraine, neither of which is particularly friendly to 
Russian irredentism. Abkhazia’s wish is to be independent from all other 
states, and this includes Russia as well as Georgia. Should Russia seek to 
bring it into line by force, trouble will ensue. South Ossetia, of course, not 
being sustainable as a state on its own, might apply to join with North 
Ossetia, which is part of the Russian Federation. But this small case of 
territorial aggrandisement by Russia will have huge consequences. 
Kazakhstan will seek to prevent Russian encroachments into its Slav-
populated industrial North, and Ukraine will have Crimea on its mind. 
Kiev will work even harder to gain fast-track admission into NATO, and 
Astana will strengthen links with Washington, Beijing and Brussels.  
Thus, there is no practical need to go ahead and pay a horrendous 
price for formalising something that Russia has learned to live with, and 
even benefit from, in the absence of an official recognition. Even more 
importantly, Moscow fears a revitalisation of the separatist virus in the 
Russian Federation, and is concerned with outside support for 
independence of some of its own territories, particularly in the North 
Caucasus. Here, its interests overlap with those of Beijing, which is focused 
on Taiwan and concerned with Tibet. 
The Russian leadership sincerely believes that Kosovo’s indepen-
dence, and even more so the methods used to achieve and formalise it are 
both a mistake (as far as the EU is concerned) and a dangerous move (on 
part of the US). Moscow can be expected to vehemently criticise Kosovo’s 
independence and its international recognition. It will block Kosovo’s entry 
into the United Nations. It will refuse to legitimate EU’s activities in post-
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independence Kosovo. The Russian strategy will probably be to sit and 
watch the West act at its own peril, without a UN mandate, and face the 
consequences. At the same time, Moscow will seek to benefit, politically as 
well as economically, from being the champion of a noble cause (upholding 
international law) and a genuine friend of the Serbian people. February 
2008 will not close the books on the Kosovo issue. Rather, it will merely 
turn a chapter in that book. 
Interestingly, Russia’s pro-active policy is currently centred on 
revitalising the peace process in Moldova and closing an agreement 
between Chisinau and Tiraspol on the modalities of a common Moldovan 
state. One can only hope that Moscow has learned from the failure of the 
2003 so-called Kozak plan and will deliver a public good, which, while 
taking account of Russia’s own interests in the area, would lead to conflict 
resolution. The situation is now more propitious for this than it has ever 
been. Should Russia fail to deliver, or overplay its hand, or be undercut by 
the West, resentment will be far-reaching. If, however, Russia succeeds in 
helping the two sides come together and stitch Moldova back again, this 
will be a most positive and constructive development, countervailing in 
part the impact of the disagreement over Kosovo.  
A success in Moldova could be built upon in the Caucasus. Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia represent, in fact, two very different cases. Abkhazia, 
like Kosovo, can hardly be peacefully reunited with the metropolitan state, 
Georgia. Imposing a solution in a Kosovo-in-reverse model is not an option 
for the West, given Russia’s presence, proximity and obvious interest. Like 
the Serbian elite, the Georgian one would be better off accepting the 
realities rather than forever dreaming of changing them. South Ossetia, on 
the other hand, has demonstrated that it could live within a Georgian state, 
provided that its autonomy is for real and guaranteed by the international 
community as well as the Georgian constitution.  
The international context is not hopeless. Russia needs a peaceful 
environment for holding the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, only a few 
miles away from Abkhazia. The West is grappling with a way to integrate 
Georgia, which does not control all of its territory. The situation calls for an 
imaginative solution, using both the positive and negative experience 
gained in Kosovo and in Moldova. 
In very broad terms, the solution could include: 
- an agreement on the terms of South Ossetia’s autonomy within 
Georgia, guaranteed by Russia, the EU and the US; 
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- Georgia’s recognition of Abkhazia’s independence within the borders 
to be determined, and most likely leaving the Georgian-populated 
Gali district to Georgia; 
- broad international recognition of Abkhazia’s independence, and its 
entry into the UN; 
- compensation provisions to the Georgian refugees from Abkhazia, 
with an international fund established for the purpose, and Georgia’s 
renunciation of property claims in Abkhazia; 
- Georgia’s accession to NATO with assurances to Russia with regard 
to foreign military presence in its territory, and to the Russian 
military transit to Armenia. 
The confines of this paper do not allow for an in-depth discussion of 
the ways of solving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This is not to say that it 
can safely be removed from the to-do-list and be allowed to fester. A new 
war between Azerbaijan and Armenia would destabilise the region and 
damage the interests of both the West and Russia. For Karabakh, neither a 
Moldova-style common state with Azerbaijan nor a Kosovo/Abkhazia-
style independence, nor yet the proposed guaranteed-autonomy status for 
South Ossetia, are realistic options. One has to deal with the reality of the 
underlying conflict between two fully recognised states, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. This recognition leads to the need to chart a new border 
between the two neighbours, taking account of the ethnic boundaries and 
the strategic interests of both. In broadest terms, a solution could be found 
on the basis of a territorial exchange that would attach much of Karabakh 
to Armenia and give Azerbaijan a land corridor to Nakhichevan. 
Borders have constantly changed in the past, and will continue to 
change in the future. Empires will fall, ethnically-mixed states will fall 
apart, and new nations will emerge. Immutability of borders between states 
is un-historical. The issue is not the results obtained, or even the objectives 
pursued, but the method used. Imposed solutions are generally less stable 
than negotiated ones. International law is ever-changing, as is the 
prevailing political philosophy. The international community will no 
longer pretend it is united in its own midst, or happily following the leader. 
International power relations matter, as do the interests and inclinations of 
the major players. The case of Kosovo is as good a signal as any that the 
extended holiday much of the world has enjoyed since the end of the Cold 
War is finally over. International politics is back, with a long train of 
history behind it.  
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Chairman’s Summing-up 
François Heisbourg* 
he XXIXth meeting of the European Security Forum was also the 
opportunity to launch the book “Who is a Normative Foreign Policy 
Actor ? The European Union and its global partners” edited by one 
of our speakers, Nathalie Tocci. We were therefore fortunate to be able to 
draw both from the presentations given at our 26 May meeting and from 
the work done by the contributors to this timely book. 
Lanxin Xiang, Professor at the Graduate Institute in Geneva (IHED) 
presented his paper under the title “There is no such thing as a normative 
Chinese model”, underscoring that the Chinese view is ethical and 
temporal rather than ‘spatial’ (i.e. in which politics are polarised along 
left/right lines). Thus China likes Europe’s social (i.e. ethical) democracy, 
but not democracy as egalitarianism. China, we were reminded, takes the 
long view. To the chairman’s doubts about Chinese views on the non-use of 
force being close to those of the EU – after all, hadn’t China resorted to 
force to ‘teach a lesson’ to Vietnam in 1979; and didn’t China publicly state 
the possibility of using force to recover Taiwan? – the speaker indicated 
that China tended to use force defensively (as in Korea in 1950 or against 
India in 1962). Mention of Admiral Zheng He’s navy in the XVth century 
was made. Lanxin Xiang reaffirmed the view made in his paper that the 
post-modern EU and traditional Chinese mentality bear strong 
resemblances, and that EU and Chinese foreign policies could converge, 
notwithstanding different approaches to the central place of 
democratisation in EU norms. 
In her oral presentation Radha Kumar of the Delhi Policy Group also 
drew on the long historical view, emphasising the role of Kautilya (3rd 
century BC) as a source of Indian foreign policy inspiration notably in 
defining the three pillars of state behaviour (engagement; adherence to 
rule-based norms supervised by judges; transparency). She noted that these 
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were at some variance with enlightenment values as retailed through 
British colonial rule; they are closer to US approaches. She reminded us that 
foreign policy in Indian history had been the product of Empire (Maurya, 
Moghol…). In domestic terms, the constitutional emphasis is on collective 
rather than on individual rights; pluralism in a union composed of 
language-based states goes further than in the US or European 
constitutions. Certain rights (e.g. family law) are administered by the 
corresponding religion. 
She noted that during the Cold War, India’s policy of non-
engagement was at variance with the historical record. To a question from 
the chair noting the disconnect between India’s democratic nature and 
Kautilyan legacy on the one hand, and a Realpolitik approach in Sudan and 
Myanmar similar to that of China, she noted that: 
- In Sudan, India is a profit-sharing partner in the greater Nile oil 
consortium, but is not physically present as an actor on the ground; 
- In Myanmar, India is courting the Junta as a response to Chinese 
influence. 
In conclusion, she remarked that the Achilles heel of Indian foreign 
policy was its sometimes unrealistic strand, as in the opposition of part of 
the body-politic (e.g. the CP-ML) against the nuclear deal with the US. 
Andrey Makaryachev, Professor at the University of Nizhny-
Novgorod, spoke to his paper entitled “In quest of subjectivity: Russia’s 
normative offensive and the triple politicisation of norms”, noting that 
Russia’s foreign policy had become increasingly norm-based in terms of the 
arguments used, as is witnessed by the handling of the Kosovo issue. The 
disagreements are less on the general nature of norms (peace, security, 
democracy, liberty, human rights, etc.) than on their content; and there 
continues to be a refusal of any kind of judgement on Russia’s domestic 
standards. 
Walter Slocombe, former US Undersecretary of Defense presented the 
paper prepared by Daniel Hamilton on “The United States: A normative 
power?” (a contributor to the book edited by Nathalie Tocci). He stressed 
that a normative policy implies standards that are consistent, explicit and 
universal, noting the importance of the Enlightenment legacy. Since 
Kosovo had been mentioned, he underlined the tension between normative 
ends and normative means; the Kosovo campaign had been the opposite of 
an interest-driven war. 
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Nathalie Tocci, presenting her paper “When and Why Does the EU 
Act as a Normative Power in its Neighbourhood?”, focused on the question 
of ends and means applied to the case of the EU. She noted that it was 
easier to agree on norms than to act on them; that it’s easier to be normative 
when interests are not involved; that there is a need for mechanisms to 
define the collective EU interest; and that normativity tends to apply in 
contractual, civilian relations, whereas its ceases to be at a premium when 
we face coercive influences. 
Given the wealth of presentations, time for debate from the floor was 
limited. A German participant raised the issue of the stability of a multi (or 
non)-polar system, as well as that of the consequences of cultural relativism 
for war and peace: after all, there had been a lot of cultural relativism on 
show between the contrasting presentations. He also wanted to draw out 
the panellists on the ‘tying of hands’ in a normative foreign policy, an issue 
much dwelt upon in Ms. Tocci’s paper. A Dutch participant wondered 
whether there could be agreement on universal norms between some of the 
rather parochial great powers. A member of the Russian mission referred to 
his country’s desire for deep reform of the OSCE, in terms of ODHIR 
(Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights) and the election 
observers. 
Lanxin Xiang, in response, noted that there is no universal Chinese 
set of norms, that China is agnostic in this regard. He considered that 
multi-polarity can be stable, with a form of “democratisation of 
international relations”. 
Radha Kumar held the view that there is a core base of principles on 
which there can be agreement. As for the tying of hands, she stated that the 
UN still remains the institution of choice, but that reform is required; 
unfortunately, the trend in this regard was towards fragmenting rather 
than universalising. China needed to become a major player in the Bretton 
Woods institutions as well as in the Asia context; but this would create 
complex reactions in the continent. Kosovo should be viewed as a specific 
European issue, not as a broader, global precedent, noting that Serbia in the 
erstwhile Yugoslav federal system had taken away Kosovo’s regional 
autonomy. 
Andrey Makarychev was sceptical about universal norms. He posed 
the question: “Who are the political actors of the international system?, 
since we now have alongside state actors, a number of collective actors (EU, 
NATO…), unrecognised states, NGO’s etc. What is the meaning of 
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international society under these conditions, and how much multiplicity 
can we afford in the international society?” 
Walter Slocombe refused relativism when it comes to certain 
fundamental rights (such as the issue of abuse of detainees). Countries can 
live together with vastly different internal regimes. It may be true that 
everybody wraps their interests in norms and values: but the proposition 
can work the other way around (e.g. adopting democratic norms is usually 
good for interests such as business and peace). 
Nathalie Tocci reasserted the need for consistency. Kosovo may be 
small, but the way it is handled is important from the standpoint of actors 
of the global international system. Referring to the Chinese approaches, she 
also underscored the importance of the relational aspects of norms. 
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When and why does the EU act as a 
normative power in its 
neighbourhood?1 
Nathalie Tocci* 
Introduction 
Since its inception, the European Union was conceptualised as (and prided 
itself on being) a distinctly ‘different’ type of international actor. Over the 
decades, it has been described as a ‘civilian’ (Dûchene, 1973, p.19), a ‘soft’ 
(Hill, 1990) and most recently a ‘normative’ power in international relations 
(Manners, 2002, 2006). The EU’s official texts make similar claims about the 
Union’s role in world politics. Since the 1970s, in fact, norms and values 
began permeating European foreign policy documents and declarations 
(see Hill & Smith, 2000). At a two-day meeting of EU heads of state on 14-
15 December 1973, which resulted in a declaration on Europe's 
international identity, the delegates talked about building a ‘just basis’ for 
international relations. The 1986 Single European Act called upon the 
Community to “display the principles of democracy and compliance with 
the rule of law and with human rights” in its conduct of external relations. 
The 1988 Rhodes European Council called for an EU role in preserving 
international peace, promoting the solution to regional conflicts, 
demonstrating solidarity for democracy, supporting the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, strengthening the effectiveness of the United 
Nations and improving social and economic conditions in less developed 
countries. The Maastricht Treaty went further, calling for the preservation 
of peace and security, the promotion of international cooperation, the fight 
against international crime, the development of democracy and the rule of 
law, the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the 
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support for economic and social development (Article J.1). Most explicitly, 
the Lisbon Treaty states that in international affairs the EU would be 
guided by and would seek to promote the values on which the Union is 
founded, including democracy, human rights, fundamental freedoms and 
the rule of law (Title V, Article 21; Title V, Article 2c).  
This paper attempts to go beyond these assertions. Rather than 
assuming that the EU is a normative international player simply by virtue 
of its declarations and its ‘different’ non-state nature, we take for granted 
that in different geographical regions and at different points in time, the 
Union’s foreign policies have taken on dramatically different forms. If by a 
normative foreign policy we mean pursuing normative foreign policy goals 
through normatively deployed means and having a discernible normative 
impact, then what emerges, perhaps inevitably, is that the EU is not always 
normative, as is the case with any other international actor. The fact that the 
EU is a sui generis actor as opposed to states such as the US, Russia, China 
or India, does not fundamentally alter the reality of its foreign policy 
practice. As we shall see below, at times EU foreign policy has been 
normative, while at other times it has been status quo oriented, at other 
times still it has been realist and even imperialistic. For the purpose of this 
paper, a realpolitik actor is one that pursues self-interest, in violation of laws 
and norms; an imperial actor is one that pursues normative goals but does 
so in violation of existing norms in the deployment of its foreign policy 
instruments; a status quo actor is one that pursues self-interest in 
compliance with existing norms and laws.  
In order to make sense of these different types of foreign policy 
approaches, this paper teases out the principal dynamics at work in 
determining why the EU acts the way it does in different cases, and draws 
some lessons about the nature of the EU’s role in the world. 
The EU as a multifaceted foreign policy actor 
We can quite easily think of cases in which the EU has acted in a variety of 
different ways in world politics. Table 1 sets out cases in which the EU 
acted as a normative, realpolitik, imperial and status quo power, as well as 
cases in which the impact of EU foreign policies reflected (intended) or 
otherwise (unintended) the original foreign policy goals.   
 | 127 
Table 1. The EU’s role in the world: Selected sub-case studies 
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In cases such as the eastern enlargement and policies towards 
neighbouring Belarus, the EU has pursued normative goals (political and 
economic reform) through policy instruments that were crafted and 
deployed within the confines of the law (the accession policy and targeted 
sanctions respectively). Yet while the EU succeeded in engendering 
democratisation and economic modernisation in Eastern Europe, its 
double-track strategy of sanctioning the Belarus regime while supporting 
civil society has, to date, failed to alter the nature and strength of the 
authoritarian regime in Minsk. The Belarus leadership has not reacted 
positively to EU sanctions, while EU actors recognise that they have been 
unable to convey effectively their message of support to the Belarusian 
population.  
By contrast, in the case of Russia and Syria, the EU has behaved in an 
overall realpolitik manner. Vis-à-vis Russia, commercial and energy interests 
explain the sidetracking of EU political pressure on Moscow in the context 
of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and the Four Common 
Spaces; pressure has neither been exerted through dialogue nor 
conditionality. Likewise in Syria, realist concerns, such as preserving the 
regional balance of power between Israel and its neighbours, and following 
the line set by the US, have had a larger sway over EU policies than aims to 
see political transformation in Syria and a law-based agreement between 
Syria and Israel. In turn, the deployment of EU policy means has been 
rather inconsistent, ranging from un-kept promises of ratifying Syria’s 
Association Agreement, to sporadic pressure on the regime (i.e. regarding 
Lebanon) without constant attention to Syria’s deficient human rights 
record.  
In Kosovo and Israel-Palestine, the EU has behaved as an 
imperialistic actor, meaning an actor intent on creating new norms in the 
violation of existing international law. While intervening in the pursuit of 
normative goals (i.e. the prevention and rectification of injustice in Kosovo, 
and a two-state solution and respect for human rights in the Middle East;), 
the EU has often sidelined or violated international law. In the case of 
Kosovo this has taken place both in the context of war, unsanctioned by the 
UN, in which several member states took part. In the case of the Middle 
East, the EU, through its bilateral cooperation with Israel, has on several 
occasions (related to trade and research principally) extended benefits to 
Israeli settlements in the occupied territories in violation of the Geneva 
conventions. Yet results have differed. While Kosovo’s independence has 
been recognised, possibly leading to a revisionist setting of ‘new norms’, in 
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the Middle East, by contrast, a viable two-state solution appears to be an 
increasingly distant chimera (the Annapolis process notwithstanding), and 
violations of human rights and international law persist unabated.  
Finally, the EU has acted as a status quo player in North Africa and 
Ukraine. In both cases, the Union has primarily pursued non-normative 
goals. In North Africa, the EU prioritised its trade and increasingly its 
security interests over the promotion of political reform. Moreover, its 
trade policies, while beneficial to itself, have been detrimental to the 
growth and modernisation of the dependent North African economies, 
given its refusal to liberalise trade in agricultural products. In Ukraine on 
the other hand, while favouring Kiev’s European orientation and its reform 
process in principle, especially since the orange revolution, normative aims 
have been hollowed-out by the resistance of several member states to grant 
Ukraine a European perspective, not least out of fear of an eventual 
dilution of their power internally within the EU. In both cases, however, 
the means pursued by the EU were normative. Relations have been 
conducted through EU contractual relations, including the Association 
Agreements, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, and, more 
recently, the European Neighbourhood Policy. Given that the EU has been 
on the stronger side of these contractual ties, Brussels has ensured that the 
pursuit of its self-interest has been channelled through clear and 
transparent legal rules. The results have differed however. In North Africa, 
EU involvement has not opened the way for a deep process of political and 
economic transformation, while in Ukraine, despite widespread feelings of 
deception on the part of the EU and ongoing political instability and 
corruption, the post-revolution period has seen the consolidation of 
democracy.  
The dynamics at work in EU foreign policy 
But what do these cases tell us about the EU as a (normative) foreign policy 
actor? And more precisely, what are the factors determining how and why 
the EU acts in specific ways in different foreign policy instances? Several 
broad lessons can be brought to the fore.  
Beginning with the goals pursued, we can contrast the normative and 
imperialistic cases in which the EU opts for normative goals, with the 
realpolitik and the status quo cases, in which self-interest prevails. Why did 
the EU prioritise normative goals in cases such as Eastern Europe, Belarus, 
Kosovo and Palestine; but not in Syria, Russia, North Africa and Ukraine? 
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Analysing these cases, it emerges that when the EU has acted as a 
normative or imperialistic power, pursuing normative goals, normative 
and self-interest objectives either have overlapped or have not contradicted 
each other. In the case of Belarus, the EU has been able to pursue its 
(limited) trade interests alongside its democracy-driven sanctions. In the 
case of Eastern Europe instead, in view of the paramount strategic objective 
of ‘reuniting Europe’, the EU could not tolerate the candidate countries’ 
blatant violations of norms, insofar as these could ultimately threaten the 
EU from within. In this respect, enlargement policy can be seen as a special 
case precisely because it is not, strictu senso, foreign policy. Likewise, in the 
two imperialistic cases, after decades (in Israel-Palestine) or years (in 
Kosovo) of standstill, the member states converged at the level of rhetoric, 
to pursue normative objectives consisting in a rights-based, two-state 
solution in both Israel-Palestine and Serbia-Kosovo. In both cases, 
discursively agreeing on normative goals has been the least controversial 
option for the EU, despite the fact that, particularly in the case of Kosovo, 
important differences between member states remain.  
In the realpolitik and status quo cases, instead, the configuration of 
self-interests and intra-EU divisions has been far more pronounced, leading 
to a prioritisation of self-interest. On the one hand, strong and competing 
self-interests such as energy security (Russia), transatlantic cooperation in 
the Middle East (Syria), commercial interests and the management of 
migration flows (North Africa), and member state preservation of their 
internal power (Ukraine) have trumped competing normative objectives. 
On the other hand, the primary concern of several member states to pursue 
their disjointed self-interests at the expense of EU-wide objectives, and 
member state ability in EU foreign policy to veto collective action explains 
the prioritisation of self-interest in these cases.  
Turning to the foreign policy means used, here normative behaviour 
can be found in the normative and the status quo case studies, in contrast to 
the realpolitik and imperialistic cases, in which the EU has acted in 
contravention of or sidelined international law and multilateral institutions. 
The primary, albeit not only, explanation of why this has been the case 
seems to lie in the EU’s internal capability, although in a manner that partly 
contradicts the intuitive consensus about EU foreign policy. The problem in 
fact does not seem to lie in the fact that the EU has insufficient capabilities 
(e.g., in the military domain). Normative means tend to be deployed when 
the EU chooses to act within the confines of its international agreements 
with third states and has limited or no coercive instruments at its disposal. 
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Indeed, normative means have been deployed in cases where the primary 
vehicles of EU policy have been contractual relations, whether the 
accession process (Eastern Europe), the association process (North Africa), 
the Partnership and Cooperation process (Belarus) or the ENP (Ukraine).  
By contrast, whereas the EU has disposed of contractual options in 
the realpolitik and imperialistic cases, it has either chosen not to make use of 
these instruments (Syria) or it has pursued its objectives beyond the 
blueprint and stated aims of these contracts (Russia, Kosovo and Israel-
Palestine). Of course, in some cases, the EU has been strongly pressed by 
external actors and factors to sideline rules and law. In the Middle East, the 
US has induced the Union either to avoid concluding a contractual 
agreement (Syria), or to set aside or violate the norms, rules and laws 
embedded in these agreements (Israel-Palestine). In the other cases, 
Russia’s new assertiveness has either obstructed international legal 
channels (Kosovo) or cornered the Union into sidelining the human rights 
and democracy standards spelt out in its bilateral agreements with 
Moscow.   
Yet while important in defining or constraining foreign policy means, 
the external environment is critical above all in influencing the EU’s foreign 
policy impact. Naturally, what the EU does is the primary determinant of 
its impact. Hence, it is far more likely that the Union will have a normative 
impact when it pursues normative goals and means (Eastern Europe) than 
when it acts in an imperialistic, realpolitik or status quo way. But on the one 
hand, the Belarus case exemplifies that this is not always the case and that 
the Union can fail to engender a normative result despite its pursuit of 
normative goals through normative means. On the other hand, the cases of 
Syria, Ukraine and Kosovo suggest that the EU can have a normative 
impact even when either its goals or policy means are not normative.  
Especially in these non-intuitive cases, the role of the external 
environment is of the essence. A conducive external context is of primary 
importance for an effective normative impact. In Syria, Damascus’ isolation 
by the West and its many internal weaknesses explain in part why, to some 
extent, the Ba’ath regime has abided by international norms, especially in 
terms of retreating from Lebanon and accepting an international presence 
there. Furthermore, the EU is Syria’s first trading partner and is viewed as 
a less aggressive actor than the US. Hence, against all odds, Damascus 
strives to keep a door open to Brussels. In Kosovo, despite Russian 
resistance, the West has the power to assert the end-game and recognise 
secession, even if in contravention of international law. In Ukraine, 
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paradoxically it is the nearby pressurising influence of Moscow that has 
induced pro-reform actors in Kiev to latch on to the EU irrespective of what 
the Union says and does and in spite of the EU’s lukewarm reception of 
Ukraine’s membership ambitions. In the case of Eastern Europe however, 
the complementary support of the US and the international financial 
institutions, as well as the warm reception of EU involvement by the 
Eastern European countries has served to bolster the effectiveness of 
normative EU goals and means. 
By contrast, an unfavourable external environment, coupled with EU 
weakness vis-à-vis third states or the wider milieu, reduces the likelihood 
of a normative impact. In Belarus, in the absence of free media, the Belarus 
leadership has divulgated its own vision of reality, hardened its stance and 
instumentalised Western pressure to induce a ‘rally around the flag’ effect. 
Belarus’ relatively stable economic situation and its geopolitical anchorage 
to Russia have also made the country less dependent upon Europe. In 
Russia, the discovery of energy leverage and an accompanying political 
(re)assertiveness on the international scene have contributed to 
undermining the effectiveness of the EU’s normative message, and allowed 
Moscow to play member state interests against each other. In the Middle 
East, the EU’s acceptance of playing second fiddle to the US, its 
preoccupation with maintaining close ties with Israel and the hold that 
Israel itself has on the EU have all induced the Union to strive for a 
modicum of stability in the region and respect rights. Finally, in North 
Africa, whereas the EU has sufficiently strong bargaining power vis-à-vis 
the Maghreb countries, the resilience of these regimes has reduced the 
prospect that the EU’s (secondary) normative goals will have a discernible 
impact on the ground.  
Transforming the EU into a normative power in the world 
The discussion on means and impact points to a conundrum. On the one 
hand, the EU is more likely to pursue normative means when power 
relations between the EU and a third state are relatively balanced and 
relations develop within the confines of mutually negotiated agreements. 
On the other hand, power and particularly relational power seems to be of 
critical importance to engendering a normative impact, given that even the 
best of intentions may be an insufficient condition of success (Belarus). 
How can the EU escape this conundrum and maximise its chances of acting 
as a ‘normative power’ (Manners, 2002), as it repeatedly proclaims its role 
in the world?  
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In so far as the EU and its member states do not live, at least not 
always, on Kagan’s Venus (Kagan, 2003), but rather are also driven by self-
interest just like any other international actor, there is little point in naively 
asserting that the EU should sideline its interests and goals in the name of 
its proclaimed norms. Desirable as it may be, simply calling for this to 
happen will not change the dynamics at work. Neither can the EU single-
handedly affect the external environment in which its foreign policies 
unfold. While it can certainly influence the external context, particularly in 
its neighbourhood where it has real foreign policy presence, it is also bound 
to rely on fortuitous external circumstances to effectively assert its 
normative power. 
One suggestion is to improve the EU’s internal capabilities. This 
would not necessarily mean strengthening capabilities in the classic sense 
of the term such as for example organising greater economic leverage or 
building military capacity. Strengthening capabilities in these terms could, 
by contrast, damage the EU’s normative role by generating internal EU 
incentives to bend the law in order to pursue foreign policy goals in the 
interests of the EU or its member states. Instead, the Union could 
strengthen its web of contractual relations with third states in a manner 
that would ‘tie its own hands’, thus reducing its ability to act non-
normatively. This would entail developing further the set of rules and laws 
that bind EU external behaviour in relation to third states, and link these 
rules and norms explicitly to the obligations set under international law. It 
would also entail establishing or strengthening the EU’s internal 
institutional watchdog mechanisms, ensuring that when one EU actor (such 
as the Council or Commission) behaves or is tempted to behave in 
contravention of set rules, others (such as the Parliament) are ready and 
able to prevent this from happening. Understanding the importance of 
working in this direction is predicated upon an appreciation that the EU is 
not necessarily normative and that its internal actors are often driven by the 
very same set of interests and priorities that motivate other international 
actors. A shift in this direction would also substantiate claims that the EU’s 
sui generis nature reflects a truly novel identity as a normative actor in 
world politics. 
134 | READINGS IN EUROPEAN SECURITY 
References 
Dûchene, F. (1973), “The European Community and the Uncertainties of 
Interdependence”, in M. Kohnstamm and W. Hager (eds), A Nation 
Writ Large? Foreign Policy Problems before the European Community, 
London: Macmillan.  
Hill, C. (1990), “European foreign policy: Power bloc, civilian model – or 
flop?”, in R. Reinhardt (ed.), The Evolution of an International Actor, 
Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Hill, C. and K. Smith (2000), European Foreign Policy: Key documents, 
London: Routledge. 
Kagan, R. (2003), Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World 
Order, New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
Manners, I. (2002), “Normative Power Europe: A contradiction in terms?”, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 235-258. 
Tocci, N. with H. Darbouche, M. Emerson, S. Fernandes, R. Hanau-Santini, 
G. Noutcheva and C. Portela (2008), The EU as a Normative Foreign 
Policy Actor, CEPS Working Document No. 281, CEPS, Brussels. 
 
 
 | 135 
The United States: A Normative Power? 
Daniel Hamilton* 
The shifting centres of gravity in US foreign policy 
This paper on US foreign policy summarises the conclusions of a larger 
study, which in turn is a contribution to a multi-country project 
(concerning also the EU, China, India and Russia), published by CEPS and 
edited by Tocci et al. This project has used a common analytical framework, 
consisting of several stylised foreign policy paradigms: normative, 
realpolitik, imperial, and status quo. Tocci acknowledges that the same 
international actor can display all these types of foreign policy in different 
regions and in different policy areas at different points in time. The US case 
study indicated that the US, at least can – and does in fact – engage in each 
of these ways simultaneously.  
But what do these typologies really tell us? Do they help us answer 
the question of whether the US is a normative power? While the US may at 
times indulge in all of types of foreign policy, this however begs the deeper 
question: overall, which most closely reflects the core of US foreign policy? 
Which examples are representative of deeper currents in American society, 
and which are not? Which are exemplars and which are exceptions?  
Our first finding is to refute the rather superficial claim that the US 
used to be a normative power but isn’t today. While most ‘normative 
power EU’ theorists acknowledge, in the words of Diez and Manners (2007, 
pp. 170, 174, 186), that the US “has exemplified the concept of a normative 
power during parts of its history”, particularly “in the inter-war and 
immediate post-war periods”, they deny that this has been true more 
recently. As this study has shown, however, the US advanced normative 
and non-normative goals, and deployed normative and non-normative 
means, before and after World War II, just as it does today. The reality is 
that the relative value or cost of these options has presented itself to every 
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US Administration and Congress; the US has not swung from purely 
normative phases to non-normative ones.  
This underscores my point that the more appropriate question is not 
whether the US is a normative actor but the degree to which it is one. I submit 
that this is also the more appropriate question when it comes to analysing 
other countries as well. To answer this question it is necessary to determine 
where the real centre of gravity lies when it comes to characterising the US 
role in the world. This requires us in turn to assign some kind of weighting 
to the different paradigms. 
Overall, my review of US foreign policy indicates that the United 
States has been and continues to be simultaneously a guardian of norms 
established by the international community; a norm entrepreneur 
challenging those norms and on balance pushing the international 
community toward stronger norms enshrining human rights and the rule 
of law and democratic societies; a norm externaliser when it tries to 
advance norms for others that it is reluctant to apply to itself; and a norm 
blocker when it comes to issues that may threaten its position, or that 
exacerbate domestic divisions among the co-equal branches of US 
government or among the fluid yet often conflicting currents of American 
domestic thought regarding America’s role in the world.  
In addition, due to shifting political constellations and the separation 
of powers inherent in the US constitutional system, it is not easy to predict 
where the US may come out on any particular normative issue. The open 
and rather fluid nature of the US system indicates that coalitions 
transcending nominal party allegiances need to be built on most issues, and 
the strength and durability of such coalitions depend not only on the issue 
at hand, but on its relationship to many other issues.1  
Moreover, the particular weight of any one of these typologies varies 
over time. In general it may be said that the ‘normative intended’ 
dimension carries considerable weight and is a legitimate source of pride 
within the US foreign policy tradition. There are of course cases in which 
the US seeks to advance normative goals through normative means, but 
with major unintended consequences, but on the whole these appear to be 
less weighty. Over the course of the past 90 years, the US has also exhibited 
                                                     
1 The same, I would argue, can be said of the EU and individual EU member states. 
The exact mix changes in each state.  
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a strong tradition of hegemonic (as opposed to imperial) behaviour. There 
have been flashes of imperialism, but overall they have been subsumed 
within a broader pattern of hegemony. While one can certainly identify 
cases of US realpolitik, intended or unintended, overall they appear to arise 
on a more case-by-case, ad hoc basis and thus seem less representative than 
the other two categories. There are fewer identifiable cases of US status quo 
orientation, but here again the case study approach limits the analysis, 
since the US is considered widely to be a major, if not the main, custodian 
and steward of the current international system.  
In sum, the mainstream of US foreign policy tends more often than 
not to reflect a varying blend of normative and hegemonic approaches. This 
mainstream tradition, however, has been challenged by the historically 
unusual Wilsonian-Jacksonian coalition that over the past six years has 
dominated the US executive branch, with only some countervailing 
influence by the legislative and judicial branches. Challenges to the 
mainstream in the 1990s instead came more often than not from influential 
Jacksonian and Jeffersonian elements in the Congress. These shifting 
coalitions indicate that it is premature to conclude that the US has turned 
from the fundamental instincts that have guided it for the past sixty years. 
The rhetoric of the major contenders for the presidency in 2008, in fact, 
seems truer to mainstream tradition than to US activities of the recent past. 
Clinton, McCain and Obama each essentially claim to be the person best 
able to pass what Henry Kissinger has called the historical test for this 
generation of American leaders: how to use preponderant US power to 
achieve an international consensus behind widely accepted norms that will 
protect American values in a more uncertain future. 
As we have seen, there is a particularly acute tension within the 
normative-hegemonic approach, and that is the extent to which the US is 
willing or able to bind itself to the norms it advances for others. This 
tension has characterised US foreign policy for many decades. For instance, 
no country was more responsible than the United States for the creation of 
the United Nations, and President Harry Truman was clear from the outset 
what this would mean. On June 25, 1945, in his closing address to the San 
Francisco conference that drafted the UN Charter, he stated, ‘[W]e all have 
to recognize, no matter how great our strength, that we must deny 
ourselves the license to do always as we please”. This statement has not 
always sat comfortably with Truman’s successors. As Stephen Schlesinger 
(2006) notes, “Washington discovered soon after the UN’s birth that despite 
its veto power in the Security Council, it could not always control its 
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wayward child. As a result, ever since 1945, US leaders have approached 
the UN with ambivalence: hoping, on the one hand, to use it to further US 
national security interests, while, on the other hand, worrying that too 
much involvement might constrain the United States' ability to act”.2 This 
tension has characterised America’s approach to most international 
institutions and norms, even though public opinion polls consistently 
record strong public support for multilateral approaches to international 
challenges.  
The US has not always mastered this tension well. As Kalypso 
Nicolaidis (2004) notes, “in non-American eyes, there is a world of 
differences between the ‘righteous might’ of Roosevelt’s era and the self-
righteous might of George W. Bush”.  
On balance, however, and despite exceptions, over the past sixty 
years the US has sought to manage its normative-hegemonic interplay by 
accepting some limits on its power and being bound by broader 
international norms and commitments, in exchange for greater legitimacy 
and acceptance of its leadership by others. The unresolved question in the 
post-Cold War, post-September 11 world is whether the US and other key 
players are prepared to stick with this bargain, or whether the US will 
increasingly act as a ‘norm externaliser’, i.e. using its power to advance 
broad norms for others but refusing to apply such norms to itself, and 
whether other nations will refuse the ‘followership’ that leadership 
requires. “Nothing undermines US authority more than the perception that 
the United States considers itself too powerful to be bound by the norms 
we preach to others” notes former US National Security Advisor Sandy 
Berger (2004).  
Comparing the US and the EU 
Since this project was prompted by consideration of the EU as a normative 
power, and since much of the literature in this regard contains explicit or 
implicit references to the United States, a few points warrant consideration.  
First, much of the literature on the EU’s alleged ‘normative power’ 
ignores some fundamental underpinnings of European order that have 
enabled conceptions of normative power to develop and be exercised at all. 
During the first half of the 20th century, most Europeans squandered any 
                                                     
2 See also Bull (1977).  
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pretension they might have had to normative leadership through two 
World Wars and continued colonial rule. Following World War II, the US 
security guarantee removed – at least for half a continent – a key source of 
European conflict: the perceived need by mistrustful European states to 
build arms and alliances against their own neighbours. The American 
security commitment offered west Europeans an umbrella under which 
they could reconcile and agree on new norms that could offer a common 
foundation upon which they could work together and with others. Over 
time, the reassurances offered by a supportive – yet comfortably distant – 
hegemon enabled Europeans to create a community within which they 
could derive their security from each other rather than against each other. 
The very creation of the EU and the ability of its members to domesticate 
their foreign policies and render them normative rested on security 
guarantees provided by the United States.  
It is perhaps easy today to forget that NATO was the umbrella under 
which the European integration project could proceed, or that postwar 
institutions were created as much to prevent west Europeans from again 
dragging the world into conflict and depression as to prevent Soviet 
dominance or communist infiltration. Kalypso Nicolaidis (2004) notes that 
“[T]he creation of a quasifederation without collective security as a driving 
force was an aberration of history made possible to a great extent by the 
US”.3 
Moreover, this security logic continues even today – despite the end 
of the Cold War, despite September 11, and despite transatlantic and inner-
EU squabbles over Iraq and other issues. The US continues to provide the 
ultimate reassurance enabling Europeans to reconcile, build and extend 
their Union. This is as evident in Kosovo today as it has been throughout 
the Balkans for the past decade and more4 This logic has been particularly 
                                                     
3 There is perhaps a relevant historical analogy, however: the young US also 
enjoyed the luxury of believing in its own normative uniqueness in the 19th century 
because it was protected by the British navy from being dragged into inner-
European conflicts. This constructed a space in which Americans could enjoy a rare 
vacation from harder international realities – and in which such notions as 
American “exceptionalism” and “the virtues of isolationism” flowered and became 
such powerful guiding narratives.  
4 During the Kosovo war and its aftermath, the US used the slogan “the only exit 
strategy is an integration strategy” to press the EU to recognise the logic of its own 
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evident in the determination of Central and Eastern European states to join 
NATO as well as the EU. New member states have been very clear about 
this relationship: while they have been keen to integrate with European 
societies within the EU, they are ultimately reassured in doing so through 
their membership in NATO.  
The ‘normative power’ Europe discourse is strangely silent on this 
point. I was struck that the case study of EU enlargement in the EU 
working paper failed to even mention the parallel process of NATO 
enlargement and the obvious relationship between the two. While each 
operates according to its own particular logic, most EU countries are 
NATO countries, and the same officials and populations have been 
addressing the same historic opportunity: to extend to as much of the 
European continent as possible the democratic, free-market space where 
war simply does not happen.  
This relates to a point Diez and Manners (2007, pp. 176, 180) have 
made about the relationship between normative and military power. “In 
contrast to civilian power”, they note, “normative power is not the opposite 
of military power. It is entirely conceivable that military force is used to 
back up the spread of normative values” and that “military capabilities 
may underpin normative power”. I couldn’t agree more. What is important 
to add, however, is that in some instances the military capabilities – and 
political commitment – that underpin the EU’s ability to project normative 
power are provided not by the EU but by the United States. 
Second, much of the literature describing “normative power EU” is 
highly selective, including policies of EU member states when it is 
convenient and excluding them when it is not. There are two dimensions to 
this. The first has to do with foreign policy, where authority and 
competence still reside largely with member states. The EU, qua EU, in fact, 
has little real purview over the vast range of foreign policy decisions 
confronting any particular EU nation. Any consideration of the EU as a 
normative foreign policy actor, therefore, needs to consider the actions of 
individual EU member states, not just examples of common EU action. This 
is important for our purposes because the tendency is to compare the EU 
                                                                                                                                       
enlargement and to work with southeast Europeans to create conditions enabling 
them to join the larger Union, even as it agreed to extend its own security 
commitments to those countries willing and able to join the Atlantic Alliance. 
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with the United States. In one such comparison, for instance, Diez and 
Manners (2007, p. 182) argue that the US readily resorts to force, whereas 
“the fact” is that “the EU or, rather, EU member states consider the use of 
force a last resort”. Really? What about the British and Polish invasion of 
Iraq and Spanish support for it? What about German, British, French, 
Dutch etc. intervention in the Balkans without a UN mandate? What about 
French or British interventions in Africa or the British intervention in the 
Falklands? My point is not to criticise such decisions, it is to ask for greater 
analytical rigour – for this, too, is the EU. 
The other dimension has to do with domestic policies, or the extent to 
which EU member states have coordinated and ‘domesticated’ aspects of 
their interactions with one another. There is no doubt that in many areas 
there have been historic successes, even as progress is halting in other 
areas. The issue is whether the EU’s ‘normative power’ is enhanced by 
projecting such ‘domesticated’ policies abroad or by advancing them at 
home. This debate, new to the EU, echoes the long-standing American 
debate between Jeffersonians and Wilsonians. The EU’s normative power 
in this regard seems to be more influential simply through its example at 
home – the fact that nations that regularly used violence against each other 
now join together in common cause in a variety of traditionally domestic 
policy areas. There seem to be relatively few examples where the EU has 
projected its ‘domesticated’ policies abroad. The death penalty seems to be 
a prominent one, but even here success seems limited largely to Europe 
and Latin America, and problems of ratification and implementation in 
vast parts of the world remain (Katzenstein, 2006). Nonetheless, the 
possibilities are intriguing. 
If one looks for examples beyond treaties and international law, 
however, one uncovers some promising experiments in the international 
extension of domesticated EU policies – particularly with the US. The 
recently created Transatlantic Economic Council, for instance, is in essence 
an effort to tie the US and the EU into a consultative process that identifies 
and then seeks to resolve domestic regulatory or policy barriers to the 
deeper integration of their economies, and to consider whether common 
standards developed through this process could form the basis for broader 
international norms. Yet it is striking that most of the literature either 
ignores the US dimension or goes to great pains to define “normative 
power EU” against the US example. 
These considerations lead to a third point – the role of the United 
States, or perhaps more accurately, stereotypes of the United States, in 
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European debates about ‘identity politics’. Proponents of “normative 
power EU” refreshingly acknowledge that the notion of ‘normative power’ 
is part of the broader debate about identity politics in Europe, and as such 
requires an ‘other’ against which such identities are constructed. “Not only 
is the success of this representation” of normative power EU “a 
precondition for other actors to agree to the norms set out by the EU”, state 
Diez and Manners (2007, pp. 173-188), “it also constructs an identity of the 
EU against an image of others in the ‘outside world’”. After reviewing the 
literature, however, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the ‘other’, 
whom, the adherents of “normative power EU” are constructing their 
arguments ‘against’ is in fact the EU’s closest partner, the United States. 
Diez and Manners explicitly seek to draw such distinctions. They 
argue that the American tradition of ‘exceptionalism’ essentially 
disqualifies the US from being considered a normative power, whereas it is 
precisely what they believe to be Europe’s ‘ordinariness’ that provides 
“normative power EU” with such strength and attraction. This represents 
almost wilful ignorance of the strong exceptionalist rhetoric that is part and 
parcel of daily European political debates. In fact, the very premise of 
normative power is that Europe is uniquely positioned to guide humanity 
to a better future.  
The more compelling distinction, it seems to me, is rooted in each 
partner’s sense of its own exceptionalism. As Kalypso Nicolaidis (2004) 
notes, historians trace difficulties between France and the US to their 
similar sense of mission, of being the upholders of political and 
philosophical models for the world through the avowedly universal reach 
of their respective 18th century revolutions. I would add that German 
critiques of the US are also rooted in part in a German sense of 
exceptionalism: since Germany had been exceptionally evil, many Germans 
today believe their country must be exceptionally good. Since the US 
helped inculcate such beliefs in German society over two generations, it is 
particularly grating for Germans when US achievements fail to meet US 
aspirations, or when US demands of solidarity force Germans to abandon 
black and white in favour of grey. The moralistic undertone to much 
German critique is inescapable, even when it is not explicit. 
These dilemmas arise in part because both the US and the EU think of 
themselves as normative powers projecting their internal norms of 
democracy and human rights abroad. Nevertheless these two competing 
exceptionalisms are of a different kind. As Nicolaidis (2004) notes:  
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Their respective founding myths, the escape from despotism and 
the escape from nationalism, tyranny from above and tyranny 
from below, led both entities to elevate commitment to the rule of 
law as their core. But this was domestic law in the US, supra-
national law in the EU; this meant checks and balance between 
branches of government on one side, between states on the other. 
While the US progressively became a federal state, the EU, 
admittedly still in its infancy, is braced to remain a federal union 
of nation-states. In the last two decades, while both the US and the 
EU have been fertile grounds for exploring “subsidiarity”, and 
multilevel governance, the EU alone has explored ways of doing 
this without coordination by a centralized state, through methods 
that might one day be relevant to global governance. US 
exceptionalism is a national project; European a postnational one.5 
 
Within this distinction lies an opportunity: to reconcile these different 
‘normative’ traditions rather than to deny the legitimacy of one or the other 
or to ignore the common foundations upon which they are based – all in 
all, an attractive agenda for US-EU relations. 
 
 
                                                     
5 See also Hamilton (2004); Keohane (2002); Brimmer (2006). 
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In Quest of Political Subjectivity: 
Russia’s ‘Normative Offensive’ and the 
Triple Politicisation of Norms 
Andrey S. Makarychev* 
ussia is usually portrayed as either a fundamentally pragmatic or a 
Realpolitik type of international actor. Yet the end of Putin’s 
presidency was marked by what might be figuratively called 
Russia’s ‘normative offensive’: surprisingly enough, Russian foreign policy 
discourse became – at least rhetorically - increasingly normative. In fact 
Moscow seems not only to accept the normative challenges thrown down 
by parts of Europe but even to politically counter-attack in the normative 
battlefield. According to a renowned Russian journalist, “pragmatism is 
death for Russia. Without a value-oriented positioning Russia would 
simply turn into a resource-rich object of alien subjects’ policies”.1  
Starting from the outbreak of the ‘colour revolutions’ in countries of 
its ‘near abroad’ Russia, indeed, has invested heavily in the infrastructure 
of a soft power.2 This type of reaction could be discerned, for example, in 
the State Duma statement of October 2nd, 2007 accusing the Saakashvili 
regime of violating the principles of democracy and abusing human rights, 
including tightening control over opposition, the media and dissidents. In 
the case of Ukraine, Russia’s key normative argument refers to the security 
decisions taken without due account of public opinion as “non-democratic” 
(of course, the point here is the Ukrainian NATO application). In 2008 
Russia proudly announced the establishment of the Institute of Democracy 
and Cooperation (IDC) with two key headquarters – in Paris and New 
                                                     
* Professor of Political Science and International Relations, Nizhny Novgorod 
Linguistic University. 
1 Maxim Shevchenko, interview with “Russkii zhurnal” online journal, 28 February 
2008 (available at http://www.russ.ru).  
2 Nicu Popescu, Russia’s Soft Power Ambitions, CEPS Policy Brief No. 115, CEPS, 
Brussels, October 2006, p.1. 
R 
WHAT PROSPECTS FOR NORMATIVE FOREIGN POLICY IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD? | 145 
York. This move, quite new in the tradition of Russian foreign policy, can 
be interpreted as a direct response to the activities of European and 
American foundations and think tanks in Russia and, simultaneously, as an 
alternative to the Western interpretations of normativity in world politics. 
In theory, there are two important facets to normative behaviour. 
Firstly, a normative power has to be grounded in a certain set of ideas, as 
opposed to the pursuance of purely material advantages. Secondly, a 
normative power has to be based upon multilateral institutions, as opposed 
to unilateral actions. Only a combination of these two aspects gives a 
proper model of normativity in international relations. Seen from this 
perspective, the emergent normative framework of Russian foreign policy 
so far seems to be deficient. Even the cooperation within the Northern 
Dimension initiative, in spite of its undeniable normative background in 
terms of establishing multilateral trans-border mechanisms, was largely 
perceived by sub-national elites in Russian regions as a source of economic 
and financial gains. By the same token, Russia’s commitments to 
international legal norms in the Kosovo issue were contaminated by the 
unveiled pursuance of economic goals as well. Russia’s harsh criticism of 
Estonia’s decision to remove the Second World War monument in 2007 did 
not reveal a comprehensive normative policy conduct either: it was based 
upon a strong ideational background but lacked both a clear institutional 
dimension and mechanisms of coordination with other (at least post-Soviet) 
countries.  
Against this background one may presume that the normative turn in 
Kremlin foreign policy can be discussed as one of its political instruments 
aimed at reinstalling Russia as one of key international subjects and an 
organic part of the ‘international society’– a status which, Moscow feels, is 
either disputed or directly challenged by many in the West. As the IDC 
Director put it, the Freedom House’s ranking of Russia at the level of 
countries like Angola, Libya and Uzbekistan is an exclusionary and unfair 
move that makes Russia resist and rebut it.3 In the meantime, the 
sensitiveness of Russian authorities to such normative gestures from the 
part of an international NGO is a good proof of the understanding that the 
only way to gain political subjectivity in international society is through the 
                                                     
3 Itogi, No. 5 (p. 607), 19 March 2008. 
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recognition of a country’s democratic credentials and, consequently, 
observance of democratic procedures.4 
In this paper I will argue that it is exactly this political logic that 
sustains Russia’s ‘normative offensive’; it is therefore, political effects that 
such a turn eventually entails. More specifically, there are three modalities 
inherent in the politicisation of norms. 
Firstly, most of Russian opinion- and policy-makers admit that there 
is always a certain degree of political decisionism in a normative type of 
foreign policy. This argument splits into two parts.  
On the one hand, in the likely cases of collision between different 
norms it is a political decision that prioritises one over another. For 
instance, in discussing the Kosovo situation from the normative point of 
view, Vladimir Putin implicitly admitted that there might be a conflict 
between the two constitutive principles of international society - territorial 
integrity vs. peoples’ right to self-determination. Yet, according to him, the 
first principle has to prevail, since the second deserves a double negative 
marking as a left-over of the Soviet strategy in times of colonialism.5  
On the other hand, in many cases norms applicable to one situation 
might appear to be irrelevant to or questionable in other – even seemingly 
similar - cases. Coming back to the Kosovo incident, many Russian analysts 
deem that global politics are defined not by shared rules of the game but 
rather by sovereign decisions on the part of the pivotal actors, first of all the 
United States and the European Union, who most of the time tend to act in 
a decisionist way.6 This argument appears to parallel the reasoning of those 
European experts who suggest that “the EU has a very ‘undemocratic’ 
approach, since it tends to select its interlocutors” in a variety of issues 
related to human rights and democracy.7 
                                                     
4 Andrei Bystritskii, “Gibel’ ili kontsert” (Death or concert), Apologiya, No. 9, 2006, 
p. 15. 
5 Vladimir Putin’s interview with journalists of G8 Countries, 4 June 2007 
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Secondly, one “of the political effects of norms”8 is the perspective of 
exclusion looming large behind their implementation. Normativity 
presupposes an interplay between inclusion and exclusion: certain norms 
are referred to as ‘constitutive’, while others are ignored or marginalised. 
The normative appeal “is more and more marked by a frontier … between 
those who succeeded in remaining ‘within’ (the ‘developed’, those to 
whom the rules of human rights, social security, etc., still apply) and the 
others, the excluded (the main concern of the ‘developed’ with regard to 
them is how to contain their explosive potential, even if the price to be paid 
is the neglect of elementary democratic principles)”.9 Consequently, “the 
‘normal’ ones are the ones born in the ‘normal’ fabric of the so-called 
European culture and believed to be a product of an imagined and 
invented European and culturally homogeneous civilization … which is 
placed in contrast to the ‘deviant’, the non-native … the one born outside 
Europe”.10  
All this is arguably very much relevant to EU – Russian relations, 
since, as many European authors assume, “through its normative-power 
narrative, Brussels necessarily ‘others’ those international actors that lack 
moral fervour… Moreover, in this tradition of thought, the term ‘norm’ is a 
close conceptual affiliate of the term ‘legitimacy’”.11 As a pertinent example, 
one may refer to the Polish ‘Eastern Dimension’ project that introduced 
‘Easterness’ not as a unifying platform for shared values but as a concept 
                                                                                                                                       
conference “La fin du moment democratique? Un defi pour l’Europe”, CERI, Paris, 
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that “underlines the existence of a divide between”12 the accession 
countries, on the one hand, and Russia – on the other.  
Russian views – even of ostensibly liberal profile - do not seem to 
differ much from those mentioned above: “Under the guise of European 
values, the EU pursues a peculiar kind of bureaucratic imperialism that 
seeks to modify and partially control EU’s neighbourhood through various 
instruments like the ENP, the Common Spaces, the Energy Charter, etc.”, 
one author argues.13 Another Russian scholar deems that the expansion of 
EU’s “normative empire” represents a political challenge to Russia14 and 
pushes her outside the so called “new (enlarged) West”. 
As a reverse side of this challenge, Russia has every reason to 
perceive the European normative discourse as constitutive of her own 
international subjecthood: in an indicative utterance of Natalia 
Narochnitskaya, “the IDC has to make Europeans question the widely 
spread stereotype of Russians as a barbaric nation”.15 Thus, the Russian 
game is two-fold: on the one hand, Moscow does accept the normative 
distance with Europe, though reformulates it in her own way: “today the 
West is short of non-economic values”. What stems from this enunciation is 
that the West is in no way ‘untouchable’ on normative grounds and, 
therefore, its pretensions to monopolise the interpretation of democracy 
have to be rebuffed.16 Yet on the other hand, Russia – through a variety of 
discursive moves – is eager to (re)imagine a Europe she might feel 
                                                     
12 Christopher Browning & Pertti Joenniemi, “The European Union’s Two 
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comfortable with (“We are to defend not a Europe of gay parades, but a 
Europe of Mozart, Goethe and Schiller”).17   
Thirdly, the normative type of international policy behaviour leaves 
ample space for “normative disagreements”,18 i.e. contestation and re-
definition of key normative signifiers.  
A major source of discursive discord between Russia and the EU 
could be discerned in the way both parties utilise the normative language 
of communication. While frequently using the same normative vocabulary, 
European and Russian discourse-makers deliberately infuse them with 
different meanings. It is exactly where the sources of misunderstanding 
come from, provoking - as a chain reaction to these discursive ruptures – 
multiple attempts to symbolize the differences. A few examples could be 
pertinent at this juncture, all based upon Ian Manners’ identification of key 
norms that shape EU policies.19 These norms, arguably, might be tackled, in 
terms of Ernesto Laclau, as “privileged, hegemonic signifiers which 
structure, as nodal points, the ensemble of a discursive formation”.  Yet, in 
the meantime, these signifiers tend to remain vague and imprecise, and it is 
exactly what constitutes for Laclau “the very nature of the political”.20 
Peace (and, therefore, security). Here we see a clear perceptional gap: 
for countries like the UK it is the Kremlin that represents a security threat 
(and, therefore, ought to be securitized) due to its complicity in the murder 
of Alexander Litvinenko, while for Russia herself it is the UK, which hosts 
key figures of the Chechen terrorist groups that is perceived as a security 
problem. The Russian government has repeatedly raised similar issues in 
diplomatic talks with Denmark, Sweden and some other European 
countries. 
Democracy. European discourse contains a number of arguments 
critical to EU democratic credentials. Some authors argue that in the 
Balkans, “an election is less about domestic legitimacy than about 
                                                     
17 Natalia Narochnitskaya, op. cit. 
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international legitimacy”.21 Others, in the meantime, deem that democracy 
promotion became a type of “technique of governance beyond political 
discussion”, which faces problems wherever “the power relations are so 
asymmetrical that the attempts to legitimize and rationalize the projection 
of power through technocratic means fail”.22 
Even the most liberal of Russian policy analysts side with this critique 
and speak of the “democratic deficit” within the European integration 
process.23 Meanwhile, in Russia this argument is paralleled by an attempt 
to automatically project the concept of democracy – originally crafted for 
describing the state of domestic political regime – to the whole 
international area. It is within this context that one has to discuss the 
concept of ‘democratic multipolarity’, which posits that the idea of 
democracy, being transferred from the domestic to the international 
domain, is denotative of a plurality of interests whatever the nature of 
these interests might be.  It is debatable whether a ‘democratic 
multipolarity’ model with such key actors as, for instance, Iran, North 
Korea, Pakistan, Libya, Nigeria or Venezuela would lead to a more secure 
world. 
The simultaneous activation of the ‘sovereign democracy’ and 
‘democratic multipolarity’ concepts renders a profound effect on the way 
the normative type of arguments is employed by Russian authorities. On 
the one hand, the Kremlin refuses to recognise the legitimacy of any 
attempts to assess the quality of domestic electoral or human rights norms 
(since Russia’s democracy is a sovereign one, no foreign government can 
impose its standards or judge whether domestic practices correspond to 
any norm external to Russia). On the other hand, Russia keeps a free hand 
in appraising the international behaviour of other countries, expecting 
them to act ‘democratically’, i.e. respect the interests of all parties involved. 
In other words, having foreclosed the internal political space from external 
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22 David Chandler, “Democracy Promotion and the Simulation of the European 
Union”, paper presented at the conference “La fin du moment democratique? Un 
defi pour l’Europe”, CERI, Paris, 11-12 May 2007, p. 1. 
23 Timofei Bordachov, Predely evropiezatsii (Limits of Europeanisation), Moscow: 
Higher School of Economics Publishers, 2007, pp. 162-163. 
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criticism, Moscow claims to possess a full right to point a finger at those 
countries it thinks are ‘violators’ of ‘international democracy’ (reduced, as I 
have mentioned earlier, to the plurality of actors). By doing so, Russia 
claims that foreign policies of countries that speak of themselves as 
democracies are not that democratic at all: in particular, Putin referred to 
the European support of the ‘orange revolution’ in Ukraine as an 
intervention from the outside which, as a form of external pressure, 
allegedly can’t be democratic.  
The rule of law. Again, Russia’s response to Europe in this domain 
redirects attention from the domestic understanding of the ‘rule of law’ to 
the international one. Putin repeatedly expressed his doubts about whether 
European countries are sincere in their legal commitments as soon as it 
comes to their foreign policies. The Kosovo debate is perhaps a good case 
in point.  
Another line of reasoning is the questioning of the leadership of the 
Western countries in terms of the attractiveness of their legal culture. Thus, 
according to Narochnitskaya, the right of French children to denounce their 
parents is highly controversial for Russians. She then gives another 
example of legal imperfections, this time in the United States where, 
according to her observations, most of the time voters’ identities are not 
being properly checked.24  
Liberty. There is a strong Russian conservative discourse aimed at 
drawing a line of distinction between the Western and the Russian versions 
of liberty. According to the conservative tradition of thinking, liberty is not 
about making individual choices, but about something more fundamental – 
getting rid of sin, including the alleged freedom to commit blasphemy and 
sacrilege.25 Many Russian political thinkers are convinced of Russia’s ability 
to confess and defend “genuinely Christian and, therefore, genuinely 
European values, among which the key one is the value of free human 
                                                     
24 Natalia Narochnitskaya, op. cit. 
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beings whose liberty is derived from its creation on the basis of the image 
of the Lord”.26 
Russian official discourse seems to be more nuanced in this respect. 
Foreign Minister refers to Russia’s eagerness to contribute to the formation 
of “a single Euro—Atlantic space of freedom and democracy” – a strategy 
that partly explains the creation of the IDC. Yet in the meantime, the 
numerous references to normative arguments lead Russia to criticise those 
Western countries that, in Russia’s opinion, “are ready to forgive the 
friendly governments for everything – from cracking down opposition and 
pressuring on business to open repressions and even crimes against 
opponents”.27 
Respect for human rights. In Europe, the key criticism in this domain is 
grounded on the presumption that “the West presents itself in a form bereft 
of any normative core as long as its concern for human rights only extends 
to promoting free markets abroad”.28 The key Russian argument seems to 
be a bit different – it points to the questioning of the universal and absolute 
applicability of the human rights concept. It is highly indicative that these 
claims come largely from religious circles. Thus, according to a key figure 
in the Russian Orthodox Church, in the public sphere “it is the moral 
norms that could be used as restrictions for human rights 
implementation”.29 Otherwise, the logic goes on, the human rights agenda 
might turn aggressive, as exemplified by public demands to legalise same-
sex marriages, the adoption of children by homosexual couples, gays’ 
employment in public education, etc. 
There is another twist in Russia’s human rights discourse – the 
increasing attempts to raise concerns about the state of human rights in the 
EU countries. As the chairman of the “United Russia” party puts it, “Russia 
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is very much troubled by the human rights situation in countries like 
Estonia and Latvia where hundreds of thousands of people are deprived of 
basic civil rights … since they can’t elect and be elected, and their native 
language can’t be used for communication with authorities”.30 It is at this 
point that the human rights discourse turns into Russia’s implicit – and 
somehow dissembling – claims to be “more European than Europe itself”: 
“In making the case against the effacement of the Second World War 
memories, Russia defends European values and the future of all Europe”,31 
– the argument goes on. In continuation, Russia is eager to portray itself as 
a country where ethnic and cultural differences are tolerated and respected, 
as demonstrated by the centuries-long co-existence of the Russian and 
Muslim population in Russia’s heartland. As Narochnitskaya claims, 
“Europe has absolutely no right to accuse Russia of xenophobia, since in 
this respect Russia appears to be a much healthier nation”.32 
Therefore, one may see that normative discussions are an important 
part of Russia – EU relations. The reasons behind the re-actualization of the 
normative discourse seem to stretch far beyond specific issues like, for 
example, the fairness of elections in Russia. Russia accepted the normative 
challenge because of the awareness that it is exactly the normative matters 
that are being used by Western countries to define how ‘civilised 
humankind’ – one facing the threats of terrorism and other security 
challenges – looks. In fact, Russia’s newborn normative zeal is a crucial tool 
in her attempts to be accepted as a legitimate and constitutive member of 
the international community which, by and large, might be equated with 
the West.33 In fact, what is at stake is the drawing of the borders of this 
‘international community’ and the distribution of roles within it.  
The normative debates between Russia and Europe mostly deal with 
such issues as: a) which norms should be given priority in particular 
situations; b) how far each of the two parties should go with internationally 
promoting these norms; and c) whether ‘domestic’ norms may be equally 
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applicable for the international arena as well. Indeed, Russia wishes to be 
recognised in Europe as an equal partner in norm-setting, but this intention 
is not to be understood as an indication of Russia’s possession of its ‘own’ 
norms that Europe, arguably, either rejects or disregards. Russia seems to 
be ready to offer an alternative reading of a set of norms constitutive of 
European identity, but definitely not to substitute them with some kind of 
Russia-only norms or values.   
By way of conclusion, one may argue that Russia apparently accepts 
strong political connotations of norm-based discourse, but the politicisation 
described above is never complete, since on certain occasions it may be 
reversed by a series of implicitly de-politicised moves. One of them was 
Dmitry Medvedev’s reference – made at the German – Russia Forum in 
Berlin, June 5th, 2008 – to human rights issues as a value per se, irreducible 
to matters of political bargaining between Russia and the West and not 
susceptible to any kind of political trade-offs. Another example of the same 
sort is Moscow’s unease with NATO’s insistence on a logical linkage 
between the normative issues (like the state of democracy in applicant 
countries) and security (their perspectives to join NATO). On the one hand, 
the Kremlin fears being excluded from the NATO-centered security 
domain on the basis of Russia’s alleged failure to meet Western standards 
of democracy. On the other hand, the troublesome lesson Moscow may 
draw from the conflation of security and democracy arguments is that the 
more it supports undemocratic practices in neighbouring countries, the 
fewer are their chances of NATO membership. It is at this point that an 
inherently ‘undecidable’ character of Russia’s normative discourse becomes 
obvious: it seeks to reinvent the values of democracy, human rights and the 
rule of law, but in the meantime seems to be succumbing to the temptation 
of pragmatically implementing them as (supposedly) effective foreign 
policy tools. 
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There is No Such Thing 
as a Normative Chinese model 
Lanxin Xiang* 
Misreading China’s Rise? 
Many key concepts currently used in the West about China’s internal 
governance and foreign policy can no longer be valid, especially those from 
the fields of political science and history. We need a new conceptual 
framework and analytical tools.1 The world's preoccupation with China's 
sudden rise as an economic superpower is a matter of some bemusement 
among Chinese political leaders and intellectuals. Massive trade surpluses 
with the rest of the world? The embrace of free markets and globalisation? 
The Chinese have been there before. As we see it, this is not China’s rise, 
but rather its restoration to its historical position of global influence.  
Today’s restoration constitutes China's third great encounter with the 
West, following the Jesuit missions of the 16th century and the Opium 
Wars of the 1840s. The current encounter – this time between equals – will 
produce much more than economic competition with the West. As China’s 
economic strength grows, no one, not even the Chinese ourselves, can 
prevent China's influence from spreading into politics, values and 
ideology. It is in those arenas that conflicts with the West, the United States 
in particular, can arise, and unfortunately, it is precisely in those areas that 
misunderstandings between China and the West run rampant.2 
To come up with a normative Chinese model as regards world affairs, 
one must start with the simple but often neglected fact that China has no 
                                                     
* Lanxin Xiang is Professor of International History and Politics at the Graduate 
Institute of International Studies (HEI), Geneva. 
1 For details, see Lanxin Xiang, Chuantong yu Duiwai Guanxi (Tradition and Chinese 
Foreign Relations), Beijing: Sanlian Press, 2007 and “Don’t Use Western Language 
to Explain China”, Op-ed page, Global Times, 23 April 2008, Beijing. 
2 See further analysis, Lanxin Xiang, “Why Washington Does Not Speak Chinese”, 
Outlook, Washington Post, 16 May 2005. 
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faith in any universal value, hence has never offered any model in the past 
and will never do so in the future. Chinese tradition stipulates that any 
governance style, either domestic or external, be contingent in a historical 
and cultural context. A normative model would mean a value system that 
clamours for universal status, but China never believes in ‘universalism’ of 
any kind and universalism (a word synonymous to Catholicism) can never 
be translated accurately into the Chinese language.3  
Domestic Governance 
Western powers should abandon the idea that the ‘democratisation’ of 
China will definitely take place in the future. From the Chinese perspective, 
Western democracy in its post-Enlightenment form is a Gothic, pseudo-
secular system. It is deeply rooted in Christian theology. The United States 
today holds the last defensive line of a political ideology buttressed by a 
three-fold theology: metaphysical interpretation of human history – the 
Hegelian philosophy of history, a teleological tool of analysis, and an 
eschatological faith. China has none of the above. “Is Confucianism or 
Daoism a religion?” is a question the Westerners are never in a position to 
answer, but the Chinese never in a position to ask.  
The democratisation of China is not preordained by universalism. On 
the contrary, the traditional Chinese political logic remains the dominant 
force in China. The communist party cannot escape the same fate as all the 
dynasties before it. According to tradition, politics is a relationship between 
water and boat. Water (people) can allow the boat (government) to float but 
can also overturn the boat. The real issue of political legitimacy in China is 
thus not ‘democratic legitimacy’ (or procedural legitimacy Chengxu Hefa, as 
the Chinese call it), but ‘deeds legitimacy’ (Zhengji Hefa) based on the 
continued performance of the leadership. Most Western observers have 
missed this point. 
The Chinese view about internal and international politics is more 
coherent than outsiders have realised, since it is essentially an ethical one. 
                                                     
3 For example, it would be most misleading to say that China has accepted at least 
ONE universal value by signing up to the UN “Universal declaration of Human 
Rights”. In fact, the Chinese version is “The World Declaration of Human Rights” 
(shije renquan xuanyan). The difference is obvious to those who know Chinese: the 
world is dominated by nation states.  
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In Chinese tradition, a ‘state’ is the extension of the family, as the Chinese 
term ‘Guojia’ (state-family, the official terminology for the ‘state’) indicates. 
Thus, only moral authority can guarantee the long-term stability of a family 
as well as a state. It would be misleading therefore to use Imperial 
Germany as a historical analogy in describing China’s ‘rise’ today. To put it 
simply, there is no inherent ‘power politics’ logic that would automatically 
lead China into repressive policies at home and expansionist policies 
abroad. Any use of force has to be morally justifiable. Even in actual 
warfare, winning without engaging in battle is considered the ideal result.  
National Security 
The Chinese view of national security is predicated on two factors: the 
modern Chinese experience since the Opium War of 1840s and the 
traditional culture concerning armed conflict. The first factor is crucial, 
since modern China has been a victim rather than a beneficiary of the 
existing international system (the Westphalia System). Before the Opium 
War, the Chinese perception of national security was based on a relatively 
benign hegemony – a Sino-centric international relations network, known 
as the Tributary System, in which China received ‘tribute’ (i.e. a formal 
diplomatic gesture by foreign countries to present a gift to the Chinese 
emperor, symbolising the acceptance of Chinese leadership) in exchange 
for trade and protection.  
The Westphalian conception of power and balance of power was 
unknown to the Chinese until the Opium War and was imposed by 
Western powers upon Asia to replace the Tributary System with a new 
‘Treaty System’. Operating through competitive principles of free trade and 
extraterritoriality, the Treaty System never provided China with any real 
sense of national security. On the contrary, these two principles inevitably 
turned China into a major playground of the political and economic rivalry 
among the Great Powers. In other words, Western imperialism created, for 
the first time, a malignant ‘balance of power’ system in Asia that had little 
to do with local culture. It was a miniature version of European power 
politics.  
In the first half of the 20th century, the ‘rising’ Japanese made an 
extraordinarily bold attempt at establishing a malignant hegemony in the 
region – the so-called “Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere”, to 
replace the Treaty System. But this was a short-lived adventure. After a 
bloody civil war in the late 1940s, the Chinese communist party was able to 
seize power, with popular support mobilised successfully during the war 
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against Japan. The dramatic ending of foreign domination means that 
China has obtained, for the first time in modern history, the opportunity to 
design a national security policy based upon its own national interests. But 
China’s humiliating past has always cast a long shadow on any security 
policy. Self-reliant economic development and strong national defence 
have been two main pillars of the new regime.  
The second factor, the influence of cultural heritage, is no less 
important. From the very beginning of the People’s Republic, the Chinese 
view of security has been influenced by China’s ancient tradition and 
attitude regarding the use of force to deal with security threats. Some 
Western scholars have labelled this factor as ‘strategic culture’. According 
to Iain Johnston, the dominant Chinese strategic culture is parabellum, a 
term he used to refer to Chinese ‘cultural realism’ – the alleged pro-
offensive approach to dealing with the threat from the enemy.4 
This analytical framework seems useful, especially since it is 
designed to ‘correct’ the prevailing view in the West about an inherent 
Chinese ‘pacifism’. But it is also misleading, because it suggests that war 
and peace can be considered separate subjects in Chinese tradition, 
ignoring the interactive dynamics of the two aspects of using force. The 
Confucian tradition dictates that the Chinese forego territorial conquest 
and colonial adventure; hence the traditional Chinese purpose of using 
force has to be fundamentally defensive, and linked to the desire of 
achieving a more durable peace at the frontiers through military 
superiority. The prevailing inclination is neither aggressive nor offensive.  
More significantly, domestic stability always takes priority, since true 
national security requires, above all, building harmony within society, 
which cannot be achieved by any conquest of a foreign land. The alleged 
Chinese’s propensity of using force is at best a pseudo-thesis, just like 
another pseudo-thesis:  the ‘Venus vs. Mars’ parody, advanced by Robert 
Kagan,5 about Europe’s innate unwillingness to use force in world affairs. 
                                                     
4 According to Iain Johnston, strategic culture consists of a central paradigm, 
designed to answer three questions: 1. what role warfare has to play in human 
affairs; 2. the nature of threat and enemy; and 3. how effective is the use of force in 
dealing with the threat?  See Johnston, Cultural Realism, pp. 248-251, Princeton, 
1995. 
5 Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power, New York, 2001. 
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The Europeans, like the Chinese, are by no means allergic or oblivious to 
the use of force, they simply want to reduce the role of using force in 
international affairs and more importantly, when force is necessary, it must 
be used with the consent of the international community at large. The Sino-
European preference for moral authority in using force should not be 
confused with universal pacifism. Neither China nor the EU holds a typical 
pacifist view that rejects the use of force under any circumstances. It is here 
that traditional China and ‘postmodern’ Europe meet.  
Undoubtedly, the body that represents the moral authority of the 
international community has so far been the United Nations. Therefore, the 
EU and China share a common interest in upholding UN authority when 
force must be used in settling international disputes. Multilateral 
diplomacy is logically considered to be the foundation for seeking 
international consensus.  
Foreign Policy and Global Governance 
In the foreign policy arena, the experience of European integration is 
equally important, because it provides real hope for China’s peaceful 
integration into the world. Beijing's declared foreign policy principle is to 
promote “peace and development” (heping yu fazhan). This is certainly a 
great leap forward from the days of Mao when ideology dominated China's 
external relations. However, the theme of peace and development does not 
have a unique operating value, because every country can make this 
general claim. One important, but little noticed, principle that Beijing has 
recently added to its grand strategy of ‘peaceful rise’ is a theory of 
“democratisation of international relations (guoji guanxi minzhuhua)”. 
Uttered by an undemocratic state, such a theory has failed to be taken 
seriously. However, it is precisely what China may demand from and hope 
to contribute to the future international system.  
By using the word ‘democratisation’, the Chinese seem to be 
searching for a way to embrace certain fundamental values of the cultural 
West. Specifically, they are eager to see an internationalised version of the 
key principles of the French Revolution of 1789. The principles of ‘Equality, 
Liberty and Fraternity’ inspired a whole generation of the Chinese 
revolutionaries in the 20th century, who established the People’s Republic. 
But the West seemed not only to have failed to stave off its internecine 
wars, but also to have adopted a double standard when applying these 
principles to the non-European world. The European Union is in fact the 
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first successful experiment in applying these principles to intergovern-
mental relations. 
In practical terms, international ‘equality’ is another expression for 
the multipolar system; international ‘liberty’ at least protects national 
independence; and international ‘fraternity’ requires an amicable and 
multilateral approach bound by international norms and regulations. This 
is the world China has been desperately seeking since the Opium War of 
1840. It took some 160 years for China to reconcile with a system that has 
inflicted enormous pains on its people in the past. 
As a result, Chinese diplomatic outlook and behaviour have 
undergone fundamental transformations. Two typical diplomatic 
behaviours have derived from the painful historical encounter with the 
West. First there was the ‘G-One’ behaviour of distrusting any international 
system and its sub-systems. For most of the Cold War, China was known as 
a G-One country, pursuing its own independent objectives while jealously 
guarding its national sovereignty. The irony is, in comparison with the 
United States, China had far more experience in unilateralist behaviour. 
Beijing never had much faith in multilateralism, let alone alliances. Its only 
alliance experience with the Soviet Union ended in a bitter confrontation. 
Second, the ‘friend or foe’ mentality is gone. China never understood 
the European integration process until recently, because the European 
model of diplomatic ‘muddlism’ did not fit the Chinese Communist notion 
of an effective strategy in a revolutionary world.  
Today, China is no longer a revolutionary power. The new Eurasian 
orientation of China’s grand strategy has brought about great changes to 
China’s foreign policy practices. Since the mid-1990s, China has abandoned 
the G-One posture, and begun to participate and initiate multilateral 
organisations. China is an active member of the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF), a founder of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a recent 
member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and a proactive and 
constructive member of the UN Security Council. But China lost no 
independence in multilateral diplomacy. For example, China is engaged 
actively in non-proliferation issues without necessarily acceding to a 
Western conception of its rationale. Nevertheless, China has finally stepped 
out of the ‘Middle Kingdom Complex’. 
More interestingly, in the process of rediscovering its own history, 
China has also discovered the unsurpassable advantage of handling its 
external relations with ‘go-go-muddlism’. The geopolitical instinct may tell 
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the leadership in Beijing that the Euro-Asian orientation is far superior to a 
Pacific orientation when searching for a safe route to enter the world. The 
Euro-Asian continent is absent of major strategic confrontations; a 
muddling-through diplomatic approach may take long time but is safer 
than the water-muddying approach in the Pacific. There the potentially 
explosive issues are abundant, such as the real or imaginary US-China 
strategic rivalry, the crisis on the Korean Peninsula, a rearming Japan and 
last but not least, the intractable Taiwan Question. China is eager to learn 
from the EU experience, for the EU happens to be the shining model of 
muddlism in the 20th century and the current world. 
In conclusion, Beijing is not seeking a place in the sun, but finding a 
place in the shade. The Euro-Asian continent casts a long but comfortable 
shadow for years to come. With a grand strategy of ‘peaceful rise through 
Euro-Asia’, a long-term peaceful Chinese foreign policy is thus on the 
horizon. The West should focus not on changing the nature of Chinese 
internal and external policies, but encourage China in a process of 
reclaiming traditional, Confucian values. 
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India as a Foreign Policy Actor – 
Normative Redux 
Radha Kumar* 
Introduction 
Observers of Indian foreign policy are often puzzled by its inchoate 
combination of idealist rhetoric on international issues, post-modern 
nitpicking in negotiations and isolationist behaviour when it comes to 
matters of national interest. “What does India want?” they ask in 
frustration: “do you want to be a major power, or do you just want to score 
points?”  
The question is a difficult one to answer. When India achieved 
independence in 1947, the country’s founding fathers assumed it would be 
a leading international player, expanding rules for normative behaviour in 
relation to goals as well as means. But though India’s founding fathers 
produced grand policy visions, such as the 1946 Asian Relations 
Conference for an institutional structure to buffer Asia against the Cold 
War, they were unable to translate their sweeping goals into action. The 
Chinese revolution, followed by the Korean, Vietnamese and Cambodian 
wars, brought the Cold War into the heart of Asia (Gonsalves 1991). 
Sixty years later, India’s new policy-makers define India as ‘a rising 
power’ that is today beginning to match global goals and means in order to 
achieve the most favourable results for its citizens, and at the same time 
expand normative principles for inter-state and transnational behaviour. 
India’s steady 8-9% growth over the past decade, and the Indian 
government’s proactive diplomacy in the same period, allow Indian policy-
makers to bring context and substance to the normative principles that 
their predecessors advocated – a development that one leading Indian 
analyst describes as “crossing the Rubicon” from idealism to pragmatism 
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(Mohan, 2003), and another as “India Unbound” (Das, 2002); both phrases 
indicating what a large leap it is. During the Cold War, Indian policy-
makers advocated principles divorced from political reality, to use 
Morgenthau’s definition (Morgenthau, 1982), but today they seek to 
combine normative principles with national interest, in the way that most 
states do, especially those with regional or major power ambitions.  
As other papers in this series have pointed out, categories of what is 
normative vary from culture to culture, and are hotly debated across 
cultures (Tocci, 2007, pp. 2-3). The international norms that do exist do not 
represent an international consensus on even the lowest common 
denominators of normative international relations; when nations view 
themselves as normative foreign policy actors they are inevitably selective.  
In terms of definition, therefore, this paper inclines towards Daniel 
Hamilton’s argument that all states behave normatively to a varying extent; 
what is important is the degree to which they are normative as well as the 
issues that elicit their normative behaviour. Thus, for example, the US and 
China behave least normatively when it comes to security threats 
(accepting that the use of force can be a normative means), while most of 
the EU countries and India tend to be more normative in their reactions. On 
the other hand, the US is most likely to come to the rescue of a persecuted 
state, the EU and India are less likely to and China is the least likely of all. 
Then again, the US and India provide far greater freedom of labour 
movement, including immigration, than do the EU or China; conversely, 
the US and China are the greatest investors in other countries’ 
infrastructure development. 
To these distinctions we need to add another variable: regional 
differentiation. If regional perceptions are taken into account – how your 
neighbourhood views you – China would come off as less threatening than 
the US, EU or India, not to mention Russia. The EU pattern of pushing 
norms in its immediate neighbourhood is not a common foreign policy 
practice; less intervention is considered more normative in most parts of 
Asia. This may partly be due to the post-colonial heritage in which 
establishing sovereignty is itself a prime normative goal. 
With these caveats, this paper applied Tocci’s typology to eight case 
studies of India’s foreign relations – with Pakistan, China, Japan, the US, 
Nepal, Sikkim (now an Indian state), Myanmar and the EU – to examine 
what kind of foreign policy actor India is, accounting for varied purposes 
and power. Do India’s current foreign policy actions conform to its 
founding fathers’ vision? If they are different, can they still be called 
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normative? Have Indian views on what constitutes normative foreign 
policy changed? What can other countries expect from India? 
What do Indians consider to be normative foreign policy?  
Indian views of what is normative in foreign policy are framed by the 
canonical 3rd-4th century text on statecraft, Kautilya’s Arthashastra (laws of 
political economy), which highlighted three key pillars of normative state 
behaviour: engagement with the world, adherence to rule-based norms, 
and transparency.  
Written for the most outward looking of India’s several empires, the 
Mauryan dynasty, whose rule spanned the Indus valley and was home to 
one of the greatest universities of its time: the Buddhist seat of Taxila (now 
in Pakistan), the Arthashastra viewed the Mauryan empire’s neighbourhood 
as a core foreign policy priority and defined its relations within a set of 
concentric circles. He also counselled more general realist precepts: greater 
powers should be cultivated, equal or weaker powers could be defeated 
through judicious alliances, and weaker powers could be attacked, 
patronised or ignored.  
These views led to a debate on whether Kautilya was the ultimate 
political realist or whether the Arthashastra skillfully combined elements of 
idealism with realpolitik serving the national interest (Boesche 2003; Alagappa 
1998, pp. 74-5). The latter characterisation is more convincing – Kautilya 
believed that alliances for peace were preferable to war even if war 
highlighted a country’s primacy over others.  
Had the traditional strand remained dominant in Indian foreign 
policy doctrine it would have been easy to classify India as a normative 
(although not necessarily naively idealist) international player. But British 
colonialism added a new element to Indian foreign policy – that of 
dependency. Whereas previous empires had been rooted in India and 
adopted foreign policies that served Indian state interests, Britain was a far-
away country and India’s foreign policy was adapted to suit British 
interests. Thus what I term ‘unrealpolitik’ international action (because it 
subordinates national interests to that of other countries) entered into 
Indian foreign policy.  
Indian attitudes towards norms based on Enlightenment values were 
also complicated by the fact that these values arrived in India as a 
consequence of empire. Indians have tended to view European and to some 
extent American references to normative behaviour with scepticism. Most 
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Indian policy-makers and analysts do not, for example, see a difference 
between European policies in Bosnia and Kosovo, and the US and allied 
invasion of Iraq. Humanitarian intervention, they argue, is not distinct 
from regime change or ‘shock and awe’: it is more often a cover for 
imperial design (Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 2003, pp. 44-5; 
Dixit, 1999; Naqvi, 1999).  
In an attempt to rid itself of unrealpolitik, during the Cold War, India’s 
foreign policy focus was on decolonisation and multilateral constraints 
over Great Power domination. Furthermore, Indian leaders sought 
consensus rather than using economic, political or military pressure to 
influence world affairs, an approach that lasted well into the 1990s.  
Following the 1962 war with China – which was largely Tibet-driven 
and in which India suffered a crushing defeat – and Nehru’s death in 1964, 
Indian foreign policy veered back to unrealpolitik, which in this case put the 
interests of the USSR above its own. Unrealpolitik reached its zenith under 
Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (1966-75, 78-84), during which period 
India aligned itself firmly with the USSR and its economy became 
dependent on the Soviet military-industrial complex.  
With the end of the Cold War, India experienced what some called an 
opportunity to combine normative and realpolitik goals (Kumar, 2006), and 
others defined as a conflict between the two (Mohan, 2003). But Indian 
policy-makers were slow to take advantage of this new opening. It was 
only in the early years of the 21st century that Indian policy-makers made a 
concerted effort to re-engage with the world; and this time it was the 
Kautilyan strand in Indian foreign policy that came to the fore.  
In contrast to India’s Cold War leaders, the country’s new policy-
makers came to the conclusion that if India was to pull its weight 
internationally it would have to become an economic and regional power 
(Dasgupta, 2003, pp. 92-111; Schiff, 2006). This was a view that had been 
cogently put by Kautilya and kept alive during most of the Mughal Empire 
because its rulers became native to India, but was then lost during colonial 
rule and the Cold War.  
After the first wave of economic liberalisation in 1990-1, when many 
of the bureaucratic constraints on industrial growth were lifted, wave two 
of economic liberalisation prioritised resource and infrastructure 
development. The new policy-makers believed that neither could be 
achieved without integration into the global economy. So they swung into 
an active diplomatic campaign to improve relations with the major powers, 
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identified as the US, EU, Russia, Japan and China (Dasgupta, 2003) and 
implement a ‘Look East’ policy in the wider Asian neighbourhood, 
especially the ASEAN countries where the Indian ‘footprint’ had a long 
reach (Saran, 2003, p. 115).  
India, which had eschewed membership of multilateral forums under 
Indira Gandhi, joined a slew of regional trade and security organisations in 
the short span of a decade, such as ASEAN, the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, the Asian Regional Forum, the Asia-Europe Meeting process 
and the East Asia Summit. Finally, India’s new policy-makers also 
recognised that India would fail as a regional power until it could turn its 
South Asian neighbours around. As a result, the Indian government 
launched several new peacemaking initiatives – with Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, China, Nepal, and Sri Lanka – hoping that these 
could help pull South Asia out of the slough of hostility and poverty that it 
had slipped into following independence from British rule.  
The new diplomacy had mixed results. Overall, it yielded rich 
dividends for improved relations with the major powers and East Asia; but 
South Asia proved to be an uphill climb.  
The Eight Case Studies 
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Indian Foreign Policy: Selected Case Studies 
Type of 
Actor 
Normative Realpolitik Imperial Status Quo 
 Intended Unintended Intended Unintended Intended Unintended Intended Unintended 
Goals Peace & 
regional 
integration 
Cooperation 
& coexistence 
Commercial Economic & 
political 
support  
Stable border  Stable 
relations 
Realpolitik 
with 
normative 
strand  
Maintain 
bilateral 
relations 
Means CBMs talks 
trade 
Trade border 
talks 
Naval 
exercises 
Military 
cooperation 
Govt. to 
Govt. 
Diaspora 
Annexation Political 
pressure/ 
open 
borders 
Political/ aid 
pressure  
Strong 
bilateral/ 
wary EC/EP  
Result Moving to 
normative 
Realpolitik Mixed Norm 
changing  
Integra-tion Greater 
acceptance 
Status Quo  Moving to 
normative  
Case 
Study 
Pakistan China Japan US Sikkim Nepal Myanmar  EU  
 
168 | READINGS IN EUROPEAN SECURITY 
What kind of a foreign policy actor is India? From the cases above a 
mixed picture emerges, but certain general conclusions can be derived 
nevertheless. 
Speaking at a think tank in 2007, Foreign Secretary Shivshankar 
Menon identified three key goals for India foreign policy: “Firstly, ensuring 
a peaceful periphery; secondly, relations with the major powers; and, 
thirdly, issues of the future, namely food security, water, energy and 
environment”1 (Menon, 2007). 
The means that he enlisted to pursue each goal were different. To 
build peace in the neighbourhood, India looks to create social partnerships, 
offer economic benefits such as zero tariff for the poorer South Asian 
countries, support cross-border infrastructure and development projects, 
stress ‘civilisational linkages’ that grew from the ancient flow of people and 
ideas, and work for intra-regional trade through SAARC, ASEAN and the 
East Asia Summit. Significantly, Menon described the neighbourhood, as 
Saran did, in the same terms as Kautilya: “expanding circles of 
engagement, starting with the immediate neighbourhood, West Asia, 
Central Asia, South-east Asia and the Indian Ocean region”.  
There is, however, a slight elision of categories in this description.  
Looking at the eight cases, there is a clear distinction between India’s 
policies in South Asia and India’s policies in East Asia. In South Asia, India 
has increasingly engaged in peacemaking both with its neighbours 
(Pakistan) and between warring factions within its neighbours (Nepal). 
India has not been so proactive with the one South-East Asian country with 
which it shares a land border, Myanmar; and is gingerly in peacemaking 
with its most powerful neighbour, China.  
Indian policy-makers, therefore, perceive a greater threat to the 
country’s security from instability in its South Asian neighbours, an 
assessment that the US and EU share. They also act with more confidence 
in seeking to resolve the threat, and have used a very wide range of 
normative means, from back channels to hotlines to tracks one and two, 
from military to civilian CBMs, to help develop normative neighbourhood 
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relations. The EU is in some ways a model – India seeks greater regional 
economic integration through SAARC as a means of peace-building in the 
region. It is significant that Menon’s speech was remarkably silent when it 
came to the peace initiatives that India launched in the late 20th and early 
21st centuries. Whether this means that Indian policy-makers continue to 
have reservations about the scope of and for normative relations in South 
Asia is an open question. 
Turning to the broader Asian neighbourhood, the first striking point 
is that India’s Look East policy indicates a new departure for India, a focus 
on maritime interests. India has found it easier to develop strong relations 
with its neighbours at sea than with its land neighbours, and these 
successes have entered Indian doctrine. Today Indian policy-makers see 
India as “at the confluence of two seas”, to use the words of the 17th century 
Indian ruler, Dara Shikoh, and India’s navy is involved in an increasing 
number of multilateral exercises to improve maritime security.  
India’s Look East policy has clearly been the primary impetus to 
India’s recent economic growth and has deepened strategic relations with 
the major powers, whom Menon listed as the US, EU, Japan, Russia and 
China (in that order). India-US strategic cooperation was founded on 
maritime security in South-East Asia and the Indian Ocean, as was India-
Japan strategic cooperation, and the former was accompanied by a rapid 
rise in trade. Up until 2005, the US was India’s largest trading partner, with 
a trade volume of $32 billion that year. The EU and China have now 
outstripped the US as a trading partner, but arguably it was the India-US 
strategic partnership that prompted the India-EU and India-China 
partnerships, both of which gained substance only after they took off. 
Menon tellingly commented that the India-US partnership had a “positive 
effect… on our dealings with the rest of the world” (Menon, 2007). 
That said, India’s goals in collaborating with the Great Powers were 
quite different from India’s goals with Asia; they were, in Menon’s words, 
“access to markets, high technology and resources crucial to our future 
economic growth and development”. While Indian goals thus mix 
realpolitik and normative elements, the means that India has used are by 
and large within the normative framework of international law (the EU-
India and India-Japan strategic partnerships). But they have also on 
occasion sought to alter or expand international law (the US-India civil 
nuclear energy agreement). At the same time, India is developing 
institutional partnerships, for example between space, technology, defence 
and agricultural agencies (the EU and US), as well as through membership 
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of regional forums (the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia 
Summit).  
If these points indicate that India is beginning to expand as a 
normative foreign policy actor and has been able to bring some depth to its 
normative behaviour as a rising power, it is also worth noting that Indian 
policy-makers have encountered a surprising obstacle to achieving some of 
their goals, in particular the civil nuclear energy agreement – domestic 
political opposition. This casts doubt on whether there is internal consensus 
or even clarity on what constitutes the national interest, and raises the 
question of whether the unrealpolitik strand in Indian foreign policy is as 
strong as ever. 
These factors indicate that India might remain a rising rather than an 
established power for a longer time than it would take if the country’s 
political parties had an overarching and non-partisan conception of the 
national interest. This is unlikely to affect India’s behaviour as a normative 
foreign policy actor, though it will dent policy-maker confidence and could 
mean that India’s ability to be effective in its actions will be curtailed. Much 
depends on how well the India-EU and India-US partnerships develop on 
the one hand, and how steadily India’s Look East policy progresses on the 
other hand. The potential is good: each set of relationships is based on a 
strong foundation of goodwill, little strategic competition and Diaspora 
ties. The India-China relationship is more complicated and lacks the 
foundation that the other three have, but it too could improve as the other 
three progress.  
In short, India is steadily becoming a more influential as well as 
normative foreign policy actor, despite domestic confusion, and this trend 
is set to grow over the coming decade. 
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The EU and the Rise of China 
Daniel Gros* 
he EU should have no ideological problem in recognising the 
emerging power of China since it is not a major power itself (beyond 
the area of economics), so the rise of China should not create any 
particular friction within the EU. 
Moreover, while both the EU and China dominate their respective 
‘near abroads’, their two spheres of influence do not overlap, which further 
reduces the potential for conflict. 
It is misleading to speak of an ‘EU position’ towards China, however. 
A key determinant of the European position(s!) towards the emerging 
economic power of China remains the incomplete internal institutional 
framework of the EU, which in many fields makes it very difficult to 
formulate and actively implement a coherent policy towards China. This 
has led to a distribution of roles whereby actors with little influence on 
actual foreign policy decisions (the EP, NGOs, national parliaments) 
specialise in symbolic gestures, and the actual hard policy decisions taken 
at the national and EU levels are mainly determined by perceived self 
interest. 
The lack of an EU position is particularly evident in the 
representation of ‘Europe’ in international organisations, especially the IFIs, 
like the IMF and the World Bank. In principle it is clear that in these 
institutions a smaller representation of European countries and a much 
larger one for China is warranted. The EU institutions agree on this (in 
private), but member states are not yet ready to formally acknowledge their 
diminished global role, although in reality they recognise their limited 
influence. 
The two exceptions to the rule that the EU does not have a China 
policy are in the areas of trade and (soon) the environment. China is 
already the biggest emitter of greenhouse gases (mainly CO2) and given its 
extensive, energy-intensive growth its emissions are certain to continue 
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growing. Its contribution to global warming cannot be ignored and this is 
one key area where the EU (together with the US) needs to engage China 
constructively in order to avoid an open conflict. A successful compromise 
will require careful diplomacy on all sides: the EU, China and the US, 
whose conversion to cap and trade remains a necessary condition for the 
EU’s scheme to work properly. However, the EU’s institutional set up 
seems to be well prepared for this particular issue.  
The EU’s peculiar institutional configuration also implies that 
European ‘China bashing’ comes mainly from member states where, 
depending on the national context, leaders find it convenient to blame 
China for the economic difficulties of the moment. However, since 
conditions vary so much across member states ‘China bashing’ seldom 
comes from a large majority of member states at the same time and thus is 
very much less likely to lead to action against China than in the US, where 
populist policy stances can be more easily picked up by the federal 
institutions (Congress or the President). It is thus unlikely that the EU will 
assume an overall confrontational stance vis-à-vis China. 
Outside the area of economics there is even less reason to anticipate 
conflict between the EU and China for the simple reason that the EU as 
such does not have a great power position to defend (and its member 
countries have long given up the pretence of being great powers 
themselves). Hence it is difficult to imagine a coherent EU policy towards 
the rise of China. Member states will, over time, have to acknowledge that 
China is an increasingly important actor in many parts of the world, but 
they all pursue their own, national policies towards China, which are 
mainly determined by the national equilibrium between the interests of 
traders and human rights activists, with the interests of the former usually 
prevailing over the latter. Other national constituencies take scant interest 
in China. 
The remainder of this note concerns the economic issues that make 
up most of the substance of the EU-China relationship. 
Today the major sources of friction in the field of economic policy 
concern imports of labour-intensive products and China’s large trade 
surplus. The first source of friction is likely to wane rapidly with the shift 
towards relatively capital-intensive production methods in China. 
However, the second source of friction is likely to persist as exports 
continue to be the main driver of demand and growth in China. But this 
seems to be more of an issue between the US and China, given that Europe 
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is likely to continue to run a small current account surplus for the 
foreseeable future. 
A key peculiarity of China’s economy is its extraordinary degree of 
openness: exports amount to about 40% of GDP, a figure closer to the 
average of individual EU member countries, rather than the approximate 
15% one observes for large economies like Japan, or the EU and US. This 
implies that in many cases the outlook of China on global economic issues 
might be quite similar to that of most member countries. 
Moreover, about 60% of Chinese exports are generated by so-called 
‘foreign invested enterprises’ (enterprises with a large foreign 
participation). Over one-half of the Chinese ‘export machine’ is thus 
managed by foreigners. This suggests that while China is likely to remain 
stubborn in the pursuit of its perceived national interests, it is unlikely to 
become a disruptive element in the world economy.  
Furthermore, China is already one of the biggest capital exporters 
(capital exports are the mirror-image of its current account surpluses). This 
implies that China has a stake in the stability of the global financial system, 
but, as the events surrounding the rescue of US government-sponsored 
enterprises (Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac) showed, its stance remains rather 
passive since the accumulation of foreign assets occurred through foreign 
exchange market intervention at the central bank and central banks are 
always extremely conservative in their foreign investments, limiting 
themselves mostly to government (or quasi government) debt instruments. 
This is likely to change over time. As large Chinese corporations emerge 
they are increasingly likely to use their abundant and cheap funding to buy 
up assets around the world. It is thus conceivable that over the next decade 
many of the Western enterprises with strong investments in China will in 
turn have a large Chinese element in their capital base. All this is likely to 
strengthen the interest of China not only in an open and rules-based 
international trading system, but also an open global capital market. As a 
very large investor China must be interested in a rules-based framework 
for international finance because it might soon become the preferred target 
for restrictions on international capital flows. 
The EU and China should thus have a similar overall stance in global 
economic affairs: a general preference for an open and rules-based system. 
But both also dominate their respective regions. The overall multilateralism 
will probably be punctured by a number of regional agreements. 
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The table below summarises the potential for a conflict of cooperation 
in the main areas of economic policy. 
Table 1. Areas of conflict and cooperation between EU-China 
 EU interests Chinese interests Likely outcome 
Trade   Common support for 
WTO 
Environment Global 
reductions in 
emissions 
Avoid constraint 
on growth 
Conflict leading to 
compromise over 
trade measures 
Energy Secure supplies 
without paying a 
moral price 
Secure supplies Competition without 
animosity 
Finance I: 
regulation 
More global co-
operation 
Indifferent Little contact 
Finance II: SWF Control over FDI Avoid controls Low level conflict 
Finance III: 
representation 
in IFIs 
 Recognition of 
economic size 
Internal conflict in 
EU: MS versus 
Commission 
Economic fundamentals: China’s place in the global economy 
China and India are often mentioned in one breath as representing similar 
challenges for the EU (and indeed all OECD countries). However, the scale 
of the challenge from each of these two economies is not comparable. In 
terms of the sheer size of trade and investment flows the differences dwarf 
the similarities, as shown in Table 2 below. At current prices and exchange 
rates, the GDP of China is about twice that of India, and China exports nine 
times as many goods and still almost twice as many services. In terms of 
inward FDI, China is more than ten times larger than India. 
Table 2. China and the ‘West’: Comparing size ($ billion) 
GDP Trade (exports) Inward 
 Current exchange rates PPP Goods Services FDI 
China 2,600 5,000 970 92 78 
EU 27 13,000 13,700 1330 192  
Sources: WEO database, Eurostat & International Comparison Programme (ICP) (2007) of the 
World Bank. 
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The raw data suggest that China on its own is big enough to have a 
strong impact on the global economy (and on the EU). In the area of 
international trade China is now on a par with the EU and the US. The 
importance of China for the global economy is likely to increase as the 
combination of a housing bust and financial crisis weakens the transatlantic 
economy. If the Chinese economy were to maintain the gap in growth rates 
(i.e. if the slow-down in China is not stronger than that in the US or 
Europe) China’s economy would be roughly of a similar size in less than 
ten years. At that point the EU, the US and China would each account for 
about 20-25 % of global GDP. Moreover, if Chinese exports (and imports) 
were to continue to grow as they have done so over the last ten years, 
China alone would account for roughly one half of total world trade (and 
would export about 3 times as much as either the EU or the US). Past trends 
will not continue forever, but it is clear that even if they weaken the world 
trading system will increasingly revolve around China. 
Capital accumulation as the key driver of growth in China 
Will China actually be able to continue to grow at this rapid pace and thus 
to catch up with the advanced economies over the next decade? The main 
reason for assuming that this will be the case is that the key motor behind 
this catching-up process is a fundamental upgrading of the human and 
physical capital stock in China.  
Both elements are equally important, but their upgrading is 
proceeding at somewhat different speeds: 
Physical capital 
Here the catching up process is quickest due to the extraordinarily high 
rate of savings in China.  
For an economist the key measure for the capital stock is the 
capital/labour ratio, which to a large extent also determines the level of 
productivity and thus of wages. The key factor that dominates the 
evolution of the capital/labour ratio in China is the very high Chinese 
investment rate. While there is some debate over the measurement of the 
denominator (GDP), it is generally agreed that China invests more than 
40% of its GDP (against about 20% for the EU and the US, and 25 % for 
India). This must be the starting point for any assessment of this issue.  
FDI plays only a minor part in determining the overall resources 
devoted to investment since total FDI inflows represent only around 10% of 
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all investment in China. The importance of FDI for China is thus not the 
amount of capital invested, but the transfer of technology that it brings 
about. 
The direct consequence of the extraordinarily high rate of capital 
accumulation in China is that it leads to an unprecedented increase in the 
capital/labour ratio (a key determinant of productivity). Gros (2008) 
calculates that within 15 years China will have a similar capital/labour 
ratio as the EU, which will have major implications for economic relations 
between the EU and China. Most European policy-makers still seem to be 
under the impression that imports from China are likely to threaten mainly 
labour-intensive industries, such as textiles and clothing. Given the 
extremely high investment rates in China, however, this is likely to change 
rather quickly. As the difference in capital/labour ratios is shrinking 
rapidly, the composition of Chinese exports should shift quickly as well; 
with Chinese exports becoming more capital (and energy) intensive. 
Human capital 
While the current policy concerns focus on cheap labour, there have been a 
number of press reports suggesting that China is rapidly catching up in 
terms of innovation activity. The raw data suggest, however, that concerns 
about China taking the lead in innovation activity on a broad scale are 
exaggerated. Moreover, in this area the speed at which China can close the 
gap with the EU is limited by demographic factors. With a roughly 
constant population, the average stock of human capital per worker can 
change only gradually as better-educated new generations replace the older 
ones. This is by definition a slow process. 
The starting point in terms of human capital in China is not far from 
the EU average, but it is still clearly behind (with an average 6 years of 
schooling versus 8-10 years for most EU member countries). The level 
China has today is widely regarded as sufficient to build up a strong 
industrial base, but not to become a leader in innovation. 
However, human capital accumulation is also accelerating at a very 
rapid pace in China as one can see from the enrolment ratios, especially in 
higher education. An indispensable input for R&D is a workforce with the 
appropriate level of education. Research and development is mostly 
undertaken by personnel with tertiary (university level) education. In 
China the enrolment rates in tertiary education are increasing at a very 
rapid pace, but the level reached in 2005 was still only 20%, much lower 
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than the 56% recorded for the EU (and even further from the US ratio of 
83%). Over the last 20 years there has been a jump in tertiary education in 
China, with enrolment ratios increasing by a factor of 7. But the starting 
point was so low that even today enrolment rates are below one-half of the 
European level.  
As an aside, it is interesting to note that despite its reputation for 
strength in high-tech services, India has made much less progress than 
China (tertiary enrolment up only from 6 to 11%). The Indian software 
industry seems to constitute an exception that hides an average that has 
fallen way behind that of China. 
The available data thus suggest that for some time the Chinese 
workforce will continue to lag behind that of the EU (and even more than 
that of the US) in terms of the percentage of younger cohorts that have a 
tertiary education. 
The upgrading of the skills of the Chinese workforce is thus 
proceeding less quickly than is sometimes assumed. However, one needs to 
recall that the cohorts that are currently studying (and will soon enter the 
labour force) are also much more numerous in China (about 3 times as 
many) than in the EU. This implies that in absolute terms one should 
expect that China already produces as many university graduates 
(including engineers, which have been the focus of much attention) as the 
EU. Moreover, as enrolment rates are still increasing rapidly it is 
unavoidable that China will eventually overtake the EU (and the US) in 
terms of the number of scientists that graduate each year.  
Table 3. Enrolment ratios, 1985-2005 
 Secondary education (Net) Tertiary education (Gross) 
 1985 1995 2005 1985 1995 2005 
China 39.7 65.8 74.3 2.9 5.3 20.3 
United States 91.2 90 89 60.2 80.9 82.7 
India 37.9 48.8 56.6 6 6.6 11.4 
EU27 (average) 82.7 97.9 100.8 26.7 44.9 56.2 
Source: World Bank. 
Finance: China’s absence 
Although China is a giant in the field of trade it is still a dwarf in the area of 
finance. While China and the US are about the same size in terms of exports 
there is a huge difference in terms of financial openness: in absolute dollar 
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terms the external assets and liabilities of the US are about ten times greater 
than those of China. And even measured against exports one can see from 
the chart below that China is much more interested in trade issues than in 
financial markets. 
Figure 1. Financial globalisation 
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That China is also much less integrated in the global capital markets 
can also be seen from the importance of capital flows (as opposed to the 
stocks of foreign assets and liabilities), which for China amount to little 
more than 10% of GDP, compared to about 30% of GDP for the US. China’s 
interest in constructing a new order for global financial markets is thus 
rather limited. 
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Figure 2. Total capital flows (inflow+outflow) as a % of GDP 
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Energy: China’s carbon-rich economy 
Another area in which China will be a dominant player on the global scene 
is greenhouse gas emissions. As shown in Table 4, China already consumes 
almost as much energy as the EU (1,700 million tonnes of oil equivalent 
(mtoe)/year versus 1,780), implying that its energy intensity (energy 
consumption per unit of output) is similar to that of the EU, at least if GDP 
is measured at PPP. However, the composition of China’s energy 
consumption is quite different from that of the EU (or the US): China 
consumes almost four times as much coal as the EU. Moreover, if current 
trends continue, in 10 years China will consume 50% more energy than the 
EU. Most of the increase in energy demand is likely to continue to come 
from coal, which is relatively abundant in China.  
Table 4. Energy consumption and composition (mtoe*) 
Primary energy consumption Major fuels (2006) 
 1996 
Today 
(2006) 
Projected 
(2016) 
Oil 
(net imports) 
Coal 
(consumption) 
EU 1691 1782 1878 720 (560) 320 
US 2190 2326 2471 940 (608) 567 
China 965 1698 2987 350 (169) 1,191 
India 271 423 680 120 (80) 240 
* Modification Table of Organization and Equipment. 
Sources: BP (2007), World Energy Review. 
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China’s self-sufficiency in coal has two implications: 
i) China is already the biggest source of CO2 emissions (coal is much 
more intensive in CO2 than the equivalent energy obtained through 
oil or gas).  
ii) China is much less dependent on hydrocarbon imports than either 
the EU or the US, and the price of coal has increased much less than 
that for either oil or gas. India resembles China in that it also has 
abundant coal reserves, but in terms of overall size, they are again 
much smaller, about one-quarter of those of China, with a total 
annual consumption of primary energy of about 400 mtoe. 
Climate change is thus an area where considerable friction seems 
unavoidable. China will not be willing to accept any absolute limit on its 
emissions of CO2. However, China also knows that if both the EU and the 
US introduce a ‘cap and trade’ system (which puts a visible price on 
carbon) its exports might be subject to ‘border measures’, i.e. an import tax 
on carbon content. Given China’s huge stake in keeping its exports growing 
there might be room for a compromise in the sense that in exchange for 
keeping access to its two major markets China agrees to a specific set of 
other measures to limit domestic emissions of CO2. 
China will not be able to avoid a major policy clash (not only with the 
EU) on how to prevent global warming given that Chinese exports contain 
a substantial amount of all the CO2 emitted in China (according to most 
estimates around one third). This implies that the EU cannot ignore the 
‘carbon leakage’ that results if the EU puts a price on carbon, but major 
exporters do not do the same. This leaves the EU with only the choice to tax 
the carbon content of its imports. Such a policy could most probably be 
made WTO-compatible; implying that membership in this organisation will 
afford little protection to China. Furthermore, own calculations indicate 
that the tariff rate that would result from taxing the CO2 content of imports 
would be around 8%, which would constitute a substantial hurdle for 
Chinese exports, which still contain large amounts of CO2. The Chinese 
leadership has already indicated that it might be amenable to compromise 
given that exports constitute the key driver of growth in China and given 
that the importance of environmental concerns is also becoming self-
evident in China itself, in the form of excessive levels of local pollution.  
By contrast, the signs from India are that it would take a 
confrontational stance, taking the issue to an arbitration panel in the WTO. 
THE RISE OF CHINA: POLICIES OF THE EU, RUSSIA AND THE US | 183 
Summary of economic issues 
The likely Chinese and EU positions regarding major global economic 
policy issues can be summarised as follows: 
1) Trade: China has been a major beneficiary of the rules-based global 
trading framework (WTO). It is likely to support this system, which it 
is anyway bound to dominate. 
2) Climate change: this will be a key area of friction. The EU and China 
are on opposite sides here, but a compromise is still possible, indeed 
likely. 
3) Energy: As China depends less on access to hydrocarbons than others 
and since it does not have political problems in the Middle East, its 
interest will be limited. 
4) Global finance: China does not have a stake in financial market 
regulation and will resist any attempt to interfere with its exchange 
rate policy in the context of global surveillance. A greater role in the 
global financial institutions might be welcome for China, but would 
only be used to block interference with its own policy (much as the 
US has done so far). 
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Washington Tea Parties: 
Managing Problems and Imagining 
Solutions in US China Policy 
Brantly Womack* 
here are two American tea party traditions, both relevant to 
American attitudes towards the rise of China. The first is English-
style polite; playing by the rules. Applied to China policy, its 
influence can be seen in constructive engagement, encouraging China to be 
a responsible stakeholder. The second is Boston-style dramatic 
unilateralism.1 The urge to stand tall, to upset the table, is most evident in 
declarations about US China policy aimed at domestic American audiences. 
These two contrary trends are evident in their purest form at both ends of 
the spectrum of attitudes towards China, but the tension between them 
defines the general ambivalence in America’s perspective on the rise of 
China. Since the end of the Cold War the US has generally played by the 
rules in managing specific problems in its relations with China, but at the 
same time there has been a vocal undercurrent wanting to solve the ‘China 
problem’ in various ways. Both of these trends are likely to continue for the 
foreseeable future. Regardless of the call for change reverberating in the 
current presidential campaign – and the real changes occurring in the 
global economy – Washington is likely to continue to be influenced by both 
tea parties for the time being, but with a preference for practical 
management at the presidential level. 
Although the presidential candidates had quite different styles and 
emphases in their pronouncements regarding China, the tea party tensions 
                                                     
* Brantly Womack is Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs at the 
University of Virginia. 
1 On 16 December 1773, citizens of Boston as the “Sons of Liberty” boarded three 
East India Company ships and threw 45 tons of Darjeeling tea into Boston harbour 
as part of a dispute over taxes and control of trade. The event, known as the 
“Boston Tea Party,” was an important precursor to the American Revolution a few 
years later. 
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were evident in both. Their most extensive and personal statements on 
China policy can be found in China Brief, a publication of the American 
Chamber of Commerce in Beijing (AmCham-China).2 Since the table is set 
in China among American businessmen, the venue favours the polite tea 
party approach. McCain is certainly the more Bostonian of the two. He 
couches his positive gestures in more general frameworks of relations with 
Asia and commitments to free trade, while most of his China-specific 
comments focus on what China needs to do in order to be an acceptable 
stakeholder: “The next administration should be clear about where China 
needs to make progress.” McCain would like to see more transparency in 
China’s military build-up and more cooperation against ‘pariah states.’ On 
the other hand, McCain claims that “China and the United States are not 
destined to be adversaries,” and his opposition to protectionism would 
restrain the use of economic sanctions. 
Obama’s essay is more carefully crafted and more comprehensive. It 
touches on the major points of policy contact between the US and China, 
and seems designed to be well received not only by American businessmen 
in China, but by the Chinese themselves. He praises China’s economic 
accomplishments and balances an admonition about sustainable growth 
with the admission that the United States also must make “serious 
adjustments.” He is optimistic about the direction of relations across the 
Taiwan Strait and about cooperation on resolving the North Korean 
nuclear issue. He emphasises, unlike McCain, that Asian security requires 
the inclusion of China in strategic cooperation. However, Obama also 
indicates that he is prepared to stand up to unfair trading practices.  
The context of talking to American businessmen already engaged in 
China is quite different from a town meeting in a union hall in Ohio. 
Moreover, these pieces are more likely to have been written by the 
candidates’ China specialists than by their Ohio specialists. Both candidates 
are therefore showing the sunny sides of their China policies. The shadows 
can be seen in their silences. McCain does not mention Taiwan. Anything 
he would say would risk alienating either his present audience or his more 
                                                     
2 John McCain, “US-China Policy Under a McCain Administration”, China Brief, 
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right-wing and defence industry supporters back home. Moreover, his 
emphasis on America’s allies in Asia and his complaint about Chinese 
military opacity could fit into a Rumsfeld-Cheney view of China as the 
looming strategic threat. For Obama’s part, his brief and mild mention of 
human rights as an issue in US-China relations is certainly a far cry from 
Bill Clinton’s declamations against the “butchers of Beijing.” It is either an 
indication of a difference with anti-China crusaders such as Speaker of the 
House Nancy Pelosi or its brevity is merely a prudent silence in front of a 
business audience. Moreover, he does not detail his advocacy of a value-
based international trade system to an audience that includes critics of 
China’s new labour law. 
In general, it is impressive that neither presidential candidate used 
China as a scapegoat for the current economic crisis, preached a crusade 
against Chinese communism, or called America to arms against the China 
threat. I would agree with the overall assessment by Professor Shen Dingli 
of Fudan University that the lack of heat in China issues in the current 
campaign is a sign that “Sino-US relations are stabilizing.”3 Of course, each 
of the China-hostile options remains open to a new president, regardless of 
campaign rhetoric. But China-bashing would be more useful as a tool of 
campaign rhetoric than as a basis for policy, so the restraint of both 
candidates is significant. Nevertheless, differences of national interests 
remain, as well as the domestic political appeal of future Boston tea parties. 
The underlying difficulty of American ambivalence towards China is 
that polite problem management involves at least a formal acceptance of 
the legitimacy of the other side as well as the possibility that one might 
have to settle for less than one’s maximum demands. Moreover, 
exceptionalism is not allowed. Everyone plays by the same rules and 
everyone must wait their turn.  
For China, newly allowed a seat at the global table, playing by the 
rules is a sign of status. But for the US, the sole superpower, letting China 
into the game appears as a necessary condescension, especially since China 
is an unfamiliar newcomer, and a communist one to boot. Even the official 
terminology of engagement – encouraging China to become ‘a responsible 
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stakeholder’ and to be ‘socialised’ into the international system – implies a 
status difference rather than mutual respect. It is not the rules per se that 
chafe, since the US wrote them, but rather the necessity of the game. And 
with China’s rise to global presence in the new century the games appear 
both more necessary and more frustrating. 
To a great extent the two tea parties express the tension between the 
necessity of managing the relationship with China and the lingering 
impulse to ‘solve’ the China problem. Since the task of managing the 
relationship falls to the American president, even China problem-solvers 
like Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton moved towards more accommodating 
diplomacy once they were elected. The presidential learning process has 
now filtered down to the level of presidential candidates, but there are still 
many public voices, including congressional ones, that want to dump the 
tea in the harbour (this time Chinese tea) and consider any compromise or 
even delay as a sign of official cowardice.4 The premise of the latter-day 
Bostonians is that if only bold moves were taken, the China problem could 
be solved, a premise known to be false by those in charge of managing the 
relationship. Nevertheless, the calls from the sidelines to stand tall against 
China exert pressure on presidential rhetoric and on policy options. 
The global economic crisis currently unfolding will add to the 
tensions between managing the US-China relationship and calling for 
solutions. Although the crisis will have negative effects on both countries, 
the US and China face the crisis from vastly different perspectives. For the 
US, the International Monetary Fund estimates a GDP growth rate of one-
tenth of 1% for 2009, and it admits that this is the optimistic edge of its 
range.5 Cassandra speaks more gently to China, predicting a fall from its 
2007 growth rate of 11.9% to 9.3% in 2009.6 Although the predicted gap in 
growth rates is actually smaller in 2009 than it was in 2007, the 
psychological effect of an American economy stagnant at best and a 
Chinese economy still galloping forward will be immense.  
                                                     
4 See for example “Testimony of Sophie Richardson [Human Rights Watch] before 
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5 International Monetary Fund, Global Economic Outlook: October 2008, Washington, 
2008, p. 51. 
6 Ibid, p. 65. 
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It is almost inevitable that there will be a temptation to scapegoat 
China as the cause of the crisis, and to see solving the China problem as the 
solution to America’s economic problems. China will certainly be the most 
inviting target for protectionist sentiments, and any concrete step that 
China could take will elicit from many on the sidelines the response, “Not 
enough!” More subtly, it is imaginable that companies and institutions with 
interests in military budgets for high-tech weaponry will feel doubly 
threatened by an economic crisis and an Obama presidency, and will 
therefore exaggerate the ‘China threat’ in order to profit from being the 
solution.7 
Nevertheless, the actual magnitude and complexity of the global 
economic crisis are almost certain to keep the management of the US-China 
relationship within the bounds of mutual interest. As Henry Paulson’s 
recent article in Foreign Affairs suggests, cooperation and mutual 
understanding between the US and China will be essential to coping with 
both the immediate problems caused by the collapse of institutions and 
expectations and the longer term problems of global economic 
restructuring.8 China’s foreign reserves, its growth rate, and its centrality to 
Asia combine to make it a reality that cannot be imagined away. China is 
too important as part of the possible way out of global economic 
uncertainty to be dismissed as a problem. 
There will of course be hard bargaining on economic issues. In 2009 
no US president will be able to afford a trade and investment policy that 
ignores the problem of jobs at home and trade deficits. Pressures for greater 
protection of intellectual property and for raising the exchange rate of the 
renminbi (RMB) will continue regardless of China’s actual 
accomplishments in these areas. There will be pressure for greater quality 
control of exports. An Obama administration is likely to emphasise 
environmental and labour concerns in its trade policy. These matters are 
not simple contradictions between national interests, however. China has 
already overhauled its labour law and the milk crisis has created a 
firestorm of popular demand for product quality control. There would be 
                                                     
7 See Jim Lobe, “Hawks looking for New and Bigger Enemies?”, Interpress Service 
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major domestic beneficiaries both to greater IP protection and to raising the 
exchange rate. Since the issues are not zero-sum, it should be possible to 
negotiate compromises. 
In my opinion, the greatest danger of Bostonian disruption of the US-
China relationship would come from diverging reactions to third country 
events rather than from an economic crisis. Although accidents in bilateral 
relations can never be ruled out – prime examples are the bombing of the 
1999 Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the 2001 spy plane incident – these 
typically lead to incident-focused, temporary crises. By contrast, continued 
American unilateral adventurism could lead to standoffs in which China 
and the US could assume increasingly adversarial positions. By 
temperament and by policy record Obama would not be likely to continue 
the path of the last eight years. The same could not be said of a McCain-
Palin administration given his penchant for ‘zingers’, out-of-the-box quick 
fixes and her moral primitivism. Intervention in Iran or North Korea would 
confirm a pattern of behaviour that China would find offensive and 
implicitly threatening. However, in the context of pressing economic 
problems and existing commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, further 
adventures are less likely. A third-country event that is not caused by either 
the US or China, such as the collapse of the Myanmar government, would 
expose differences of national perspective but would more likely lead to 
issues of diplomatic management than confrontation. 
The global economic crisis will slow China’s rise in absolute terms, 
but it is likely to increase its growth rate relative to developed economies. 
China is likely to be the most stable major economy in a world of global 
economic uncertainty. Moreover, its cautious financial policies and 
multilateral diplomacy are well-suited to the new environment of 
uncertainty. China will be a major player in the restructuring of the global 
economy, and it will become the decisive player in the Asian regional 
economy. China’s international prestige is likely to leap forward. 
The United States inevitably has ambiguous feelings about the rise of 
China. On the one hand, it is a new reality beyond American control and 
economically it has been a win-win process. We may not be in a Chinese 
century, but we are certainly in a century with China. On the other hand, it 
erodes the American sense of self-importance and self-confidence in being 
the world’s only superpower. It is not surprising, therefore, that even as the 
core momentum of a stable US-China relationship builds, American 
attitudes will also show a tendency to imagine a solution to the ‘China 
problem’ and a return to happier days of unilateralism.  
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Variants of Russia’s Policy 
towards the Rise of China 
Alexei D. Voskressenski* 
ussia and China maintain complex external relations with the rest of 
the world, notably in their strategies towards Asia, and both aim to 
exploit the potential of the other to accelerate their national 
modernisation projects. It is against this background that the political elites 
of Russia and China strive to construct a strategic partnership.1 A number 
of actors explain China’s well-known interest in Russia: Russia’s military-
technical potential, its power projection capabilities, its independent 
foreign policy and Russia’s resources and raw materials are among the 
factors at play. These resources supply some of China’s production chains, 
especially in the northern provinces of the country.2 In an international and 
geopolitical sense Russia has become a key ally to China, helping to resolve 
global issues and regional questions on the northern and north-western 
borders of the country, from communication in the UN Security Council to 
a certain coordination of diplomatic activities in the Near East and Central 
Asia (including strengthening the joint project: the Shanghai Organization 
of Cooperation) etc. Russia’s economic interest in China is linked to the 
realisation of China’s military-technical and security programmes, which 
are undergoing forced modernisation but have limits in terms of attracting 
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national and international technologies for military modernisation. There 
are also opportunities to receive Chinese investments and relatively 
sophisticated but cheap technology to benefit Russia’s regional economy. 
Some analysts also argue that Chinese labour resources could be of some 
interest to Russia. 
Notwithstanding the intense growth of official parameters in bilateral 
economic activity and the internationalisation of the economy in the 
Russian Far East, which is becoming the main focus for Russia’s political 
elite in Russian-Chinese relations, the intense Russian-Chinese trade 
turnover barely disguises serious problems, both on a regional and federal 
level of relations. Russian interests demand that its economic relations with 
foreign, especially neighbouring countries have a stabilising influence on 
the Russian economy as a whole. They also aim to promote its structural 
transformation, eliminate economic disparities between the Russian 
regions, strengthen the expansion of Russian state corporations and private 
businesses in international markets, increase the economic role of the 
country internationally and, finally, ‘tighten’ the territories of the Russian 
nation-state into a single whole. This reinforcement of the concept of 
Russian statehood should assume a special role for the regions in national 
development. This does not occur in reality, however.3 
Since the end of the 1980s the Chinese authorities have carried out a 
sophisticated strategy of forced modernisation and rapid development 
based on importing foreign technologies and equipment and, recently, with 
an emphasis on strengthening export-oriented production structures in the 
territories of north-east and north-west China, mechanical engineering and 
electronic equipment. The realisation of such a strategy has coincided with 
the economic opening of the Russian Far East, Transbaikalia and Siberia. It 
also coincides with the economic crisis in Russia and, accordingly, with the 
massive imports into Russian regions of foreign goods to offset the 
consequences of the Russian economic crisis of the 1990s. Chinese strategy 
was later reformulated to meet domestic demand – unfettered by world 
market limitations. These phenomena have led to high rates of economic 
growth for China as a whole and in recent decades also for north-eastern 
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China neighbouring Russia. This recent economic growth far surpasses that 
of Russia as a whole, especially that of the Russian Far East and 
Transbaikalia territories. China’s success will probably continue well into 
the 21st century. 
A number of factors explain the relative vulnerability of Russia’s Far 
Eastern inter-regional economic development compared to other countries 
and especially to China: the sparseness of the population in the Russian 
periphery, the uncertainty of the regional development model, 
infrastructural backwardness and the length of communication lines 
between Russian-Chinese trade and economic cooperation. These factors 
have promoted the resolution of trade and economic problems in north-
eastern China, but not in the Russian Far East, though they have led to the 
increased circulation of imported technologies and products in the Russian 
Far East and Siberia.  
These negative trends in the Russian economic territories, especially 
in the regions bordering China, have not really been addressed, although a 
number of measures have been undertaken by the Russian authorities. An 
analysis of regional economic development shows that despite a dynamic 
increase in the parameters of Russian-Chinese trade, the Russian Far East is 
slowly but surely losing economic ties with the rest of the country and 
lowering its industrial production, with no visible substitution of new 
spheres of economic development since the late 1990s. The population 
there continues to decline, the region generally continues to reorient its 
exports (first of all in terms of resources and raw materials) towards China, 
and at the same time the Russian Far East is marginalising itself within the 
system of regional economic relations. Such a situation, in the opinion of 
Russian experts, could result in further regional imbalance in Russia, 
especially if accompanied by certain negative events, and would result in 
the loosening of state control over the far eastern territories. Other Russian 
experts, on the other hand, consider the prospects of Russian-Chinese 
political and economic interaction, especially on the world stage, as a 
counterweight to all the problems arising within the regional relations 
between Russia and China.  
For the most part, Chinese analysts believe that in the next 10 years 
Russia will not be able to wean itself off the model of exporting raw 
materials and hydrocarbons, and accordingly Russian raw materials will 
remain the basic staple of Chinese imports for the foreseeable future. 
However, since Russia has generated impressive economic growth over the 
last decade, it will need industrial and technical equipment, relatively 
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advanced but not too expensive pharmaceutical products and light 
industry goods, and consequently will import these goods from China, 
especially to the Far East and Siberia. From the point of view of Chinese 
analysts, it is necessary to establish joint Russian-Chinese enterprises in 
those technological spheres that are underdeveloped or non-existent in 
China, cooperating in those areas that are above all labour-intensive. This 
means that Chinese enterprises will pay extra attention to the construction 
industries, communication and engineering infrastructure markets in 
Russia, for which Chinese labour resources will be in high demand and will 
probably be warmly welcomed. Such an analytical vision of regional 
development only partially corresponds to the desire of the Russian 
political elite to provide industrial help to the Chinese programme of 
reviving the old industrial base in the north-east of China.4 This 
programme of possible Russian participation in the industrial 
modernisation of Manchuria is considered by some factions within Russian 
political and analytical circles as an important if not core part of the 
acceleration of social and economic development of the Russian Far East 
and Transbaikalia, since it gives these territories a chance to revitalise their 
industries.5 
Thus today, the main sticking point in the economic relations 
between Russia and China and therefore the target of any Russian solution 
to the further rise of China is the structural imbalance in Russian-Chinese 
trade and economic relations and the disparity between them and their 
regional components. The quality and structure of bilateral economic 
relations, especially its regional dimension, do not match the proclaimed 
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strategic character of relations between the two countries. In order to 
overcome these negative trends in the Far East and Transbaikalia, the 
Russian government has elaborated a multitask and multidimensional 
Federal programme: “Economic and social development of the Far East and 
Transbaikalia in 1996-2005 and till 2010”. Realisation of this programme 
provides the alignment of an economic situation in the Russian Far East 
and Transbaikalia in comparison with other regions of Russia and allows 
the softening or even elimination of negative factors prevalent today. The 
question, however, is: what role will be played by Russian-Chinese 
regional relations in this situation because the direction, character and 
intensity of the final success of the Russian federal programme “Economic 
and social development of the Far East and Transbaikalia in 1996-2005 and 
till 2010” depends on the answer to this. If the Russian authorities manage 
to formulate the political, legal and economic conditions, incentives and 
limitations necessary for a Russian-Chinese collaboration that would 
guarantee steady development, especially in the eastern regions of the 
country, there would be no need for a special solution to the issue of China 
rising. In my view this policy should not consist of the forced 
modernisation model, which only solves short-term problems under certain 
conditions and has many negative consequences for the economy and the 
population, but should be a formulation of the system of priorities; the 
cumulative effects of which can speed up modernisation, limit negative 
trends and would constitute a policy of state-business partnership. 
Russia has four detailed conceptual approaches to the development 
of Russian-Chinese relations, including Russian-Chinese regional 
interaction and also the possible solution to the rise of China. The concept 
of open regionalism has two subvariants: the first relies on investments 
from the Asian-Pacific region and the regional export of Russian raw 
materials;6 the second relies mostly on Russian federal resources and a 
more diversified export model.7 Despite the administrative resources 
already generated by these variants, it would seem that they cannot halt 
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negative (for Russia) regional trends, probably because of insufficient 
coordination or the different views of the situation from the regions and the 
centre, where there may also be insufficient political support. The world 
financial crisis does not help in the implementation of these strategies 
either.  
The Russian-Chinese co-development strategy8 has also been 
elaborated in detail and has considerable administrative resources allocated 
to it. The implementation of this strategy began in 2005, but has not yet led 
to the alignment of the rates of development, at least not in the Russian and 
Chinese bordering regions and did nothing to curb negative phenomena 
for Russia. Co-development as it was conceived would not necessarily 
mean equally beneficial development, though it could be based on partial, 
but unequally mutual benefits. 
Two other approaches are also analysed in detail here. The 
multifactor analysis of international/regional relations and security based 
on energy diplomacy is the pragmatic tool of promoting Russian national 
interests in Greater Eastern Asia.9 Such an assessment of a regional azimuth 
is integrated within the concept of multi-factor equilibrium approach and, 
as a matter of fact, represents a vision of macro-regional processes within a 
relatively coherent macro-approach. Applied questions of economic and 
especially regional economic interaction have not yet been developed on 
the basis of the concept of multi-factor equilibrium.10 This approach steers 
the development of Russian-Chinese relations in conformity with the 
model of more balanced multilateral regional development. One of the 
most obvious implementation measures within the parameters of this 
approach is the construction of the Western Siberia–Pacific Ocean pipeline, 
which is aiming to bring cooperation to the competitive regional energy 
market and open it to all interested regional participants.  
The so-called ‘guardian’ or ‘Russia as a fortress’ concept sees the 
army and the state safeguarding the development of Russian-Chinese 
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regional relations. This concept is also elaborated in detail,11 but has no 
definite administrative support although, apparently, there are some 
supporters in the state and military structures, especially in the border 
areas. This approach has been partially implemented in the Far Eastern 
frontier zone, its strength consisting of the appeal to the historical 
experience of Russian-Chinese economic interaction where the structuring 
role from the Russian side was traditionally played by the state and army. 
This approach also has obvious weak points however, of which the first is 
the under-assessment of new global trends (regionalism, particularly)12 and 
a reliance, first of all, on primarily non-economic actors and accordingly 
her a priori money and resources consuming character13 which will 
inevitably lead to the curtailing of regional economic interaction in the 
region and the reliance on only federal financial and military power 
resources. It is quite probable that as a result of the implementation of this 
concept some kind of semi-power/supramilitary opposition in an 
economic zone of the Russian-Chinese border-region will arise. This 
approach would definitely be economically detrimental in these times of 
economic crisis and stagnation. 
What is clear is that in the future, due to the current political power 
restructuring in Moscow, we can envisage the synthesis of these four 
approaches as the effective state strategy for the development of the 
Russian Far Eastern territories within the limits of Russian-Chinese 
partnership, and the multilateral cooperation in north-east Asia. It is not yet 
clear however whether the assessment of the four above-mentioned 
approaches to ensure the steady, balanced, highly competitive, open and 
mutually advantageous regional development in which Russia will take a 
worthy place has been elaborated or not.  
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Chairman’s Summing-up 
Michael Emerson* 
his 31st session of the European Security Forum on the strategic 
consequences of the global economic and financial crisis took place 
on 20 February 2009, at a time when the crisis seemed still to be 
deepening. The graphs of industrial production and global trade looked as 
if the world economy had fallen off a cliff, without showing any signs of 
hitting bottom. The losses of output and trade had not yet reached 1930s 
proportions, but they were already way beyond any post-World War II 
experience in terms of gravity. No member of the panel claimed to know 
what was going to happen next: no-one volunteered to forecast the timing 
of a rebound, or to predict a sharp rebound versus a decade long (Japanese 
style) stagnation.  
Brad Setser of the Council for Foreign Relations, New York, 
underlined the gravity of the current crisis, with annualized data for the 
fourth quarter of 2008 pointing to huge output losses for industrial 
production and trade, most of all in Asian economies heavily dependent on 
exports. As the crisis passed on from the localised US sub-prime affair of 
2007 into the global crisis of 2008, new financial vulnerabilities have 
emerged, especially at the level of Chinese financing of US deficits, now 
running at the unsustainable pace of about $400 billion a quarter. Chinese 
official investors are now giving priority to the comparative security of US 
Treasury paper, after painful experiments at investment in riskier assets. 
This has boosted the dollar exchange rate, but leaves the US strategically 
exposed to funding by non-democratic states (Gulf as well as China). Setser 
called this a dangerous game. The ideal scenario is for the US-Chinese 
current account imbalance to get onto a glide path towards reducing deficit 
and reliance on Chinese funding, but there was no sign of this happening.  
For his part Lanxin Xiang of the Graduate Institute, Geneva and 
Fudan University, Shanghai, advocated a massive shift in Chinese 
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economic policy, away from excessive export dependency and into social 
welfare and education programmes, which he called Chinese Keynsianism. 
If this was accompanied by dissaving by the government (i.e. deficit 
spending) it could indeed cut the current account surplus and get away 
from the huge and wasteful investment in US Treasury assets. However, 
there was no assurance that this was going to happen on a scale sufficient 
to set the US-China imbalance on a correction course.  
Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of Russia in Global Affairs, characterised 
the Russian situation now as having shifted from the past decade of 
‘automatic growth’ to a new period of ‘automatic decline’. With the rise of 
oil and other commodity prices the Russian economy could not but grow, 
and now there was nothing that could prevent a very painful period. 
However, he portrayed Russian society as being adaptable in the sense of 
being able to endure hard times. So far the authorities had been reasonably 
successful in keeping to a stable path tactically, e.g. with a smooth and 
controlled depreciation of the ruble. However he speculated that the 
present tandem leadership would be under strain, with a possible shift of 
power to the Kremlin. Russia’s foreign policy priorities would become 
more constrained, with less priority for initiatives in distant places (e.g. 
Latin America), but new opportunities in the former Soviet space, as these 
countries were coming to Moscow for economic aid, which no-one else 
seemed willing to supply.  
Richard Youngs, of FRIDE and CEPS, saw the crisis accentuating the 
trend in EU foreign policy, which he characterised as pulling back from the 
serious promotion of a liberal democratic order. This had the effect of 
sacrificing the EU’s comparative advantage as a global actor. The pressures 
for protectionism were evident, but not yet amounting to a qualitative 
change. He saw the emerging multi-polar world in increasingly Hobbesian 
terms, but raised questions nonetheless over how non-democratic regimes 
would fare in the adequacy of their responses to the crisis. An EU official 
remarked that ‘maybe’ Youngs was right in detecting a retreat from liberal 
cosmopolitanism, but noted that Europe’s political values were very deeply 
rooted.  
The deteriorating situation in Eastern Europe was described by a 
Commission economist. This was not just the shock impact of the global 
financial crisis. The transition indicators of the EBRD had been stagnant 
now for several years, and notably so for Ukraine. “Back to basics” was his 
message, i.e. an inevitable need to revert to hard adjustment policies. The 
emergence of Russia as supplier of financial aid to several CIS countries 
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including Ukraine meant that there was a new case for the coordination of 
EU policies in the region with those of Russia, as well as with the IMF, for 
which there is already experience to build on. This remark met with the 
agreement of the Russian diplomat, remarking that there is the need now 
for frank discussions over our goals for the region, and over what to do 
together, rather than acting in a competitive mode. The chair remarked that 
this would be quite a revolutionary prospect, but one to be greatly 
welcomed.  
In discussion over the possible political impact of the crisis on the 
world, Youngs’ supposition was that it would be bad news for fragile 
democracies, and would push authoritarian regimes into more repressive 
measures. This argument was met with sceptical comments from Lukyanov 
and Xiang. For Lukyanov Russia’s failed democracy would continue to 
navigate between semi-authoritarianism and semi-democracy. For Xiang 
China had its own system, with its own logic. Whether or not Western 
democracy was better placed to face up to the crisis, he was not sure.  
A number of more specific themes were touched upon. A discussant 
on the social consequences contrasted the situation at least in Europe with 
that of the 1930s. Today’s advanced social security regimes and large public 
sectors ensured that powerful automatic stabilisers would be activated. 
Nonetheless large differences in labour market flexibility between 
European countries would see mean difficult adjustments in the most rigid 
of regimes, versus more organic adjustments to follow naturally in the 
more flexible regimes.  
The structure of the presentations and debates came to take on a 
certain shape: one of different combinations of pairs among the four actors 
under consideration: the US-Chinese pair locked in a uniquely important 
but dangerous financial interdependence; the EU-Russia pair due perhaps 
to become more cooperative together with shared concerns for their 
common neighbourhood; and the EU-US democrats compared to the 
Chinese-Russian (semi-) autocrats now engaged in testing which regimes 
will prove best able to handle the crisis.  
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Strategic Implications of the Financial 
Crisis 
Brad Setser* 
hou Enlai’s famous response to a question about the impact of the 
French revolution – “It is too soon to tell” – is overused for a reason. 
It certainly applies to any attempt to assess the strategic impact of 
the financial crisis.  
The crisis has already been through two very distinct phases. The 
collapse in prices for complex ‘structures’ in August 2007 (‘the subprime 
crisis’) was followed by a fall in private demand for US assets, a 
depreciation of the dollar, a surge in the price of oil, a surge in China’s 
reserves and an increase in the United States’ reliance on non-democratic 
governments for financing to support its still-large trade deficit. The US 
economy slowed, the world economy did not. The relative position of the 
US fell. The collapse of Lehman brothers – ‘the Lehman crisis’, though that 
seems too narrow to describe the ‘great unwind’ of financial leverage that 
followed – unleashed another phase of the crisis. It led to a huge surge in 
demand for US Treasuries from central banks and private banks alike, a 
rise in the dollar, a sharp fall in the price of oil and a reduction in US 
demand for the financial assets of the rest of the world. The US government 
shifted from borrowing from other central banks (through the sale of 
Treasury bonds) to lending to other central banks, as the Fed’s swap lines 
supplied scarce dollars to other central banks. The US economy fell into a 
recession, if not something rather worse. But European output is falling at a 
comparable pace. The fall in output now underway in Asia looks to be 
steeper than the fall that accompanied Asia’s own crisis.  
The crisis has dimmed the lustre of the US economic and financial 
model – no doubt a key part of the US soft power. The US financial system, 
until recently considered a model of sophistication, gave rise to a crisis that 
infected the world. The world’s willingness to adopt aspects of the US 
economic model has unquestionably declined. The United States itself is 
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shying away from the stylised version of the US model. In other ways, 
though, the crisis has improved the relative position of the US: dramatic 
shifts in the global flow of funds and the fall in the price of oil – have 
worked to the advantage of the US, largely at the expense of the oil 
exporters. The United States’ external deficit is shrinking even as the 
world’s demand for dollars, at least temporarily, has increased. It now 
relies far less on non-democratic governments for financing than it did 12 
months ago. However, the crisis is sure to evolve. Its long-term strategic 
consequences will hinge on which country proves most able to pull itself 
out of the current, severe, global downturn, and whether it does so by 
drawing on its own resources or borrowing (demand as well as funds) 
from the rest of the world. 
This paper reviews the impact of the financial crisis on the strategic 
position of the US, Russia (and the Gulf), China and Europe. It is based on a 
key assumption: financial power tends to accrue to creditors not debtors 
and that thus relying on other countries’ governments for financing is a 
strategic vulnerability. Other prisms for analysing the strategic impact of 
the crisis would undoubtedly lead to different conclusions. The goal of this 
paper is to spur discussion of the strategic impact of the crisis, not to offer a 
comprehensive assessment. 
The United States 
The US entered the current crisis with two enormous financial 
vulnerabilities: a leveraged financial system that had little resilience against 
shocks and a larger external deficit than could be financed in the private 
market.  
The first vulnerability led directly to the current crisis. Poorly 
regulated banks, lightly regulated broker-dealers and the unregulated 
components of the shadow financial system all made an enormous, 
leveraged bet that the rise in US home prices would be sustained and large 
macroeconomic imbalances were consistent with low levels of 
macroeconomic and financial volatility. When home prices started to fall, 
the combination of leverage and financial complexity proved lethal to most 
major financial institutions. Some institutions initially raised capital from 
private investors and – to a lesser degree – from the sovereign funds of 
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non-democratic countries.1 Over the course of 2008, though, it became clear 
that financial losses were growing not shrinking – and more and more 
financial institutions failed.  
An overleveraged financial system that lacked resilience in the face of 
shocks proved to be a larger risk to US taxpayers than to the strategic 
position of the US. The financial system will ultimately be recapitalised by 
the public purse, not by the wealth funds of non-democratic governments. 
The losses in the European and American financial system are now 
estimated to exceed the assets managed by the world’s sovereign funds.2  
The second vulnerability posed larger long-term strategic risks. The 
gap between the United States’ need for external financing and private 
demand for US assets (private inflows, net of US purchases of foreign 
assets) was met largely by the purchase of US bonds by emerging market 
central banks. The sources of financing for the rise in the United States’ 
external deficit that accompanied the recovery from the 2000-01 recession 
consequently differed from the sources of financing for past rises in the US 
external deficit. In the early 80s, high US interest rates pulled in funds from 
Japan and Europe. In the latter half of the 1990s, the United States’ rising 
stock market pulled in funds from the world – including, after 1998, funds 
                                                     
1 Nearly all the investment in US and European financial institutions came from 
the Gulf, China and Singapore. But for every rule there is an exception: the Korean 
Investment Corporation (KIC) invested $2 billion in Merrill Lynch (now part of 
Bank of America). Korea now regrets that investment: not only did it take large 
losses, but it also turned out to have a larger need for liquid financial assets than it 
anticipated when it set up the KIC. 
2 A related issue is whether relying on the sovereign funds of non-democratic 
countries to provide the capital for a large share of the financial system poses 
strategic risks. Hillary Clinton’s comment about China “It is hard to enforce your 
trade law against your banker” presumably applies to the folks who own your 
bank too. Democratic change in autocratic states with large investments in the US 
could potentially jeopardise US financial stability; it isn’t clear, for example, if a 
democratic Saudi Arabia would be willing to continue to hold most of its reserves 
in dollars. The current head of the national economic Council, Lawrence Summers, 
has highlighted another risk, namely that investments in regulated banks by 
foreign governments would necessarily turn a banking crisis into a foreign policy 
crisis. The decision to shut down an insolvent bank and wipe out its equity – 
including the equity of a sovereign fund – could easily be perceived abroad as the 
confiscation of its investment. 
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that previously had been flowing to an emerging Asia. For most of the 
2000s, though, returns on US financial assets lagged returns on non-
American financial assets. Not surprisingly, (net) foreign demand for US 
financial assets from private investors was restrained.3 However, the 
enormous increase in the foreign exchange reserves held by the central 
banks of the world’s emerging economies – China in particular – provided 
the net inflow needed to support the US deficit. Asian economies that 
import oil were adding record sums to their reserves – largely because they 
sought to resist Asian market pressure for their currencies to appreciate 
against the dollar – at the same time that high oil prices were generating 
record growth in the reserves of the oil-exporting economies.  
This relationship had aspects of mutual dependence. Asian countries 
rely on the US to supply demand for their products as much as the US 
relies on Asian central banks for financing on terms that were not available 
in the market. The oil-exporters rely on the United States for demand for 
their crude oil – and in some cases protection – as much as the US relies on 
the oil-exporters for financing. Any sudden interruption in the relationship 
would have damaged the economies of both the borrower and the lender. 
But the persistence of large deficits financed by the build-up of reserves 
implied growing underlying risks – and a large build-up of US treasury 
and agency bonds in the hands of foreign central banks. 
The cheap financing from central bank reserves classically has been 
viewed as a ‘good thing’ – and as a source of national power. The ability to 
borrow allows countries to spread costs – including the costs of wars – over 
time. As long as other countries could not reduce their dollar reserves 
without risking their own financial stability, it was hard for any country to 
                                                     
3 For a time, the expansion of the shadow financial system – which operated 
offshore – masked the absence of private demand for US financial assets. The 
shadow financial system led to a huge increase in gross flows, as vehicles legally 
domiciled in London (and European banks) issued short-term dollar debt to US 
money market funds to finance the purchase of longer-dated US asset backed 
securities. This led to matched inflows and outflows, leading gross flows to 
increase. However, such matched flows couldn’t meet the financing need 
associated with the US current account deficit, which required a net build-up of 
foreign claims on the US. The shadow financial system took the credit risk 
associated with lending to risky US borrowers, but not the currency risks 
associated with lending to the US.  
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translate its dollar holdings into leverage over US policy. The asymmetries 
in this relationship though were changing. Key countries – notably China – 
built up dollar reserves well in excess of what they needed to guarantee 
their own financial stability. The US increasingly risked finding itself in a 
position where it needed central banks around the world to add to their 
reserves more than the central banks actually needed more reserves.  
Of course, no country with a large current account surplus that is 
adding to its reserves rapidly could stop doing so without risking its own 
exports. As a result, the US increasingly relied on the desire of other 
countries to support their own exports – not the intrinsic appeal of US 
financial assets – to offset its low savings rate. The current head of the 
national economic council, Lawrence Summers, referred to this relationship 
as the “balance of financial terror” back in 2004. Summers’ analogy to the 
balance of nuclear terror implicitly raises the question of whether the 
United States reliance on other countries government for financing posed a 
strategic threat. Even if other countries could not cut the United States off 
without risking their own economies, awareness of its need for financing 
could constrain the United States’ policy choices.  
The strategic impact of other countries’ surplus reserves could 
express itself in other ways as well. The availability of alternative sources of 
large quantities of dollar financing could reduce the United States’ ability 
to use other countries’ need for dollars in a crisis as a strategic tool. 
Countries with large quantities of reserves have more strategic freedom of 
action; they are less likely to be deterred from taking geostrategic risks by 
the possibility that their actions could precipitate a financial crisis.  
The United States’ strategic and financial vulnerability increased after 
the price of securities constructed from subprime mortgages collapsed in 
August 2007. The dollar had been moving down against the euro over the 
course of 2006, as initial downturn in residential investment pulled down 
US growth. After a brief rally as European institutions scrambled to find 
dollars to repay their dollar debt, the dollar’s fall accelerated in autumn 
2007. Moreover, the dollar’s fall against the euro was simply the most 
visible manifestation of a broader decline in foreign willingness to hold US 
financial assets – and a rise in US demand for foreign financial assets. The 
US economy – but not the world economy – slowed, and private capital 
moved from the stagnant US to the fast growing parts of the world. Asian 
reserve growth soared, as central banks in all emerging Asian economies – 
not just China – added huge sums to their reserves to keep the dollar from 
falling against their currencies. At the same time, high oil prices pushed up 
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the growth in the foreign exchange reserves of many oil exporters – and 
allowed others to transfer large sums to their sovereign funds. Emerging 
markets that kept their currencies pegged to the dollar encouraged this 
flow, as private investors started to bet that a host of fast growing 
economies would eventually allow their currencies to rise. Countries that 
pegged to the dollar were importing loose monetary policy from the US at 
a point in time when their economies were generally doing well. The 
predictable result: an uptick in inflation in the emerging world.  
During this period, the US external deficit fell as a share of US GDP, 
but not in nominal terms. And the US increasingly relied on central banks 
to make up for a shortfall of private demand for US assets. Many observers 
argued that financial power was shifting from West to East, as the US relied 
ever-more-heavily on emerging market governments for financing. Niall 
Ferguson wrote in the Financial Times:4 
We are indeed living through a global shift in the balance of power 
very similar to that which occurred in the 1870s. This is the story of 
how an over-extended empire sought to cope with an external 
debt crisis by selling off revenue streams to foreign investors. The 
empire that suffered these setbacks in the 1870s was the Ottoman 
Empire. Today it is the US. …. The US debt crisis has taken a 
different form, to be sure. External liabilities have been run up by a 
combination of government and household dissaving. It is not the 
public sector that is defaulting but subprime mortgage borrowers. 
As in the 1870s, though, the upshot of this debt crisis is the sale of 
assets and revenue streams to foreign creditors. This time, 
however, creditors are buying bank shares not canal shares. And 
the resulting shift of power is from west to east. 
In other words, as in the 1870s the balance of financial power 
is shifting. Then, the move was from the ancient oriental empires 
(not only the Ottoman but also the Persian and Chinese) to 
Western Europe. Today the shift is from the US - and other 
western financial centres - to the autocracies of the Middle East 
and East Asia. 
                                                     
4 Financial Times, “An Ottoman warning for America, by Niall Ferguson, 2 January 
2008 (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a3679558-b8d4-11dc-893b-
0000779fd2ac.html). 
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…. It remains to be seen how quickly today's financial shift 
will be followed by a comparable geopolitical shift in favour of the 
new export and energy empires of the east. Suffice to say that the 
historical analogy does not bode well for America's quasi-imperial 
network of bases and allies across the Middle East and Asia. 
Debtor empires sooner or later have to do more than just sell 
shares to satisfy their creditors. 
The intensification of the financial crisis that followed Lehman’s 
default brought this unstable equilibrium to an end. It did not end though 
with a fall in demand for US financial assets from emerging market central 
banks and a dollar crisis. Rather it ended with a huge contraction in US 
demand for foreign financial assets – and a rise in demand for safe dollar 
assets from borrowers abroad who had large dollar liabilities. As the entire 
global economy slowed, private money was withdrawn in mass from the 
emerging world. Bets against the dollar were unwound. Foreign demand 
for US financial assets didn’t really rise – no one wanted toxic US assets. 
Private capital flows started to contract – but they contracted in a way that 
increased (net) demand for dollars. Americans sold foreign assets and 
called their loans to Europe’s banks faster than private investors abroad 
sold their US assets. This shift, combined with the fall in oil prices that 
brought the United States’ external deficit down, dramatically reduced the 
United States reliance on foreign governments for financing. 
Indeed, the basic pattern of the past six years fully reversed itself in 
the second half of 2008. A shortfall in private demand for US financial 
assets gave way to a shortage of dollars in Europe and many emerging 
markets as private actors that had borrowed dollars scrambled to find 
dollars to repay their debts. The US – and international financial 
institutions where the US continues to have a lot of influence – helped meet 
that demand. The Fed, not China’s State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange, acted as the world’s dollar lender of last resort. In the third 
quarter, the US government provided more financing to the rest of the 
world – through the Fed’s large dollar loans to European central banks that 
needed access to dollars to help their own banks – than it received. That 
pattern continued in the fourth quarter.  
This isn’t an argument that the crisis has been good to the United 
States. It clearly hasn’t. The fiscal cost of the financial bail-out – and the 
fiscal cost of a necessary Keynesian stimulus to counter a stunning 
contraction in private demand – will add to the United States’ stock of 
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public debt. The burden of that debt is a limit on the United States long-run 
ability to project power abroad.  
At the same time, a continuation of the trends that existed prior to the 
crisis would not have worked to the United States’ advantage. During the 
course of this decade, the coffers of a set of countries that in general didn’t 
fully share US strategic goals were growing – and the US increasingly came 
to rely on the governments of countries that were neither democracies nor 
US allies for financing. The intensification of the crisis in autumn 2008 
reduced the funds available to the governments of these countries – oil fell, 
and ‘speculative’ outflows reduced China’s reserve growth. It also reduced 
the United States’ trade deficit – and therefore the United States’ need for 
financing from abroad. In this respect, it reduced – at least temporarily – a 
key US strategic vulnerability. 
The oil-exporters: Russia and the Gulf 
In 2008, Russia needed $70 oil – and comparably priced natural gas – to 
cover its imports. Oil averaged close to $100, though obviously it was much 
higher in the middle of the year and much lower in the fourth quarter. 
When oil was high Russia – like many other oil exporters – received 
substantial capital inflows. Until the middle of 2008, Russia’s private firms 
and banks were building up external dollar and euro debt almost as rapidly 
as Russia’s government was building up its external reserves. 
This changed last autumn. Oil fell sharply. Capital started flowing 
out of Russia even faster than it flowed in during the boom. The change in 
Russia’s financial and strategic position over the past 12 months has 
consequently been extreme. The first phase of the financial crisis was 
marked by a huge rise in oil prices that worked to Russia’s advantage. The 
second stage of the financial crisis, by contrast, has been marked by a large 
fall in oil prices and a collapse of private capital flows to emerging 
economies. Russia’s reserves fell from close to $600 billion to under $400 
billion in record time.  
The crisis has had three effects: 
- The government of Russia’s oil and gas revenues no longer generate 
the funds needed to cover the government’s spending commitments; 
it is consequently currently drawing on the fiscal stabilisation fund to 
cover a large fiscal deficit. 
- Russian banks and firms – whether private, state-owned or owned by 
friends of the state – cannot refinance their maturing external debts, 
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let alone finance rapid growth with new credit. Russia consequently 
has relied on its foreign exchange reserves and the foreign exchange 
that was slotted for its incipient sovereign wealth fund to cover the 
external debts of Russian banks and companies. This has kept 
Russian companies in Russian hands rather than handing them over 
to (generally) Western bank creditors, but it also has contributed to a 
rapid depletion of Russia’s reserves.  
- Russians themselves have gone from betting on the ruble to betting 
against the ruble. Dollars under the mattress that turned into rubles 
in the banks at the peak of the boom are once again returning to the 
mattress. The ruble has already fallen significantly against Russia’s 
euro-dollar basket – and it remains under pressure. 
A year ago, Russia looked to be a financial rock – with enormous and 
growing reserves and a large external surplus. It had plenty of funds to 
spread around, and growing external confidence. Then Prime Minister 
Medvedev was talking of the ruble’s eventual emergence as a global 
reserve currency at Russia’s own version of Davos.5 Russia’s strategic 
interests in Georgia likely meant it would have intervened no matter what 
its financial position. At the same time, Russia’s $600 billion in assets 
seemed to guarantee that Russia didn’t have to worry too much about the 
impact of its foreign policy choices on its currency or its finances.  
Today, Russia will need to accept large (and painful) policy shifts to 
reduce the drain on its reserves. Shedding $100 billion of reserves a quarter 
simply isn’t sustainable. Without policy change, Russia risks putting itself 
back in a position where it relies on external financial support. It is hard to 
believe that in October Iceland was exploring whether Russia might supply 
it with emergency financing on better terms than the IMF. Russia is still 
willing to deploy its reserves to support major strategic priorities – drawing 
                                                     
5 “We think the ruble could potentially aspire – as a freely convertible currency – to 
the role of a reserve currency to service transactions in those countries which are 
part of the ruble zone, which use the ruble for payments. We have yet to take a 
number of steps, in particular, to transfer trade in energy supplies into rubles, but 
in general I think this is an absolutely achievable task, it is interesting for Russia 
and for the CIS governments, but, in my view, it is also of interest to the entire 
outer world, because it can create a system based on using several reserve 
currencies.” 
(http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSL2450096420080625). 
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Ukraine back into its fold, for example. But it has to make choices now that 
it could avoid when its financial resources seemed virtually unlimited. 
Some Russian oligarchs aren’t going to be bailed out, for example. 
The oil-exporting economies in the Gulf are in a similar – though less 
dire – position.  
The Gulf countries are in aggregate net lenders to the world. When 
oil was high, the governments of all the large oil exporters were building 
up large central bank reserves or adding large sums to their sovereign 
funds. However, the aggregate data was driven by the funds the Gulf’s 
governments invested abroad. At the same time as the Gulf’s governments 
were building up large foreign assets, many private banks and firms were 
borrowing large sums from abroad. Many Gulf banks in particular came to 
rely on external deposits to finance very rapid loan growth. The UAE’s 
debt to international banks that report data to the BIS rose from a little over 
$30 billion in 2005 to $110 billion in the middle of 2008. That total leaves out 
a host of intra-regional debts. It also overstates the distinction between 
‘public’ external assets and ‘private’ external debts, as many ‘private 
borrowers’ are closely connected to the ‘palace’.  
The global economic crisis has made it impossible for many 
borrowers in the Gulf to refinance their external debts even as the fall in 
global stock markets have cut into the value of the foreign investment 
portfolio of many Gulf sovereign funds. Sovereign funds consequently feel 
squeezed on both sides. They are being called on to finance domestic bail-
outs just when the value of their external portfolio hit a nadir. 
Moreover, the average oil price the Gulf States need to cover their 
import bill – and their budgets – rose during the boom. Most Gulf States 
now need roughly $50 billion oil to pay for their imports. The region’s 
public investment boom – and the ongoing expansion of government 
budgets – can only be sustained if the region dips into its existing external 
assets to meet a host of domestic needs. The viability of many of the 
region’s more ambitious internal development projects – and a fair amount 
of Dubai real estate – is in question.  
The Gulf countries’ financial position isn’t as dire as Russia’s financial 
position: the Gulf countries ‘break-even’ oil price is lower and their 
(combined) external assets are larger. Saudi Arabia was more conservative 
than many of the smaller Gulf countries and is consequently in better 
shape. But the region is also no longer flush. The Gulf’s losses from the fall 
in global equity markets probably offset the roughly $300 billion windfall 
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the Gulf received from $100 a barrel oil in 2008. And in 2009, the Gulf will 
almost certainly run current account deficits for the first time in a long 
time.  
China: the wounded financial giant 
A crisis marked by a shortage of dollar liquidity would seemingly work to 
the advantage of the government of the country with by far the world’s 
largest dollar reserves. China reports $1.95 trillion in reserves – and its true 
reserves, counting the dollars stashed in the state banks and the cash held 
at the China investment Corporation – top $2.3 trillion. About $1 trillion of 
that has been invested in US treasuries and another $600 billion or so in the 
debt of Fannie, Freddie and the other US government sponsored ‘agencies’. 
Counting its modest equity investments and corporate bonds, China’s total 
US portfolio likely exceeds $1.7 trillion.  
The foreign assets now controlled by China’s State council are, put 
simply, staggering. A few examples. Before the disruption of the fourth 
quarter of 2008, China’s reserves were growing at a $600 to $700 billion 
annual clip – faster than the reserves and sovereign funds of all the oil-
exporters combined. China’s non-dollar reserve portfolio would top the 
total reserves of all countries but Japan. China could repay its $400b in 
external debt and have close to $2 trillion left over. The combination of 
China’s large current account surplus and minimal external debt give it 
great potential freedom to use its reserves creatively. China is one of only a 
handful of countries that could lend out $100 billion (or more) of its 
reserves without worrying that it might find itself short of reserves.  
However, China hasn’t been willing to use its reserves to extend its 
influence during the crisis. It has rebuffed most bilateral pleas for help. 
China did provide backstop financing for Korea through a network of 
swaps among Asia’s central banks – in part because the weakness of 
Korea’s won was a threat to China’s exports and in part because it could do 
so through a cooperative regional framework alongside Japan. But it wasn’t 
willing to offer Pakistan financing to prevent Pakistan from going to the 
IMF. Nor has China been keen to use its resources to help private firms that 
are short of capital and liquidity. After getting burned on its investment in 
Morgan Stanley, China’s sovereign fund has repeatedly turned down 
requests from Western banks. And China, unlike Japan, hasn’t been willing 
to provide the IMF with additional supplementary resources.  
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This reluctance may reflect a desire on the part of China’s leadership 
not to disrupt the existing international system so long as the system – in 
China’s eyes – continues to evolve in ways that work to its long-term 
advantage. It could also reflect a reluctance on the part of China to assume 
the mantle of global financial leadership, whether on its own or through 
the world’s existing institutions for international financial cooperation. But 
it also likely reflects the political fallout from the financial losses China took 
on its initial investments in risky assets – along with China’s concerns 
about the safety of its large holdings of the debt of Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac.  
Put simply, China dipped into risky assets at the top of the market 
and then retreated from risk at the same time as the private financial 
system. Its quest to protect its portfolio from losses limited its ability to 
project financial power during the crisis. 
The overwhelming majority of China’s portfolio has been invested in 
safe government bonds (at least so long as the US doesn’t walk away from 
Fannie and Freddie). As a result, China’s portfolio has, in aggregate, 
performed far better than almost any other large investment portfolio. Only 
Japan – with a portfolio composed almost exclusively of Treasuries – has 
done better, as the crisis dramatically increased the market value of a 
portfolio of safe, liquid government bonds. However, Chinese politics has 
been dominated by the losses China took on the small share of its portfolio 
that was invested in risky assets in an effort to boost returns. In 2006 China 
began exploring new ways of managing its reserves to obtain higher 
returns. The state banks were allowed to borrow about $100 billion of 
China’s reserves in 2006 to invest abroad. And in 2007, China both created 
a new sovereign fund and allowed its long-time reserve manager (SAFE) to 
experiment with equities and other assets that carried a risk of losses. In 
aggregate, though, that meant that China was buying risky assets at the 
peak of the boom. China compounded that error with a string of specific 
bad bets: Chinese state banks took losses on their holdings of securities 
backed by subprime loans, the CIC took losses on its investment in the US 
private equity firm Blackstone and the US investment bank Morgan Stanley 
and a state investment company (CITIC) would have taken large losses 
from an investment in Bear Stearns if China’s regulators had approved the 
proposed deal. The CIC even has taken losses on its safe investments: it had 
$5 billion invested in the ‘Reserve Primary Fund’, an American money 
market fund that ‘broke the buck’ after investing in Lehman paper.  
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China responded to these losses – and concerns about the financial 
health of the Agencies – by shifting its portfolio toward the safest, most 
liquid bonds around: short-term Treasury bills. It likely bought close to 
$200 billion of bills in the fourth quarter alone. By running to the most 
liquid Treasuries during a liquidity crisis, China protected itself from 
taking credit losses (it obviously remains exposed to large moves in the 
dollar). But its quest for safety also limited its ability to act as an emergency 
source of liquidity, and thus its political influence. The Federal Reserve – 
which sold its Treasuries to take on the risky assets that the markets were 
selling – emerged as the key actor stabilising a host of US and global 
markets. The Fed ended up lending $600 billion to European central banks 
that needed dollars to help their own banks and stabilising the Agency 
market by indicating it would buy what China was selling.  
The crisis has had a second impact on China: it has contributed to a 
sharp downturn in domestic economic activity and thus prompted China’s 
policy-makers to focus on putting in place policies to limit the domestic 
downturn. China’s downturn isn’t totally a product of the global slump. 
China’s property sector started to cool in the summer of 2008 – before the 
‘Lehman’ crisis. The net result though is that one of the domestic engines of 
China’s growth has stalled even as a sharp contraction in US and European 
demand has cut into the external demand for China’s exports. China’s 
exports were up 20% (y/y) in September. They were down 3% in 
December. And China’s imports were down 20% (y/y). The latest data 
suggests that China’s economy stalled in the fourth quarter of 2008. While 
that is better than the outright decline most other large economies 
experienced, it represents an enormous deceleration from the fast growth 
China enjoyed until recently.  
China’s leadership consequently seems to have defined its 
international objectives in a defensive way: it wants to avoid international 
commitments that might limit China’s domestic freedom of action. For 
example, it has vetoed any international discussion of its exchange rate 
regime. It hasn’t pushed to join other international groupings out of 
concern that membership would create pressure for China to give global 
concerns more weight in its economic decision-making. China’s latent 
international financial power consequently hasn’t been tapped. 
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Europe 
Setting Britain – which has all of the United States financial weaknesses and 
few of its strengths – aside, the impact of the crisis on Europe has been 
ambiguous. 
The first phase of the crisis was marked by the euro’s strength and 
relatively strong European growth. Indeed, European growth has exceeded 
US growth – after adjusting for US population growth – for most of this 
decade. It far exceeded US growth in 2007 and 2008. During this period the 
EU was the engine of global demand growth, with the EU’s growing 
current deficit increasingly offsetting the emerging world’s current account 
surplus. Housing and consumption bubbles in many countries on Europe’s 
southern (Spain, Portugal), eastern (From the Baltics down to Bulgaria) and 
western (Ireland, UK) periphery fuelled its growth. European banks played 
a key role channelling funds from high savings countries at Europe’s core – 
and the inflows associated with global demand for euro reserves – to the 
fast-growing countries on the periphery. Strong growth in Asia’s exports to 
Europe sustained Asian export growth even as the United States non-oil 
deficit contracted. Conversely, the strong euro was creating serious 
difficulties for key European industries (aircraft most obviously). Much of 
the financing for the EU’s aggregate current account deficit and Europe’s 
global investment came from the emerging world’s growing holdings of 
euro reserves.  
In many ways, Europe was stepping into the role of the United States 
had previously played in the global economic system. The combination of 
euro strength and dollar weakness was creating incentives that were 
shifting the world’s macroeconomic imbalances from the US to Europe, as 
Europe’s deficit increasingly offset the surplus in Asia and the oil-exporting 
economies.  
The second stage of the crisis, by contrast, has been marked by the 
spread of the financial crisis to Europe, with the losses European banks 
incurred on their US book triggering a broad contraction in all lending. 
Banks in countries with domestic real estate booms – notably the UK, 
Ireland and Spain – are facing additional domestic losses. Their losses at 
home in turn have led eurozone (and Swedish) banks to scale back their 
lending to Eastern Europe.  
In effect, Europe – taken as a whole – is currently facing four 
interlinked financial crises. First, a host of European banks that previously 
had borrowed in dollars in the wholesale market to finance bets on risky 
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US bonds have lost access to dollar financing. This liquidity shortage was 
addressed by the Fed’s swap lines with the ECB, the Bank of England, the 
Swiss National Bank, Sweden’s Riksbank and others. This allowed 
Europe’s central banks to function as dollar lenders of last resort for the 
institutions they supervise. Second, a number of European banks have 
taken large losses at home and abroad. They, like their American 
counterparts, are effectively insolvent and in need of large scale equity 
injections. Third, the banks in Europe’s core have dramatically scaled back 
lending to banks and firms in Europe’s periphery, creating enormous 
pressure on a host of countries in Europe’s East. Fourth, the economic 
slump, the cost of the financial bailout and a repricing of risk across a host 
of markets has increased the borrowing costs of some of Europe’s weaker 
governments. New York and North Carolina aren’t being asked to pick up 
the cost of bailing out ‘their’ financial institutions; European countries with 
large banks sometimes are. 
The resulting crisis is testing Europe’s collective institutions for crisis 
management. The ability of Europe’s nations and institutions to rise to this 
challenge will likely determine whether the crisis strengthens or weakens 
Europe’s strategic position. This is most obvious with the crisis on Europe’s 
eastern periphery. 
In many ways, ‘Europe’ created a successful model for integrating the 
poorer countries in the East into Europe’s industrial and political core. The 
perceived protection offered by membership in the European Union 
created a portion of the world where capital was flowing in the direction 
most expected: the wealthier parts of Europe were financing high levels of 
investment in poor countries, with rapid growth in the periphery in turn 
creating strong demand for the exports of many countries in Europe’s core. 
The contrast with the Pacific – where poor Asian savers financed wealthy 
American consumers – is obvious. 
However, this model clearly got taken a bit too far. Many countries in 
Eastern Europe were running current account deficits of over 10% of their 
GDP. Many households and firms in the East were borrowing in euros, 
effectively betting that their local currencies wouldn’t depreciate against 
the euro. The result: many countries in Eastern Europe were vulnerable to 
an interruption in financial flows. The scale of the financing needs in many 
Eastern European countries though are so large that they cannot easily be 
met even with IMF’s loans of the size provided to Mexico in 95. Hungary’s 
IMF programme was supplemented with additional financing from the 
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European Central Bank. Iceland’s programme was augmented by 
additional financing from the Nordic countries and the UK. 
The current crisis is consequently testing Europe’s collective 
institutions for financial crisis management – particularly if the IMF is 
counted as part of ‘Europe’s’ institutional infrastructure. Remember, 
European countries are heavily over-represented on the IMF’s board – and 
with most IMF lending to European countries, it is quickly morphing into 
the European monetary fund. A successful response would augment 
Europe’s strategic position; Europe would have demonstrated its capacity 
to manage a crisis in its own backyard – and laid the foundation for a 
European financial order that is less dysfunctional than the current global 
financial system. Capital could continue to flow downhill, to Europe’s 
periphery and in the process facilitate the expansion of Europe’s zone of 
democratic prosperity. Capital would just flow into the countries on 
Europe’s periphery at a more subdued pace.  
Conclusions 
The United States’ most serious financial crisis since the Depression has 
led, surprisingly, to a rally in the dollar. The crisis coincided with an 
enormous reversal in global capital flows. All the trends of the past several 
years – whether large private capital flows to the emerging world that 
financed stunning growth in the emerging world’s reserves or huge two 
ways through London as the shadow financial system expanded – have 
gone into reverse. The United States unique ability to create dollars – and 
its ongoing ability to borrow in its own currency – reasserted itself as a key 
strategic asset. A host of countries had to turn to the US, Europe and the 
IMF for financing, reviving a traditional avenue for American influence. 
Falling oil prices dramatically reduced the United States reliance on non-
democratic governments for financing. The direct strategic consequences of 
oil’s fall from $140 a barrel to $40 a barrel likely exceed the direct strategic 
impact of the financial crisis. In the second half of 2008, the United States 
government even became a net lender to the rest of the world (through the 
Fed’s swap lines). The net effect was an improvement in America’s 
international financial position – at least if that position is defined by the 
US need for financing from potential geostrategic rivals – even as the global 
appeal of the American model of capitalism fell.  
Over time, the countries – and regions – that are most able to pull 
themselves out of the current slump will emerge in a stronger position than 
those countries that cannot. But even here the analysis is ambiguous: key 
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countries are – appropriately – relying on government spending and tax 
cuts to stimulate their economies. That – plus the cost of various bank 
bailouts – will add dramatically to the stock of public debt that will 
eventually need to be offset by higher taxes or reduced spending. The 
governments of countries that entered into the crisis with a stronger initial 
fiscal position will consequently emerge from the crisis in a stronger 
financial position. They may also end up in a stronger strategic position if 
the financial world shifts from worrying about the risk that a bank will fail 
to the risk that a government will fail to pay its debt. The core balance then, 
as always, is between taking on more debt to spur a recovery and the long-
term costs of additional debt.  
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How will the financial crisis affect 
EU foreign policy?1 
Richard Youngs2 
ttention is beginning to turn to the broader political impact of the 
financial crisis. The question arises of whether the crisis will affect 
the EU’s broader foreign policies – and if so, how. 
On this a degree of consensus is evident in commentators’ 
preliminary musings. Many voices are already suggesting that the crisis is 
likely to mark a turning point in international relations of the same 
magnitude as those produced by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the attacks 
of 9/11. Many predict a weakening of support for economic liberalism 
beyond the immediate banking crisis. And many also foresee the crisis 
triggering a fundamental shift in the global balance of power and even 
infecting the liberal political values that ostensibly lie at the heart of 
European foreign policies. In short, the fear is taking hold that the financial 
crisis will undermine the principal tenets of Western-sponsored global 
liberalism and encourage a retrenchment in US and European diplomacy.  
With the situation still in flux, worst-case scenarios remain a distinct 
possibility. But it is more convincing for the present to caution against such 
apocalyptic reasoning.  
In this regard, two arguments are advanced here. First, the financial 
crisis is unlikely to represent a watershed moment for EU foreign policy. It 
is more likely simply to reinforce a number of trends already in train. 
Second, it would be wrong for the EU to respond to the crisis by 
withdrawing into itself and abandoning the cause of liberalism – in either 
its economic or political dimensions. To suggest that the crisis reflects an 
excess of political and economic liberalism is misleading and likely to result 
in damaging policy responses. The EU has been shifting away from liberal 
                                                     
1 An earlier, shorter version of this paper appeared as a FRIDE Policy Brief, 
November 2008, www.fride.org 
2 FRIDE, Madrid. 
A 
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trade and foreign policies for a number of years. The crisis in part reflects 
such a trend, while also threatening to further tempt European 
governments away from cosmopolitan internationalism. This might seem 
an apparently paradoxical conclusion to draw at present, but one that 
would better safeguard long-term European interests.  
The fate of liberalism 
Some commentators have argued that the crisis risks undermining the 
whole appeal of free market capitalism. The EU’s international leverage is 
based in large measure on the ‘normative appeal’ of its own internal 
market. Surely, many suggest, that influence stands to diminish now as the 
crisis exposes the fallacies of ‘unfettered capitalism’. 
Yet it is important here to take a critical view of the hyperbole that 
has flooded press comment. The financial crisis is clearly a cataclysmic 
event. On some indictors it has surpassed the gravity of the 1929 crash and 
has exposed the worst excesses of capitalism that have been allowed to 
flourish in recent years. It represents a serious case of market failure, 
asymmetrical regulation of different parts of the financial system and lax 
supervision having failed to forestall banks becoming massively over-
leveraged.  
Prior to the crisis economic policies were based on the West 
providing capital to emerging economies and supporting a liberal trading 
regime as a means of importing goods back into European markets. The 
whole geopolitical balance of this bargain has now shifted. The West is now 
set to export less capital, while China’s unparalleled liquidity will enhance 
its power. It is argued that the ‘liberal equation’ has been undermined.3 
But it is doubtful that recent events entail the kind of general crisis of 
liberal markets as suggested in particular by some French, German and 
Spanish ministers. Contrary to much media comment, the problem is not 
the wholesale spread of ‘unfettered markets’. Government accounts for 
more than twice the share of GDP than it did in 1929. European states all 
operate a mixed economy and will continue to do so.  
What has been striking is the lack of full European integration and 
transnational supervision in the financial sector. It is this that has produced 
                                                     
3 Roger Altman, “The Great Crash 2008: A Geopolitical Setback for the West”, 
Foreign Affairs, Jan-Feb 2009. 
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responses geared towards protecting national markets rather than an 
overarching European plan – notwithstanding the loose coordination that 
has gradually taken shape at an inter-governmental level.  
Extracting the foreign policy implications from this understanding of 
the crisis requires a finer-grained understanding of recent trends in EU 
external policies. The very real risk is that a crisis rooted in the 
malgovernance of the financial sector will encourage European states to 
adopt a less liberal stance on external economic policies across the board – 
and that a wounded Europe will retreat into a new protectionism. 
To point out that the EU will now find it harder to sell a model based 
on the free market and governance standards outside its own borders 
misses a crucial fact: in recent years the EU has been circumspect in 
promoting such liberalism through its external trade anyway.  
The EU has already done more than its fair share to sink the Doha 
Round. It has ended its own moratorium on bilateral trade deals to pursue 
talks with important Asian economies to the detriment of its supposed 
commitment to the multilateral trading system. The EU is seen around the 
world as the worst culprit of intensified ‘standards protectionism’. For 
several years now the rhetoric of most EU ministers and commissioners has 
constantly stressed what there is to fear from globalisation more than the 
benefits that flow from it.  
While the EU has been criticised for imposing reciprocal market-
opening on African states through new Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs), it is also the case that member states have wrested control over 
EPA talks from the Commission’s trade directorate in order to inject a 
‘development mandate’ and somewhat dilute liberalisation requirements 
placed on Cotonou partners. Indeed, most European donors still pursue a 
very statist model to development and post-conflict reconstruction. The EU 
has, of course, also baulked at extending EU membership. And its 
determination to spread standards of trade- and investment-related good 
governance has weakened.  
Curiously, continental European politicians have been far more 
vociferous in declaring that the financial crisis represents ‘a defeat for the 
market’ and liberal economics than has the Chinese Communist Party! 
It is too early to determine whether their will be a full-scale retreat 
into protectionism. But the early signs do not look good. Since the outbreak 
of the crisis European ministers have ritually promised that there will be no 
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slide towards protectionism. The more ardently they state this, the more 
they contemplate just such measures.  
The trend is towards ‘protection lite’. The EU has not adopted out 
and out trade restrictions but a series of actions that militate against 
international interdependence. The EU reacted vigorously against the ‘Buy 
America’ campaign launched under the new Obama presidency, but 
several similar ‘buy national’ campaigns have been supported in Europe 
too. State aid rules have been relaxed. Financial bail-outs have gone hand in 
hand with governments encouraging banks to retreat into national markets. 
Some accuse the UK of letting the pound fall as a protectionist measure. 
France has offered soft loans to companies on condition they use local 
suppliers. Gordon Brown lectures the world on the dangers of 
protectionism; but for one commentator the prime minister’s own inward-
looking policies render him ‘hypocrite-in-chief’.4 In the US Democrat free 
traders have refused to criticise the Buy America initiative in part because 
they insist that European procurement rules are still far more restrictive. 
Middle Eastern, Russian and African interlocutors have all ironically 
suggested to diplomats that the European spree of bank nationalisations 
mirrors the statist route for which the EU has for so long admonished 
developing countries.  
Member states such as Germany, France and Italy have introduced 
restrictions on Sovereign Wealth Funds. A new German law restricts access 
of foreign buyers, in particular big Chinese and Middle Eastern SWFs. 
President Sarkozy has moved ahead with creating a French fund explicitly 
to fend off such foreign ‘predators’. The so-called Santiago principles 
agreed in October 2008 to open up east-to-west investment are now in 
doubt. EU populations now perceive open trade very much as a risk more 
than an opportunity. The rise of the Linke (leftist) party under Oscar 
Lafontaine in German polls is seen to be the result of its highly protectionist 
platform.  
Some have welcomed the prospect of a humbled Europe, in the midst 
of nationalising swathes of its own financial sector no longer being able to 
impose IMF-style structural adjustment on developing countries. But this 
caricatures the nature of EU external economic policies in recent years. EU 
                                                     
4 Martin Wolf, “Why Davos man is waiting for Obama to save him”, Financial 
Times, 4 February 2009, p. 11. 
222 | READINGS IN EUROPEAN SECURITY 
policies still require greater finesse to ensure that developing states are 
helped into global markets in a way that does not undermine local wealth 
generation. But even before the crisis struck, the challenge was to turn 
Europe away from inward-looking market protection and self-interested 
mercantilism much more than it was to rein in any free-trade, structural-
adjustment fervour. This challenge is likely to be magnified after the 
autumn of 2008.  
Contrary to the very thing it is supposed to excel at, the EU has failed 
to use a liberal concept of economic order as the basis for a strategy to 
support security objectives. In terms of the much-lauded (but confused) 
concept of EU ‘normative power’ one wonders how much there was to 
salvage from the wreckage of the 2008 financial crisis anyway.  
While the crisis entailed a major failure of market mechanisms, it 
should at its core be understood as a crisis of bad governance rather than 
one of market-capitalism per se. In this sense, whatever the shortcomings 
exposed in the US and European economies, governance problems remain 
much more serious outside the West. If the crisis does spread to Asian and 
other markets this is likely to become painfully apparent.  
The crisis may then help propel forward a broader and more 
assertive international focus on governance standards and regulations. The 
end result of the crisis may be to intensify pressure for international, and 
maybe even supranational, good governance regulations. This is precisely 
the EU’s supposed niche in international relations. It is where the EU can 
assist in both tempering the excesses of US deregulation and improving 
multilateral rules and governance. The crucial thing will be to ensure that 
such regulations work to facilitate, rather than restrict, global trade and 
investment.  
Power shifts 
A second widespread prediction is that the financial crisis will hammer the 
final nail into the coffin of the ‘unipolar moment’. For analysts who have 
long seen the liberal world order underpinned by US hegemony, this is 
seen as a harbinger of global instability. The journey from unipolarity to 
‘balanced multipolarity’ will certainly be difficult to navigate without 
events leading the world into far less benign forms of ‘competitive 
multipolarity.’ And certainly not a voyage best undertaken in the current 
storm of panic and confusion.  
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However, that the crisis will unleash such a fundamental shift in 
relative power is by no means certain. Few commentators have resisted the 
temptation to draw parallels with 1929 and its subsequent global after-
shocks. But for the current financial crisis to end up triggering serious 
international conflict the whole framework of collective security put in 
place since the 1940s would have to unravel. The cushioning effect of 
international institutions and cosmopolitan civic organisations simply did 
not exist to the same extent in the 1930s as today.  
It is by no means certain that European economies will emerge 
stronger from the crisis than the United States. The latter retains its higher 
productivity and innovation base. Speculation that the time is once more 
ripe for the EU to challenge US leadership looks premature. As always, any 
decline in US relative power is anyway a mix of both boon and bane for 
Europe: a relative gain vis-a-vis Washington can be off-set by 
accompanying US introversion in promoting a broad set of global liberal 
values. 
Conversely, it is not clear that the emerging powers will escape 
unscathed. Russia has been harder hit than any EU economy. Indeed it is 
ironic that the crisis has exposed underlying weaknesses in Russia’s 
economy and system of governance just as the EU was fretting over how to 
respond to the changed European security panorama ushered in by the 
August 2008 Georgia conflict. Once again, this has reinforced the fact that 
the balance between Russian assertiveness and Russian fragility is a fine 
one. Still, dealing with the post-Georgia scenario may remain a greater 
diplomatic challenge than anything thrown up by the financial crisis. In 
this sense the EU’s measures – a 500 million euro aid package to Georgia 
and a relatively weak monitoring mission – are no more than short term 
palliatives. In a situation where the EU’s model of ‘transformation through 
integration’ has so far failed, policy-makers are bereft of long-term 
solutions. The positive outcome would be that the financial crisis tempers 
Russian adventurism while also making clearer to EU governments that 
engagement with Moscow cannot be based only on traditional forms of 
geopolitical balancing devoid of any consideration of internal Russian 
problems.  
In general, while many have predicted a relative rise in power of 
resource-rich states, one of the casualties of the crisis has been the 
international oil price – at the time of writing this has halved since the crisis 
erupted. The Iranian economy is being hit hard, for example. It is true that 
several powers may feel emboldened in their dealings with what they 
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perceive to be a weakened West; but they themselves may be left feeling 
chastened too. 
It seems likely that China will emerge a more powerful actor as a 
result of the crisis, by virtue of its financial assets and the fact that it was 
not responsible for the crisis. With the West hoping that China can re-inject 
liquidity back into the global economy, Beijing will likely demand a greater 
say in international financial institutions in return. But it also the case that 
Asia itself teeters on the brink. Regulatory structures were strengthened 
after this region’s 1997 financial crisis but experts have pointed to a decline 
in basic governance standards in several key Asian economies. As of this 
writing, the crisis seems to be arriving at China’s shores. This has added 
grist to the mill of those arguing that the sustainability of the ‘China model’ 
has begun to look increasingly questionable in recent years.  
There were already compelling reasons of enlightened self-interest 
for Europe to cede its over-representation in international bodies before the 
crisis struck: if it does not emerging powers are increasingly likely to 
bypass such institutions. The new prominence of the G20 reflects a trend 
long in gestation.  
Some analysts have begun to go even further and suggest that a shift 
in international power will undermine not just economic liberalism but a 
broader set of liberal political values. The Economist Intelligence Unit has 
drawn attention to the prospects of the financial crisis undermining 
democracy and democracy promotion in many places of the world. In 
terms of Europe’s ‘soft power’ most commentators had already been 
making stark comments about the declining appeal of ‘Western’ democratic 
and human rights ideals. But the key will be how democracies deal with 
the crisis. If they succeed better than non-democratic states then pluralism’s 
appeal could actually rise. If they demonstrate that – in the spirit of 
Amryrta Sen – openness and robust democratic debate can help mitigate 
crises better than autocratic guidance it is not inevitable that the crisis will 
be entirely negative for democratisation.  
Resource diversion 
A final concern is that scarce resources will be diverted from international 
priorities. 
The most obvious fear is that spending on development assistance 
could be an early casualty. Some EU member states are already intimating 
at cuts in the less high profile areas of aid priorities. Funding to help meet 
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renewable energy targets already seems to be at risk. And money for 
inclusive migration policies could diminish, hand in hand with a rise in 
populist nationalism.  
But there are some reasons to hope this will not be the case across the 
board. Budgets for overseas development assistance (ODA) are a small 
percentage of the amounts of funding that European governments have 
found for their respective bail-out packages. Cutting back development aid 
would make little dent in newly-increased public debt levels, but would 
inflict a heavy political price on governments already under intense public 
scrutiny for having ‘bailed out the fat-cats’. The huge amounts of money 
that governments have spent on rescuing banks may even make them more 
vulnerable to public admonishment for any cuts in development aid. Most 
ODA is locked into multi-annual budgets and oriented increasingly 
towards meeting the Millennium Development Goals in relation to which 
EU governments have made so many promises.  
It has often been noted that rich countries may look to increase ODA 
when their own economies are under stress. Internal crisis heightens the 
concern to temper instability in and migration from the developing world. 
The link between development and security has been placed at the centre of 
EU foreign policy; European policy-makers would lose considerable 
credibility were they to retract from such a logic precisely when its more 
effective implementation is required – precisely when, that is, such a 
forward-looking and holistic commitment to development presents itself as 
one necessary part of systemic stabilisation rather than, as realists would 
have it, a mere ‘feel-good luxury’.  
Defence spending would seem to be far more at risk. It is indeed 
reasonable to expect defence budgets to come under more intense pressure. 
Cutbacks are already on the cards in the UK. Defence budgets have 
conspicuously not been ring-fenced from cuts in the same way as health 
and social spending. From a liberal, Europeanist perspective this may be no 
bad thing. The new juncture may provide the much-needed prompt for EU 
member states to cut duplication and attain better value for money from 
their defence budgets. Most member states maintain huge numbers of 
soldiers in uniform that cannot be deployed and are completely useless for 
‘fragile state’ type interventions. Now would be a good time to cut back 
waste and forge a more common and economical European defence 
architecture, better prepared to assist in peace support operations.  
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Recuperation? 
None of this is to minimise the seriousness of the crisis or to ignore the fact 
that events could still take an even more catastrophic turn. But it is to invite 
consideration of a paradox: that the ultimate lessons for EU foreign policies 
could be the opposite of what it would currently seem most sensible to 
argue. It should be remembered that despite the crisis and need in specific 
parts of the financial sector for state intervention and better market 
regulation, overall European economies still require more market 
competition and international interdependence not less.  
The temptation to pull in the wrong direction will be strong. But the 
crisis may also provide a wake-up call. A wake-up call that Europe’s 
already-existing drift away from global (economic and political) liberalism 
is part of the problem not part of the solution. If development budgets do 
suffer this will certainly undermine Europe’s soft power, but here public 
pressure can help keep member states to their commitments. And while the 
crisis might tempt at least some member states into resisting any further EU 
enlargement even more fiercely, it could also raise the costs of ‘non-
enlargement’ as European governments desperately seek out new market 
openings to recover growth.  
The crisis may even provide a positive service if it convinces the EU 
that simply declaring ad nauseam that Europe has a wonderfully successful 
and progressive model of ‘normative power’ no longer suffices when 
events increasingly reveal exactly the opposite to be true – and increasingly 
require real effort and conviction to ensure that liberal foreign policies 
regain some reality.  
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Russia and World Recession 
Fyodor Lukyanov* 
The former Prime Minister of Belgium, Guy Verhofstadt wrote that: 
2008 may well go down in history as a pivotal year: like 1989, 
when the Berlin Wall fell and the Iron Curtain was torn down; 
1944-1945, when World War II ended, the United Nations was 
founded and the Bretton Woods Agreements signed, and when 
two new superpowers embarked on a fanatical race for 
supremacy; or 1919, 1815 or 1648 – the years, respectively, of the 
Treaty of Versailles, the Congress of Vienna and the Peace of 
Westphalia. All momentous events that marked the end of an era 
and at the same time heralded a new epoch in human history.1 
There is no country left in the world that has not been affected by the 
general economic recession. All countries suffer from the same root cause 
of this disease (that is, an imbalance in the global economy, which stems 
from ‘blowing bubbles’). But the specific diagnoses, the way in which the 
disease runs its course, and the treatment methods are different 
everywhere. Economies pegged to natural resources (Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Iran, Arab countries, and Venezuela) are suffering from the crisis in one 
way; export-oriented countries (China and other Asian states) in another 
way; and advanced industrial countries in yet another.  
The nature of the changes and a new global alignment of forces will 
depend on how much the leading world actors have been affected by 
economic problems and, therefore, on the extent to which they will retain 
the ability to implement their international agenda. Most likely, everyone 
will have to be more economical, rethink their ambitions, and set priorities 
more clearly: what is imperative; what is desirable; and what is not 
necessary at all. This concerns every international player, but in the case of 
                                                     
* Fyodor Lukyanov is editor of Russia in Global Affairs journal, Moscow. 
1 Guy Verhofstadt, “The Financial Crisis: Three Ways Out for Europe” 
(http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/bst/de/media/ 
xcms_bst_dms_26640_26641_2.pdf). 
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Russia the contrast between the ambitions declared just a few months ago 
and the real opportunities available today is especially striking. 
New position of Russia 
The crisis has drastically changed the trend in Russia’s political and 
economic development. 
Almost throughout Vladimir Putin’s rule (from August 1999 when he 
was appointed prime minister to the autumn of 2008), the country was in a 
state of automatic growth. In other words, whatever the authorities did, the 
economic situation kept improving. At first, this phenomenon was due to 
the effect of a sharp devaluation of the ruble in 1998, and then it stemmed 
from the growth of oil prices, which since 2003 turned into a real 
hydrocarbon boom. Measures to centralise economic management gave the 
government additional opportunities to consolidate its own positions. 
The beginning of the global recession has put Russia in a situation of 
automatic decline: whatever the government does, the situation continues 
to deteriorate. All the talk in recent years about the Russian economy 
reducing its dependence on the raw materials sector has proved to be 
illusory. The dependence of the Russian economy on the external market 
environment has turned out to be all but absolute, and this applies both to 
the state in general and to the largest Russian corporations. The lack of an 
investment resource and the need for drastic cuts in spending at all levels 
have become obvious. 
The political model established in Russia since last spring has no 
parallel in history. The ruling tandem, intended to symbolise continuity 
and innovation at the same time, was planned for an entirely different 
economic situation. In the conditions of stability, it did not really matter 
that the powers and responsibilities between the president and the 
government were blurred, as the two offices were one ruling conglomerate 
with a vague division of duties. However, the crisis dictates greater 
certainty, at least when it comes to responsibility. 
Objective conditions are arising for the emergence of differences 
between the participants in the ruling tandem, although the existence of 
prerequisites does not necessarily mean that they will develop into a full-
blown conflict. Ties between the president and the prime minister are so 
close that it would take the accumulation of very serious discord to bring 
about a rift in the present model. It must be borne in mind that Vladimir 
Putin personally was (and largely remains) the only source of legitimacy of 
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President Medvedev. Without him, Dmitry Medvedev could not even 
dream of the position he now occupies. The awareness of this, coupled with 
a high degree of personal loyalty developed over many years of working 
together, will prevent the president from initiating a conflict. 
At the same time, the agenda of efforts to solve the economic problem 
is objectively more associated with the public image of Dmitry Medvedev 
than that of Vladimir Putin. Putin is a ‘man of war’, whom the public 
associates, above all, with the notion of security – national and personal. 
The population trusts Putin in these matters. Medvedev has from the very 
beginning positioned himself as a statesman who cares about quality of life, 
that is, with a more ‘human’ dimension. It is precisely the latter that 
concerns society today, and this factor enables the president to assert 
himself more often and more and more convincingly. 
It is very difficult to assess the real potential of social discontent. 
According to the Levada Center, the most influential independent 
sociological agency, the Social Sentiment Index (ISN) decreased by 17% in 
December 2008 from September, or by 21% from the record high level of 
the ISN in March 2008. These rates are comparable to the peak of decline in 
social sentiments in September 1998, immediately after the financial 
collapse and the announcement of default.2 Interestingly, 69% of the 
population believes that the crisis had been brewing for a long time.3 This 
contradicts the official position that the successful development of Russia 
has fallen victim to external factors, above all the crisis in the US. 
Nevertheless, there have been no serious manifestations of social 
discontent in the country so far. The only instance that attracted 
international attention took place in Vladivostok on 14 December 2008, 
when police violently broke up a protest against the government’s plans to 
raise tariffs on imported used cars. It must be borne in mind, however, that 
that region is the most criminalised part of the country and that the 
business of importing used cars from Japan is controlled by organised 
criminal gangs, which had a role in organising the protests. However, the 
events sparked such a widespread negative social reaction that police 
preferred not to intervene in subsequent protests in Vladivostok. 
                                                     
2 http://www.levada.ru/indexisn.html  
3 http://www.levada.ru/press/2009021301.html  
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The experience of the 1990s has demonstrated that Russian society 
has a high level of adaptability. Citizens focus their efforts, first of all, on 
adapting to ongoing negative processes, rather than on trying to change 
them by influencing the government. 
At the same time one important aspect should be noted. Previous 
periods of Russian development were based on a kind of social contract: 
stability and improved living standards for the population in exchange for 
increased political rights for citizens. This principle can no longer be 
regarded as effective. 
Meanwhile, the actions taken by the authorities reveal their growing 
concern about the situation, evident in the tone of official statements and 
personnel decisions. For example, President Medvedev began a purge of 
governors in February, after he previously lashed out at regional 
authorities for their inability to cope with the crisis. The way the authorities 
have been devaluing the ruble shows the extent to which the authorities are 
concerned about public reaction to the developments in the country: the 
first stage of the devaluation extended from November to February. The 
majority of economists insist that the ruble should have been devalued at 
once, which would have been more effective and saved considerable hard 
currency resources for the Central Bank. However, President Medvedev 
defended the stage-by-stage tactic in a recent interview: 
In my view what is most important is that the weakening of the 
ruble was gradual, which was totally unlike the barbaric way that 
this was done in 1998 when people’s wallets, in fact everyone’s 
wallets, suddenly slimmed down by 300%, and this wave swept 
over everyone and it was very unpleasant. In this case, the drop in 
value that has occurred, something of the order of 30-35%, was 
handled with great care. And virtually all the participants in our 
economic dealings, our citizens and our businesses, were able to 
choose for themselves a sensible strategy for dealing with their 
savings in rubles... Some economists did recommend a rapid 
devaluation. According to certain economic models this 
presumably makes sense, but it could have a devastating effect on 
millions of our people and our companies.4 
                                                     
4 http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2009/02/15/ 
1110_type82916_212924.shtml  
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This humane approach, which really let the population, banks and 
businesses convert their savings into foreign currencies, cost the Central 
Bank of Russia dearly. The bank’s international reserves have decreased by 
209,672 billion dollars, or by 35.1%, from 1 August 2008, when these 
reserves stood at 596,566 billion dollars. This does not mean that the 
reserves will continue to be spent at the same rate – the authorities will 
obviously be much more cautious with spending. The current balance of 
payment has now been brought back to normal, and if oil prices stop 
falling, the ruble rate will be maintained at approximately the present level. 
Russia managed to avoid major problems in the banking sector, 
nothing like the big bankruptcies in the US and EU member states took 
place in Russian banks. But the real economy has been greatly affected; 
Russia’s GDP decline in January 2009 compared to January 2008 was 8.1%.  
Economist Sergei Alexashenko writes that: 
by the end of last year, the sum of accumulated and unfunded 
anti-crisis promises amounted to about 7 trillion rubles (200 billion 
dollars, or three-quarters of the 2009 federal budget), which 
exceeded the size of the Reserve Fund by 50%. If we add to this the 
reduction of federal budget revenues from the planned figures, 
which is estimated at 3.5-4 trillion rubles this year, it becomes clear 
that the government has lost control over the growth of its 
spending promises, while the implementation of all these plans 
will put the country on the brink of a macroeconomic collapse.5 
Experts agree, however, that cuts in spending, including cuts to social 
programmes, are inevitable, although the authorities are studiously 
avoiding using the term ‘budget sequestration’. 
Much will depend on the scale of support that the government will 
give to large state-owned and private enterprises that have found 
themselves on the brink of bankruptcy. Alexashenko warns that 
if the government wants to retain control over the macroeconomic 
situation, it will have to limit the ‘size of the pie’ to be divided; that 
is, it will have to declare the maximum amount of expenses that it 
is ready to fund within the framework of anti-crisis efforts.6 
                                                     
5 http://www.vremya.ru/2009/21/4/222632.html  
6 Ibid. 
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Limiting the size of the pie may increase tensions within the elite, as 
groups of discontented will inevitably emerge. Since many large 
corporations will have to pay large debts to foreign creditors, the 
government will have to decide what industries and what owners should 
be saved and what industries could be ceded to repay the debts. 
Discussions about the protection of ‘strategic industries’, which have been 
continuing in the last few years, are now acquiring a new content. 
On the whole, the impact of the crisis on the situation in Russia can 
be summarised as follows: 
• The crisis has revealed the ineffectiveness of the existing economic 
model based, as before, almost entirely on raw materials and 
dependent on the world market environment and external sources of 
finance (foreign investment and corporate borrowings); 
• Two structural problems of the Russian economy – corruption and 
monopolisation – are growing from acute to fatal in the crisis 
conditions; 
• There emerge prerequisites for contradictions within the ruling elite 
due to the vague distribution of powers and responsibilities, to the 
emergence of interest groups deprived of their share of governmental 
support for businesses, and to the imbalance in economic and 
security agendas in favour of economic issues; 
• There is a need for structural reforms, privatisation and the opening 
of the economy to attract domestic and foreign financial resources. 
Although there is a ‘mobilisation’ element in Russian discussions 
(calls for isolationism, self-reliance, and for fencing the country off 
from the global processes), it remains marginal and, on the whole, 
has no influence on political or economic decision-making; 
• The potential for social discontent is not obvious yet – despite the 
deepening decline, the situation remains under control, and the 
authorities may launch ‘managed liberalisation’ in order to let off 
steam and reduce tensions. The government still has substantial 
financial resources that can alleviate the most acute problems. 
Changes in the world situation 
The economic crisis has affected the overall alignment of forces in the 
world arena. Yet rather than change the political reality drastically it has 
revealed processes that have been in latent development for a long time. 
THE STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS | 233 
The United States is past the peak of its global influence, and this did 
not happen last autumn. It became clear after the Iraqi campaign that the 
US lacked the strength for hegemony or, most likely, that hegemony in 
principle is impossible in the modern world. 
The relative decline of the United States (in absolute terms it will 
remain an actor beyond compare for a few more decades) will be 
accompanied by changes in tactics. Barack Obama declared that he would 
assign the key role to multilateral cooperation and international institutions 
back at the early stage of his election campaign.7 The crisis and the need to 
economise resources make the problem of ‘burden-sharing’ especially 
important. 
In practice, this means that the US will seek to build up ‘soft power’ 
(in Obama’s style) and opportunities for indirect influence, and will take a 
more flexible position on alliances. Washington will certainly try to 
strengthen its ties with Europe as its traditional and closest partner. 
Simultaneously, however, it will set its eyes on Asia, rightly believing that 
the ‘old world’ is losing its central position in the global system. The US 
may also place more emphasis on Africa and Latin America – partly 
because of Obama’s African roots, and partly because the role of these 
continents will keep growing, at least for demographic and resource 
reasons. 
Trans-Atlantic unity rests on the solid foundation of extensive 
economic ties, mutual investment, cultural and historical community, and 
traditional allied relations, which became particularly strong in the Cold 
War years. 
At the same time, the focus of Washington’s economic attention is 
gradually moving towards Asia, as has just been confirmed by the crisis, 
which has once again demonstrated how much the US and China depend 
on each other. As regards the ‘strategic horizons’ of the two shores of the 
Atlantic, they are diverging somewhat. America has not given up its global 
leadership ambitions and expects real support for its efforts from Europe. 
The old world is not ready to participate in Washington’s geopolitical 
                                                     
7 Barack Obama, “Renewing American Leadership”, Foreign Affairs, July/August 
2007 (http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070701faessay86401/barack-obama/ 
renewing-american-leadership.html). 
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projects around the globe. This unreadiness was evident in previous years, 
and the crisis will most likely only consolidate this approach. 
A possible loss in status of the privileged partner of the US would put 
Europe in an unusual position. On the one hand, the leading European 
nations have long wanted to move out from the US umbrella and play an 
independent role in world politics. On the other hand, Europeans have 
long been out of the habit of playing such a role; not a single EU country 
can play it on its own, whereas the EU as a whole is unable to work out a 
common policy due to its heterogeneity, even though this organisation has 
great potential. In addition, the US has enough levers to neutralise any 
attempts by the EU to get out of control, if ever they are made. 
By appealing to shared values and historical commonality with 
Europe, the United States is trying to involve the ‘old world’ in its efforts to 
strengthen its global positions, but there is a conceptual contradiction here. 
In remote regions (Central Eurasia, and South and East Asia), Europe is not 
ready to sacrifice its interests for the sake of its Atlantic ally. But as regards 
adjacent territories (the Middle East, North Africa, and part of the post-
Soviet space), which the European Union includes in the sphere of its 
immediate interests, the EU and the US often turn out to be soft 
competitors there. 
Many analysts say that the crisis may result in regionalisation and the 
consolidation of individual centres of gravity, around which zones of 
economic growth will be formed. Guy Verhofstadt writes about the 
emergence of political and economic entities 
potentially made up of many states and peoples, united by 
common structures and modern institutions, often nourished by 
diverse traditions and values and rooted in old and new 
civilizations… What matters is the political stability and economic 
growth that they can create at a regional level, not for one or other 
of them to rule the whole world. In a nutshell, this is not about 
nostalgia for a return to the European empires of old but rather the 
birth of new types of political organizations, established by open 
and free societies, competing with each other at a global level, 
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building bridges rather than walls, but each retaining its regional 
roots and customs.8 
Most likely, it will be impossible to avoid a surge of protectionism 
while overcoming the crisis,9 and markets will try to protect themselves. 
Therefore, the desire of each market for expansion is only natural. The most 
illustrative examples of this are the European Union and East and 
Southeast Asia, where China acts as the centre. Moscow, too, is now 
attracting visitors from neighbouring countries – it has turned out that 
there is no-one to ask for help except the former metropolitan country. 
Even ‘rebellious’ Kiev has asked for loans. 
The latter case is indicative. It would seem that the European Union 
and the US must support Ukraine, because the geopolitical alignment of 
forces in the entire post-Soviet space depends on Ukraine’s future. The 
crisis limits the ability of even large powers to provide financial aid. The 
International Monetary Fund’s reserve is not great (250 billion dollars), yet 
it can still be used. The IMF has always served as an instrument for 
strengthening American leadership, because it conditioned its assistance on 
compliance with recommendations of the Washington Consensus. 
But first, the founders of the Consensus themselves are now the main 
violators of these recommendations. Second, the economic and political 
position of Ukraine inspires no hope that Kiev will fulfil the terms set for it. 
One can now hear calls for flexibility in relation to principles: 
“Conditionality remains necessary over the long term, but with this crisis 
still unfolding, the IMF is rightly moving toward temporarily suspending 
                                                     
8 Guy Verhofstadt, “The Financial Crisis: Three Ways Out for Europe” 
(http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/bst/de/media/ 
xcms_bst_dms_26640_26641_2.pdf).  
9 The Buy American provision in a US economic stimulus bill, passed by the US 
House of Representatives on 13 February 2009, says: “None of the funds 
appropriated or otherwise made available by this Act may be used for a project for 
the construction, alteration, maintenance, or repair of a public building or public 
work unless all of the iron, steel, and manufactured goods used in the project are 
produced in the United States”, http://uk.reuters.com/article/economyNews/ 
idUKTRE51C4RG20090213. To read about the French government’s measures to 
support national carmakers see: http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
20601100&sid=aMyHAf8uV_n8&refer=germany  
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it.”10 However, this would make the structure on which the US-centric 
world was based – namely, a combination of ideological integrity, an 
attractive political image, and the ability to project military and economic 
strength – lose its rigidity and stability, especially now that lively 
discussions are being held in the world (albeit not backed by reality) about 
alternative development models. 
Of all great powers, the United States is the only one that in the 
coming decades will not be content with the status of a regional centre with 
its own sphere of influence. Europe, China, India, Russia, Brazil, Iran, 
South Africa, Japan and some other countries would be quite satisfied with 
such a status, (which does not mean that all the above-mentioned countries 
will be able to play such a role.) American hegemony is no longer possible. 
But the position of the only global force among many multi-sized regional 
forces may prove to be winning, although it would require sophisticated 
tactics. At the very least, this is a new situation. 
Russia – temptations and reality 
Russia is a natural centre of gravity for post-Soviet countries, because most 
of them are experiencing a severe economic decline and cannot count on 
support from other countries. Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Belarus and Ukraine 
have already asked Moscow for help, in one way or another, and they are 
likely to be followed by other neighbouring countries. All spending 
planned by Russia, including the allocation of 7.5 billion dollars to the Anti-
Crisis Fund of the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), has already 
exceeded 11 billion dollars. This sum does not look critical yet, compared to 
the remaining total reserves; however, the dynamics of both internal and 
external spending will limit the temptation to strengthen the country’s 
geopolitical positions. 
Changes in the global economic situation will certainly affect the 
substance of Russia’s foreign policy. Moscow will have to match its desires 
and expectations with its reduced capabilities and to build a system of 
clear-cut priorities. In particular, it will have to decide what geopolitical 
projects must be implemented, what projects are of minor importance, and 
                                                     
10 Roger C. Altman, “The Great Crash, 2008: A Geopolitical Setback for the West”, 
Foreign Affairs, January/February 2009 (http://www.foreignaffairs.org/ 
20090101faessay88101/roger-c-altman/the-great-crash-2008.html).  
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what projects can be given up. Obviously, Europe and Eurasia will remain 
Russia’s priority areas of interest in any situation, and the desire to play a 
leading role in international affairs will not disappear, even if the resources 
shrink, because this is in line with the aforementioned general tendency 
towards regionalisation. 
On the other hand, it is unlikely that last year’s ideas of consolidating 
Russian presence in the western hemisphere by establishing close ties with 
Venezuela, Cuba and Bolivia, will retain their priority. 
On the whole, the impact of the crisis on Russia’s foreign policy may 
have a dual nature. The need for investment in economic development will 
cause Russia to be more open in its relations with industrialised countries. 
At the same time, the aggravation of general competition, amidst growing 
protectionism and declining global governability, will increase the 
isolationist/anti-globalist sentiments that are already visible in Russian 
politics. 
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The Lessons for China 
Lanxin Xiang* 
China caught by surprise 
The financial crisis has caught the Chinese leadership by surprise. There are 
three reasons for the lack of psychological and policy preparation: first, 
over the years, the Chinese economy has become heavily reliant upon the 
export sector and an economic recession caused by the financial sector was 
not thought possible as long as consumer spending showed no sign of 
slowing down. The Washington Consensus created a bubble, but behind 
the bubble was real estate mortgage and subprime derivatives. China has 
little knowledge, let alone practice of this type of seemingly advanced 
financial market innovations in the United States. Hence, it was the 
backwardness of China’s banking system, and its failure to understand 
financial innovations, that saved China from falling deeply into the current 
crisis. 
Second, China has little knowledge and working experience in 
general of the Anglo-American monetary system, which has dominated the 
international financial scene since 1945. China was not part of the Bretton 
Woods system (for Taiwan had represented China in international 
organisations, including all UN institutions and the Security Council seat 
till 1971) until it collapsed in the 1970s. China hardly participated in any 
international financial cooperation and policy activities. After the Nixon 
Shock in 1972 when a floating exchange rate became a reality, the Chinese 
monetary system was not affected at all as long as the RMB was not 
convertible and trade volume was exceedingly small.  
Third, the current Chinese exchange rate regime was created during 
the 1997 financial crisis when its currency started pegging to the US dollar, 
but now the RMB is no longer immune from turbulences of the 
international financial system not only because of China’s holding of the 
largest dollar debt, but also because its heavy investment after the ‘Going-
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Out Strategy’ was launched at the beginning of the new century, especially 
in Latin America and Africa. 
The lessons from the 1997 financial crisis do not apply 
First, exchange rate pegging no longer works in coping with a sinking 
banking system in the West. China played a critical and responsible role 
during the 1997 financial crisis in East Asia, by holding its currency 
exchange rates steady to avoid competitive devaluations in the badly hit 
region. Since then, China thought that another financial crisis might come 
China’s way, but would not impact directly on China as it did during 1997. 
But such a judgement has proved wrong and the magic policy of exchange 
rate pegging has now become a liability rather than asset, since the fair 
trade issue is framed precisely in terms of currency manipulation, even 
though such a manipulation was not initially intended during the 1997 
crisis.  
Second is the danger of the ‘new weapons of mass destruction’. The 
G2 structure, or US-China condominium, publicised by Niall Ferguson as 
“Chimerica” does not necessarily serve China’s national interest well. In 
the past three years, the China-US Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) has 
become important for the world's two most powerful countries, the United 
States and the People’s Republic of China, to discuss mutually related 
topics and try to avoid many misunderstandings. The SED was initiated in 
2006 by President George W. Bush and President Hu Jintao. The format is 
such that top officials in charge of the economies of both countries would 
meet twice a year at locations alternating between China and the US. It has 
been described by a former US Treasury official as “sort of like the G2”. The 
Obama Administration decided to end such a dialogue, but at the same 
time elevates G2 to the level of summit meetings.  
What the true objective is on the part of Washington remains to be 
seen, but one thing is certain: the US needs China’s help to overcome the 
domestic economic downturn. More specifically, the US definitely wants to 
reduce trade deficits and at the same time secure financial resources when 
expanding domestic spending through its huge stimulus plans. Since 
double deficits (trade and fiscal) have been a rather common practice in US 
history since the 1970s, the only way of pursuing this twin objective is to 
manipulate the international monetary system by printing money and 
attracting foreign buyers to increase or at least not decrease dollar holdings. 
This is what might be called ‘indirect imperial tax’ as compared with the 
direct tax levied by the Roman legions in ancient history. The friction 
240 | READINGS IN EUROPEAN SECURITY 
between China and the US is therefore inevitable, as the US clearly aims to 
export ‘toxic assets’ to China through whatever means available and as 
Thomas Friedman said, by using toxic assets as the new weapon of 
mutually assured destruction, China will have no escape.  
The export-led model and the need for fundamental review  
Great trade dependency has now become China’s Achilles heel. China is 
the third largest economy in the world, China’s foreign trade dependency, 
defined as a country’s export-GDP ratio and share in total world exports, 
has increased considerably over the last two decades. In 1978, China’s 
exports constituted a mere 5% of its GDP; by 1998 that figure topped 20%. 
The country in 2006 registered an unwholesome trade-to-GDP ratio of 69%. 
In many cases the economies of large countries tend to have lower degrees 
of trade dependency because of large domestic production and 
consumption. But China’s trade dependency is already higher than that of 
the United States, Japan, India and Brazil, and a greater degree of trade 
dependency would result in an exodus of resources because of worsening 
trade terms. China now claims to be the world’s largest workshop. What 
needs to be understood is that China produces primarily for the 
international market rather than the domestic market. Export 
overproduction cannot be easily absorbed by the internal market.  
In fact, China’s greatest weakness in economic development is its 
foreign dependency. Under the so-called East Asian development model, 
foreign funds and foreign economic relations are based on the economic 
theory of ‘comparative advantage’. According to this theory, a developing 
nation must export goods it can produce cheaper than other nations and 
import goods where it is at a disadvantage. Only in this way can it 
maximise the efficiency of the international division of labour and use it to 
the benefit of its own economic development. Because of its large economic 
and population scales, China’s growth momentum and excessive 
dependence on international markets is unparalleled in the economic 
history of the world. Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong have 
small-scale economies, so it is relatively easy for them to catch up with the 
world’s advanced standard of living. Some large economies, such as that of 
the US, also evolved from secondary developed nations into leading 
trading nations. But the US has a relatively stable domestic market with a 
relatively constant market demand. On the other hand, given the low 
wages of China's labourers, the purchasing power has remained low and 
consumption demand has not been able to meet the manufacturing supply.  
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For two reasons, the comparative advantage model cannot be 
successful in China. On the one hand, China's single-minded pursuit of 
comparative advantage leads to over-production in some industries and, as 
a result, the goods it produces become too cheap. On the other hand, China 
does not have a mature domestic market to create the demand to sustain its 
economy. China’s goods must therefore be sold in overseas markets. 
China’s imports and exports represent such an immense share of world 
trade that its prices distort the world market. It should be noted that China 
has concentrated its import and export trade to a few countries and regions, 
namely the US, Japan, and the EU. These three account for around 50% of 
its total trade volume. So, any goods that China injects into these three 
markets will create pressure on local producers.  
As the communist leaders begin to consider downgrading 
manufacturing growth and export-led development strategy, the 
traditional measures based on GDP growth will become less emphasised. A 
Keynesian recipe will perhaps work better for China, given the fact that 
China badly needs to create a serious social welfare and health care system 
and revamp its entire education system. On the other hand, the long 
suppressed domestic consumer spending could be greatly stimulated if 
social welfare, health care and education savings in most households could 
be released and directed towards housing and other consumer spending.  
China and the reform of the current international financial system 
The first priority for China before any meaningful reform is attempted 
should be a break away from dollar hegemony. 
China must cooperate with those who are willing to initiate serious 
reform of the international financial system. The Bretton Woods institutions 
are outdated. But there is no consensus as to what the international 
community could do next to reform the system.  
In breaking away from dollar hegemony, China has to regain real 
sovereignty in its central banking, because in a world order of sovereign 
nation states, the supranational nature of central banking has been used as 
an all-controlling device for the world's rich nations to neutralise the 
sovereign rights of financially weak nations. Even in a democratic world 
order, central banking is inoperative within national borders, as it can be 
used by a nation’s rich population as a device to deprive the working poor 
of their economic rights. Central banking, including the state-run system in 
China, has so far supported dollar hegemony, and operates, more often 
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than not, internationally against the economic interests of sovereign nation 
states and domestically against the economic rights of the working poor by 
discrediting enlightened economic nationalism. 
To preserve dollar hegemony, exporting economies that accumulate 
large dollar reserves through trade surpluses are forced by the US to 
revalue their currencies upward, not to redress the trade imbalance, (which 
is the result of dysfunctional terms of trade rather than inoperative 
exchange rates), but to reduce the value, in foreign local currency terms, of 
US debt assumed at previously stronger dollar exchange rates.  
China is therefore stuck in a double dysfunctionality. The fall in 
exports is expected to accelerate as any quick or sharp recovery in the US 
economy is not on the horizon. But a falling exchange rate causes more 
domestic inflation from imports denominated in dollars; and rising 
domestic inflation adds pressure to a falling exchange rate in a downward 
spiral, preventing the yuan from rising against the dollar from market 
forces. That is the dysfunctionality of the yuan-dollar exchange rate regime 
in relation to the inflation rate differentials between the two economies, 
when the exchange rate is set by trade imbalance denominated in dollars. 
This problem is caused by the flawed attempt to use exchange rates to 
compensate for dysfunctional terms of trade, which has been mostly caused 
by wage disparity.  
Conclusion: Back to Keynes? 
In conclusion, China must reduce its foreign trade dependency ratio and 
drastically expand the domestic trade market. It must also reduce dollar 
debt holdings and encourage the euro to become a leading international, 
alternative reserve currency. Keynes had three beliefs that are still valid for 
China. First, he argued vehemently against over reliance on foreign trade, 
since no-one can predict market behaviour in the ‘long run’, no 
government can guarantee full employment. Second, he preferred a fixed 
international exchange rate system. If this cannot be realised, international 
cooperation is absolutely necessary to avoid currency wars. Third, 
accumulating foreign exchange reserve is not for hoarding but for spending 
and investment.  
The current Chinese policy of defending an 8% growth rate in 2009 is 
based on a flawed concept, as if China could spend itself out of its 
international dependency. There is no ‘scientific’ foundation for this 
growth rate. The only justification is China’s domestic political economy, as 
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8% is considered the bottom-line for preventing mass unemployment, 
which will destabilise its internal system. By publicly announcing this 
target, China will become even more vulnerable since international 
competitors could thus make policies aimed at either blackmailing China to 
make trade or monetary concessions, or simply undermining China’s 
chance of success. 
For the purpose of collaborating with the EU to overcome the current 
financial crisis, China has a vital stake in the EU’s success in passing the 
Lisbon Treaty and starting a serious CSFP. Despite current setbacks 
between China and its erstwhile best friend in Europe, France, the relations 
with other major EU players are dramatically improving. The new Sino-UK 
relationship is a good start, which is described by both London and Beijing 
as the ‘best’, especially in view of the UK’s position of officially recognising 
China’s sovereignty over Tibet. The recent publication of the British 
document: “The Framework of Engagement with China” marked a new 
beginning. This is after all the first British document regarding its strategies 
towards a particular country in modern times. Whether or not other 
countries in the EU could seize the same opportunity to elevate bilateral 
relations, remains to be seen. 
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The Social Consequences 
of the Economic Crisis 
Jørgen Mortensen* 
Drivers of globalisation will weaken  
This working paper draws on an earlier study on the drivers of 
globalisation,1 and considers how the current crisis may affect these trends. 
The discussion will follow the structure of Figure 1, below. Although the 
degree of weakening of the drivers of globalisation will only become clear 
as the depression unfolds, several of these drivers are set to slow down or 
be reversed.  
• Trade liberalisation is already taking several blows as a result of the 
emergence of certain measures to save ‘domestic’ financial 
institutions protect the automobile industry and certain sub-
contracting branches.  
• EU enlargement and the process of integration would seem unlikely 
to slow down much but should certainly not be expected to accelerate 
except in one important area: the possible creation of an EU financial 
watchdog or an extension of the competences of the ECB with respect 
to financial surveillance and regulation.  
• The costs and techniques of transportation may not be directly 
influenced by the financial crisis but in the short and medium term 
appear likely to be substantially reduced as a result of the lowering of 
demand and the present low oil prices. A number of cargo ships are 
already being laid up and more seem likely to follow. This will of 
course have severe knock-on effects on the shipyards.  
• The liberalisation of capital movements and financial markets will no 
doubt slow down or be reversed as a result of the ongoing 
nationalisation of banks and other financial institutions, more intense 
scrutiny of many transactions and the enforcement of regulatory 
surveillance.  
                                                     
* Associate Senior Research Fellow, CEPS. 
1 I. Begg, J. Draxler and J. Mortensen (2008), Study of the Social Impact of Globalisation 
in the European Union, SIMGLOBE Special Report, CEPS, Brussels, April. 
THE STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS | 245 
• The role of ICT and the internet as drivers of globalisation should not, 
it seems, be expected to weaken. In fact, a more active supervision of 
financial institutions and transactions would probably be facilitated 
by the internet. However, the internet and the expansion of mobile 
phones and the increasing scope for financial transactions via the 
latter will also promote the globalisation of terrorism and the drug 
trade.  
• Migration policy and frontier control may on the whole become more 
restrictive both in the short and the medium term. However, as the 
incentives to migrate from poor to rich countries would seem likely to 
strengthen, the main effect of the depression will be a rise in illegal 
migration.  
• The role and weight of multinationals in the world economy may not 
change significantly. However, an important question is whether the 
financial crisis and its economic consequences will bring about 
changes in international economic and financial governance. There 
would at present seem to be a certain movement in favour of 
assigning additional responsibility in the field of financial 
surveillance to the IMF and, within the EU, to the ECB. The 
nationalisation of parts of the financial services in several OECD 
countries will also result in a deeper involvement of governments in 
the running of key financial institutions and the financial crisis will 
per se result in changes in the perceptions and handling of financial 
risks.  
The process of globalisation may slow down  
The direction and size of trade flows and maritime and inland transport 
have already weakened significantly and we cannot exclude more 
permanent repercussions for the structure, direction and level of trade 
flows and their associated transport services. Furthermore, there are good 
reasons to expect the financial crisis to have severe consequences for capital 
movements. In general the whole process of globalisation is therefore likely 
to slow down and possibly even be temporarily reversed.  
• The direction, structure and size of trade flows have already been 
significantly influenced by the depression, but whether these changes 
are just temporary or of a more lasting nature remains to be seen. The 
principal factors having determined trade flows over the recent 
decades would seem likely to remain in force, with, however, the 
possibility that the liberalisation of trade may slow down or even be 
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reversed at least for some ‘sensitive’ products, such as automobiles or 
steel. It may also become more difficult to continue the liberalisation 
of world trade.  
• The outsourcing and insourcing of production, which has been part 
and parcel of globalisation during the last couple of decades is likely 
to slow down in response to new perceptions of risk and uncertainty.  
• Whether migration will slow down as a result of the crisis remains to 
be seen. On one hand there are signs that a number of the most 
developed countries are taking steps to tighten rules or to adopt more 
selective policies for admitting economic migrants. Furthermore, at 
least in the short run there seems to be a tendency for migrant 
workers in Ireland and the UK to return to their home countries. On 
the other hand the crisis and the depression are now extending more 
broadly to the developing countries and the fundamental incentives 
to migration would seem unlikely to weaken, rather the contrary.  
• The structure of trade in services could change as a result of a 
considerable slowdown in the size and pattern of capital movements 
but also as a result of a possible slowdown in maritime transport and 
aviation, etc.  
• A huge increase in capital movements has been one of the dominant 
features of globalisation since 1990 and there are good reasons to 
suppose that the size and flows of capital will be profoundly 
influenced by the financial crisis and associated depression. Net 
inflows of private capital, according to The Economist’s special 
feature on Globalisation (Feb. 7th), have fallen to a fraction of the 2007 
level. The perception of risks and uncertainties has been durably 
changed and the scope for the play of financial innovation severely 
reduced. Already investors and sovereign wealth funds have 
expressed increasing preference for government bonds and other 
instruments considered ‘safe’ but also an increasing tendency for 
spreads in favour of ‘prudent’ governments’ bonds to increase.  
• While there is little doubt that the financial crisis and the decline in 
financial and non-financial activity will lead to a narrowing of the tax 
base in a number of countries, this would not necessarily lead to a 
more permanent change in the location of activity, with, of course, the 
exception of a general lowering of the tax base in the branches most 
directly involved in the financial crisis and the slowdown of activity, 
such as, notably, financial services and building and construction. 
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Consequently, countries that have depended strongly on these 
branches may see a more permanent narrowing of their tax base.  
Social consequences  
The social consequences of the financial crisis and depression will not be 
uniformly and linearly dependent on the decline in activity. They will to a 
large extent depend on the basic features of the system of social protection 
and the capacity of the economy to avoid poverty traps and hysteresis.  
• As the depression is largely caused by the sudden and dramatic 
drying up of the flow of credit, regions and branches that have 
benefitted most markedly from the enormous rise in credit and the 
decline in household saving in some countries will be the first to 
suffer. Whether this can be expected to lead to an increase or, on the 
contrary, to a lowering of regional disparities can hardly be 
determined without an in-depth study of the regional patterns of 
growth in the different countries.  
• The rise in income disparities since 1990 has probably only to a minor 
extent been caused by the explosion of financial services and credit 
and more to such fundamental factors as the increasing importance of 
knowledge and investment in education and human capital as the 
key determinants of life cycle income. Similarly, the failure of EU 
member states and other countries to reduce poverty rates cannot be 
assumed to have been caused by the expansion of credit and may 
therefore not be much influenced (in relative terms) by the 
depression. This, however, is a subject that merits deeper analysis.  
• On the other hand there is no doubt that the rise in employment in a 
number of countries such as, the US, Spain, Ireland and the UK 
during the last couple of decades owes a lot to the boost in easy credit 
and therefore has been on an unsustainable path. The depression will 
therefore most likely lead not only to an increase in unemployment 
but also be followed by structural changes in employment.  
• The failure of many countries to make progress with respect to social 
inclusion, and this despite declared objectives and policies, would not 
seem to have been caused mainly by the process of globalisation. 
However, in countries with a high degree of segmentation and 
fragmentation of the labour market (for example France and Italy) the 
ongoing decline in activity and the resulting rise in unemployment 
may lead to a new process of hysteresis (permanent exclusion from 
employment of the ‘outsiders’) and thus a significant weakening of 
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the process of inclusion. Countries with a higher degree of mobility 
and flexibility in the labour market will also suffer a rise in 
unemployment but can be expected to recover more rapidly and 
without severe long-term consequences for the process of inclusion.  
Social policy recommendations  
The policy recommendations presented in the study on the social 
consequences of globalisation remain valid and in some countries the 
depression should in fact lead to a more rapid implementation of policies to 
promote flexibility and adaptability.  
• In a number of countries the labour market position of low-skilled 
groups is likely to be significantly aggravated by the depression and 
the need for a strengthening of education and training is even more 
pressing than before the emergence of the financial crisis.  
• Whereas the depression is leading to increasing public resistance to 
immigration and, in some countries, to a return of migrants to their 
home country, the need for measures to foster the integration of 
(accepted) immigrants would not in any way be reduced by the 
depression. The decline in activity and increase in unemployment, 
including unemployment among immigrants, will, if not met by 
policies to foster integration, result in new social tensions and the 
additional fragmentation of labour markets between insiders and 
outsiders.  
• More generally, the need for enhancing labour market adaptability 
and flexibility will be even more urgent than before. The association 
of the financial crisis and depression will not only lead to a rise in 
unemployment but the recovery, once it is underway, will most 
probably involve structural changes and the relocation of activities 
and employment. Consequently governments would be well-advised 
to initiate new policies promoting adaptability.  
• The likely acceleration of structural changes (including the 
strengthening of climate change mitigation and environmental 
protection) will require the additional adaptability of individuals so 
there is an added need to reshape social protection and enhance the 
empowerment and human capital endowment of individuals.  
• Consequently the need to find new ways of managing social and 
individual risk is in no way reduced but actually becoming more 
urgent by the day.  
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Figure 1. Schematic overview of the process of globalisation 
 
 250 | 
ABOUT THE CHAIRMAN AND THE EDITOR 
François Heisbourg was successively First Secretary at the French 
Permanent Mission to the UN, dealing with international security and 
disarmament issues (1979–81); an international security adviser to the 
French Minister of Defence; a founding member of the French–German 
Commission on Security and Defence (1981–84); Vice-President at 
Thomson–CSF, in charge of European and Euro-American cooperation 
(1984–87); Director of the IISS (1987–92); and Senior Vice-President 
(Strategic Development), MATRA–Défense-Espace (1992–98). Currently, he 
is a Senior Adviser to the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique in Paris 
and Chairman of the Foundation Council of the Geneva Centre for Security 
Policy as well as Chairman of the Council of the IISS (since 2001). François 
Heisbourg is the author of numerous articles and interviews in the 
academic and general media. Among other works, he has authored and 
edited European Defence: Making it Work, WEU Policy for Security Studies, 
Paris (2000) and Hyperterrorisme: la nouvellle guerre, Editions Odile Jacob 
(2001).  
Michael Emerson is a Senior Research Fellow at the CEPS. A graduate of 
Balliol College, Oxford, he began his career as an economist at the OECD in 
Paris (1966–73). In 1973, he moved to the European Commission, where 
inter alia he was economic adviser to the president during 1977 and 1978. 
He there led a series of research projects on European integration, 
including The Role of Public Finance in European Integration (EEC 
Commission, 1977), The Economics of 1992 (Oxford, 1988) and One Market, 
One Money (Oxford, 1990). From 1991 to 1996 he was the first ambassador 
of the European Commission to the former USSR and then to Russia. In 
1996, he became a Senior Research Fellow at the London School of 
Economics, where he prepared Redrawing the Map of Europe (Macmillan, 
1998). In 1998, he joined CEPS, and has since been responsible with co-
authors for many books, including The CEPS Plan for the Balkans (1999), The 
Rubik Cube of the Wider Middle East (2003), The Wider Europe Matrix (2004), 
The Elephant and the Bear Try Again: Options for a New Agreement between the 
EU and Russia (ed.) (2006), and Synergies vs. Spheres of Influence in the Pan-
European Space (2009). 
 | 251 
CONTRIBUTORS TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY FORUM 
2000-2009 
Gordon Adams, George Washington University, Washington, D.C. 
Dana Allin, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London 
Samir Amghar, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris 
Alexei Arbatov, State Duma, Moscow 
Nadia Arbatova, Russia in the United Europe Committee, Moscow 
Huseyin Bagci, Middle East Technical University, Ankara 
Vladimir Baranovsky, Institute of World Economy & International 
Relations, Moscow 
Henri Barkey, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania 
Klaus Becher, Knowledge and Analysis LLP, London 
Peter Bergen, New America Foundation, Washington, D.C. 
Didier Bigo, Institut d’Etudes Politiques, Paris 
Carl Bildt, (currently) Foreign Minister, Stockholm 
Alexander Bogomolov, Maidan Alliance, Kyiv 
Timofei Bordachev, Institute of Europe, Moscow 
Amel Boubekeur, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels 
Peter Brookes, Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C. 
Janusz Bugajski,  New European Democracies, Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS), Washington, D.C. 
Partick Clawson, Washington Institute for Near East Policy,  
Washington, D.C. 
Bruno Coppieters, Vrije Universiteit Brussel 
Ivo Daalder, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. 
Dmitry Danilov, Institute of Europe, Moscow 
Marta Dassu, Aspen Institute Italia, Rome 
Alain Dieckhoff, Centre for International Studies and Research/Centre 
National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris 
Edward Djerejian, James Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, 
Houston 
252 | READINGS IN EUROPEAN SECURITY 
Christian Egenhofer, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels 
Michael Emerson, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels 
Andrei Federov, Council for Foreign and Defence Policy, Moscow 
Jeffrey Gedmin, Aspen Institute, Berlin 
Nicole Gnesotto, EU Institute for Strategic Studies, Paris 
David Gompert, Rand Corporation Europe, Cambridge, UK 
Charles Grant, Centre for European Reform, London 
Leonid Grigoriev, Institute of Energy and Finance, Moscow 
Daniel Gros, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels. 
Daniel Hamilton, Center for Transatlantic Relations at the Paul H. Nitze 
School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) 
François Heisbourg, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris 
Rosemary Hollis, Chatham House, London 
Marc Houben, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels 
Robert Kagan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,  
Washington, D.C.  
Saban Kardas, Middle East Technical University, Ankara 
Hekmat Karzai, Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, Kabul 
Ismail Khan, Dawn Newspaper, Peshawar 
Irina Kobrinskaya, Institute of World Economy & International  
Relations, Moscow 
Viktor Kremenyuk, Institute of the US and Canada, Moscow 
Radha Kumar,  Mandela Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution  
Stephen Larrabee, Rand Corporation, Washington, D.C. 
Julian Lindley-French, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom 
Fyodor Lukyanov, Russia in Global Affairs journal, Moscow 
Andrey S. Makarychev, Nizhny Novgorod Linguistic University 
Alexei Malashenko, Carnegie Center, Moscow 
Roberto Menotti, Aspen Institute Italia, Rome 
Jørgen Mortensen, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels 
Arkady Moshes, Finnish Institute for International Relations, Helsinki 
Vitaly Naumkin, Centre for Strategic Research and International  
Studies, Moscow 
CONTRIBUTORS TO THE FIRST SIX YEARS OF THE  ESF | 253 
Vitaly Naumkin,  Centre for Strategic and Political Studies, Moscow  
Alexander Nikitin, Centre for Political and International Studies, Moscow 
Alexander Pikayev, Institute of World Economy and International 
Relations, Moscow 
Alexander Pikayev,  Institute of World Economy and International 
Relations (IMEMO), Moscow 
Tomas Ries, National Defence College, Helsinki 
Eugene Rumer, National Defence University, Washington, D.C. 
Jacques Rupnik, Centre d’Etudes et de Recherche Internationales, Paris 
Vladimir Orlov, Centre for Policy Studies, Moscow 
Natalia Oultchenko, Institute for Afro-Asian Studies, Moscow  
State University 
Bruce Riedel, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution, 
Washington, D.C. 
Alan Riley, City University, London 
Gary Samore, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London 
Vladimir Sazhin, Institute of the Orient, Moscow 
Kori Schake, National Defence University, Washington, D.C. 
Burkard Schmitt, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris 
Daniel Serwer, US Institute for Peace, Washington, D.C. 
Brad Setser,  Council for Foreign Relations, New York 
Jeremy Shapiro, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. 
James Sherr, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom 
Boris Shmelev, Institute for International and Political Studies, Moscow 
Walter Slocombe, former US Undersecretary of Defence, Washington, D.C. 
Vladimir Socor, Jamestown Foundation, Washington, D.C. 
Stephan de Spiegeleire, Rand Corporation Europe, Cambridge, UK 
Angela Stent, Georgetown School of Foreign Service, Washington, D.C. 
Michael Stromer, Die Welt, Berlin 
Bruno Tertrais, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris 
Oliver Thränert,  German Institute of International Security Affairs (SWP), 
Berlin 
Nathalie Tocci, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome 
254 | READINGS IN EUROPEAN SECURITY 
Dmitri Trenin, Carnegie Centre, Moscow 
Dmitri Trenin, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 
D.C. 
Alexei Voskressenski, MGIMO-University, Moscow 
Alexei D. Voskressenski, University of Manchester, UK 
Nicholas Whyte, International Crisis Group, Brussels 
Rob de Wijk, Clingendael Institute, The Hague 
Brantly Womack, University of Virginia, USA 
Lanxin Xiang, Graduate Institute of International Studies (HEI), Geneva 
Richard Youngs, FRIDE, Madrid 
Andrei Zagorski, MGIMO-University, Moscow 
Irina Zvyagelskaya, Institute of Oriental Studies, Moscow 
